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ABSTRACT 
This study explores how the Turkish film, Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, reflects the 
geopolitical imaginations of the Turkish people and how this political-action film is 
interpreted by different individuals in the post-9/11 world. To do this, I investigated 
three sites of the film: production includes film-making process and geopolitical 
conditions in which the film took shape; text, wherein geopolitical discourses are 
embedded, and; consumption, through which audiences make their meaning. I utilized a 
mixed-method approach, including interviews with one of the scriptwriters of the film 
and the Mavi Marmara activists, seven audience focus group discussions, analysis of 
online comments, and an online survey. The collected data, in general, showed that 
Turkish audiences’ reading of the film is diverse, but some commonalities were found.  
This study suggests that Turkish audiences had pre-conceived notions about Israel and 
its policies toward Palestinians before they had seen the film. In this respect, the film 
did not particularly affect people’s opinions about Israel, but it served as a conduit to 
have their voice be heard. Turkish audiences acknowledged the importance of 
publicizing the human drama in Palestine and valued the indispensability of bringing it 
to the attention of international movie audiences.  In particular, this study argues that 
the film, and consumption of the film, is as much about understanding the Palestinian 
struggle as it is about re-presenting and re-orienting Turkey and its geopolitical position 
in the Middle East.   
Finally, this study highlights that ‘negotiated’, ‘oppositional’, and ‘dominant’ 
readership was also present in the meaning-making of the film. Some Turkish audiences 
xvi 
 
understand that the film is a cinematic challenge to Israel’s Middle Eastern policies, 
while some see the film as an ethno-religious narrative operating within the limits of 
political economy and agenda setting. Also, a large number of people indicate that they 
understand the essence of the message in the film, which is to visualize the Palestinian 
drama, but they oppose the ways in which the message is represented.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
- He who thinks about his end cannot be a hero 
(Polat Alemdar, Valley of the Wolves) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In the twentieth century, influential continental philosophers (Swiss linguist Ferdinand 
de Saussure, French social theorists Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault) widened 
critical thinking in the conventional investigation of the genealogy of ‘Truth’. 
Conventional (partially positivist) paradigms sought to reach grand and generalizable 
explanations for making a complex world more understandable and manageable.  The 
purpose of this academic effort, which today is very deeply entrenched within western 
academic culture, was to formulate and codify the chaotic world (Wylie 2009). 
Assumptions such as establishing grand truths, making natural observations, and 
providing essentialist explanations (which dominated minds and methodologies of the 
conventional scholars) were viewed by the emerging continental scholars in a 
suspicious manner. Thinkers in this postmodern school of thought (they never claimed 
to be postmodern thinkers) mainly emphasized the disorderliness of modernity, the 
fluidity of space and the indeterminacy of grand theorizations which were embedded in 
every aspect of social, economic, and political life.  These scholars came to be labeled 
as post-structuralists, whose intentions were to question the way in which social science 
dealt with social problems,   spatiality, power, and knowledge production of/for 
academia (Popke 2003).  This unorthodox way of conceptualizing social science greatly 
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influenced human geographers, particularly critical geographers. Critical, as used here, 
refers to the adaptation of a self-reflective perspective, conscious of the social and 
discursive nature of any research practice and acknowledging that the production of 
knowledge is someway related to a network of power relations (Ang 1996, p. 36). 
Scholars in this vein began revisiting relations between space, power, and knowledge 
and the way in which they are produced and reproduced (Harley 2001). Parallel to this 
mutual influence, several political geographers of the 1990s adopted post-structuralist 
approaches to reconceptualize and deconstruct discursive components of politics and 
geography by drawing from post-structuralist thought (Toal 1994).  Besides the 
subjectivity of space and place, language as a discourse became a critical focus of 
geographical study in its role as the conveyer of meaning-making and communication 
within the socio-political realities of everyday discourses, specifically languages’ role in 
the way in which the world is signified, represented and reimagined.  
As I note throughout this dissertation, films form an everyday image-based 
language that can provide better ways of framing a radically-changing geopolitical 
world (Power and Cramton 2005). Even the most complicated and problematic issues of 
socio-political life can be expressed smoothly through cinematic narrations and artistic 
forms. Under the circumstances, cinema’s indisputable ability to present events and 
social subjects in a compelling, and even propagandist, manner charms politicians and 
world states. Cinema, for that reason, has been and continues to be the concern of states 
and policy makers. Along these lines,  Strada and Troper argues that “American foreign 
policy and film… track each other through time as compulsively as symmetrical 
sundials” (as cited in Power and Cramton 2005, p. 1). It is not surprising that following 
3 
 
the terrorist attack of September 11, Hollywood executives and White House advisors 
came together to establish a cinematic strategy to address the US’s internationally 
declining image. Indeed, the connection the Pentagon has with the film industry is not 
new. In the late 1920s, the U.S. War Department created an office to act as a bridge 
between Hollywood and the Army (Greenwell 2006). The relationships between these 
two parties changes over time but it never withers away. In fact, after 9/11, this 
partnership became denser and more visible. Greenwell reports that “at the Pentagon’s 
request meetings were set up between military officials and 30 Hollywood ‘creatives’ 
chosen at random who signed confidentiality agreements” (Greenwell 2006, Operation 
Hollywood section, ¶ 14). Scholars have studied these links, the work perhaps best 
exemplifies by Power and Crampton (2005). Their book, Cinema and Popular Geo-
Politics, draws attention to the connections between cinema and international politics. 
Contributors from various disciplines interrogate how films work to crystallize   states’ 
international identities. For example, Power and Crampton argued that Hollywood films 
provide handy maps through which Americans imagine/position themselves in an 
uncertain geopolitical world. They note that “important questions can be raised about 
the ways in which geopolitical imaginations are expressed through film and about how 
different ‘threats’ and ‘dangers’ are constructed through various Hollywood narratives” 
(Power and Cramton 2005, p. 2). They continue, arguing films “reflect in various ways 
on common themes of national identity, gender and the construction of masculinity and 
ethnicity through film and seek to explore the importance of borders, boundaries to 
cinematic narratives” (Power and Cramton 2005, p. 2).  
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By looking at what films have been produced from 2002 onward in Turkey, 
these segments of theme can be seen: history and the present, ordinary people, 
superman, the ethics of globalization, and nationalistic (mafia, soldiers, police, and 
supermen) movies (Bayraktar 2009) not to mention everlasting television serials. As in 
the example of Valley of the Wolves cinema products, nationalism, heroic sacrifice, 
combating with ‘deep state’1 and missionary groups’ dark organizations occupy much 
of the cinematic imagination. More noticeably (and will be explained in the following 
chapters), recent Turkish cinema (and TV serials) emphasizes three important 
developments. First, Turkish cinema has successfully expanded its subject matter to 
international topics in cases such as Valley of the Wolves-Iraq (2006). Second, Turkish 
cinema has enlarged the geography of its audienceship, especially when Turkish cinema 
adopted Hollywood production techniques and digital editing (Ozkaracalar 2009), 
giving weight to quality and authenticity. Today, Turkish cinema and TV serials 
entertain and are viewed by millions of people in audiences from Arab countries to the 
Balkans. Since 2006, a total of 68 serials, films, and documentaries have been sold to 
the Arab countries; in turn, Turkish producers collected approximately 30 million 
dollars (Vatan 2010). Thirdly, Turkish cinema greatly enjoyed diasporic  directors’ new 
approaches to Turkish cinema, particularly German-Turkish director Fatih Akin 
(Bayraktar 2009). Akin’s hybrid identity and cinematic skill unquestionably enriched 
Turkish cinema and made Turkish films more international than ever. Taking into 
account these aspects of new Turkish cinema, the need to investigate Turkish films and 
                                                          
1
 Generally the notion of ‘deep state’ refers to a state within the state, composed of high-level elements of 
state officials and non-state actors. The main goal of this illegal organization is to protect the state from 
internal and/or external attacks. For example, unsolved murders of the 1990s in the eastern part of Turkey 
are thought to have something to do with the ‘deep state’.  
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their representations of nationalist themes is indisputable due to their enhanced 
importance in the film industry.   
1.2 Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
The political-action film VWP was released in Turkey and abroad by Pana Film 
Company in January, 2011
2
.  Following the popular television series and cinema films 
which all carried similar names, Valley of the Wolves (Kurtlar Vadisi) (2003-2005), 
Valley of the Wolves-Ambush (2007-Present) the political-action films Valley of the 
Wolves-Iraq (2006), Valley of the Wolves-Gladio (2009) and now Valley of the Wolves-
Palestine (2011) becomes part of a collection of James Bond type cinema serials.  Pana 
Film owes its success to the television series Valley of the Wolves whose broadcast 
began in January 2003 and continues currently with different names and on different 
nationwide TV channels (see Table 1.1).  
Table 1-1: Valley of the Wolves film and TV series products 
Television Series Year Films Year 
Valley of the Wolves 2003-05 Valley of the 
Wolves-Iraq 
2006 
Valley of the Wolves-Terror 2007 Valley of the 
Wolves-Gladio 
2009 
Valley of the Wolves-Ambush 2007-Present Valley of the 
Wolves-
Palestine 
2011 
 
                                                          
2
 Other countries: USA, England, Italy, Iran, France, Germany, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, 
Bosnia, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, China, Denmark, Armenia, South Korea, Croatia, Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, Cyprus (Greek), Cyprus (Turkish), Hungary, Macedonia, Norway, 
Portugal, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine, Greece (Source: imdb.com).  
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 The television series (Valley of the Wolves) and the films familiarized audiences 
with many values such as honor, duty, bravery, and love of country before any other 
concepts or messages (Yanik 2009).  These cultural products similarly dealt with and 
engaged in domestic and international conspiracy theories and heroic sacrifice, heavily 
ornamented with nationalism, traditionalism and justified killing (Işık 2006, Demir 
2007, Yanik 2009, Anaz and Purcell 2010). The producers of the Valley of the Wolves 
set their storylines in the day-to-day subjects of Turkish life such as fighting against the 
dark organization of the ‘deep state’, corrupt financial entities and external enemies’ 
designs on Turkey and the region (Gültekin 2006).  Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, for 
example, brought the Iraq war into the cinematic reality in the same way. The film 
bases its narration on a series of events that allegedly took place in Afghanistan and Iraq 
from 2001 and 2006. The plots include: the ‘Hooding Event’ of 4 July 2003, Abu 
Ghraib prisoner abuse, American soldiers’ random shootings during a Muslim wedding 
and shootings into a shipping container carrying civilian prisoners in Afghanistan, and a 
Jewish doctor’s harvesting organs for international buyers (Anaz and Purcell 2010).  
This film challenges American and British hegemony in Iraq and Afghanistan
3
 and 
produces a counter-geopolitical argument against what is known as American realist 
geopolitics that is mainly tied to the control of geostrategic resources and framing the 
world politics in a binary sense such as ‘good versus bad’.  
                                                          
3
 Although Afghanistan is officially controlled by NATO, the film makers pay no attention to this nuance. 
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Figure 1-1: Actor (Necati Şaşmaz) who portrays the protagonist 
(Polat Alemdar), shaking the hands of Turkey’s Prime Minister and 
the leader of AKP. 
Source: Sabah, daily newspaper, January 16, 2011 
 
Even though making another film similar to Valley of the Wolves-Iraq was 
considered by Pana Film immediately after its release in 2006, the idea failed to take 
shape until the Israel-Palestine issue became a critical issue for the ruling party, Justice 
and Development Party, the AKP (see Figure 1.1). When AKP leader Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan had acrid conversation with Israeli President Shimon Peres at the World 
Economic Forum in Davos, 2009 the idea was reconsidered.  Right after the ‘height of 
humiliation’ occurred during a diplomatic meeting between Turkish ambassador, Ahmet 
Oguz Celikkol and Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon in Jeruselam in 
January 2010 (BBC 2010), VWP took shape. The subsequent attack by the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) on the Mavi Marmara Gaza Flotilla in May 2010 (which resulted 
in nine deaths and the wounding of fifty Turkish citizens in international waters) gave 
the needed momentum for this political-action film to be realized. The plot of VWP, as 
with the previous film (Valley of the Wolves-Iraq), follows well-trained Turkish agents 
led by the protagonist Polat Alemdar on a quest for revenge against the cruel Israeli 
8 
 
general Moshe Ben Eliezer who was the prime planner and the executor of the Mavi 
Marmara raid. The film begins with the IDF’s operation on the Turkish ship the Mavi 
Marmara which sails to break the Israeli blockade of Gaza and transport its 
humanitarian load to Palestinians.  From the beginning and throughout the film, many 
shootings and killings occur during the Israeli soldiers’ raids of Palestinian 
neighborhoods or when Polat and his men engage with Israeli soldiers. The film does 
not refrain for a moment from depicting IDF soldiers as ultimate killing machines of 
innocent Palestinian civilians throughout the film.  
The film was banned in Germany for being an anti-Israeli movie and was 
heavily criticized for premiering on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, 
January 27. After Pana Film appealed to the German court, the ban on the film was 
removed, but it was restricted to audiences 18 years old and older. Other European 
countries such as Netherlands, France and United Kingdom posed similar restrictions on 
the film by ruling that 16 and older could only view the film.  
As in the previous Pana Film productions, this film inflamed international 
tensions and evoked many criticisms while the same time garnered national and 
international praise in various corners of the world. For example, Europe-based Jewish 
organizations appealed to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Austrian Chancellor 
Werner Faymann to condemn the film and its glorifying violence and inciting anti-
Israeli sentiments (JerusalemPost 2011). On the other hand, according to Ozdener (one 
of the script writers), this new film stands to be the biggest film in the Middle East. He 
says that the Pana Film will continue to bring out voices of oppressed to the big screen 
and continue to criticize Israel and says: “VWP will only depict what really goes on in 
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Palestine. Israel will be demonstrated as bloody hands, cruel, human slaughter, and 
disrespectful to human dignity” (Cengil 2010, Magazine section, ¶ 5). The producers 
emphasize that the film is an effort to draw attention to the ‘human drama’ of Palestine 
for the audiences of Turkey and other nations.   
Whether the film can dramatically harm Turkey-Israel relations, which are 
already troubled more than they have been throughout history is debatable, but this film 
has significant potential as medium to project social, political, moral and cultural views 
to audiences in Turkey and around the world. VWP, being ostensibly an action and 
entertainment film, certainly employs novel forms of geopolitical representations and 
geographical imaginations for the audiences worldwide. As the film entertains millions 
in the dark rooms of cinema halls and in living rooms, it spreads out epic tales of the 
victorious Turkish and confirms Turkey’s geographical and historical responsibilities as 
well as challenges orthodox geopolitical understandings of the Palestine-Israel conflict 
and territoriality. 
 In this context, I am interested in investigating the film VWP’s multiple 
representations of space, place, geopolitical events and people in the postmodern world. 
As I investigate this film, I pay special attention to the role of interpretative and active 
Turkish audiences in the making of their geopolitical imagination of self, other, and 
their place in the world today through cinematic signification with the film VWP. This 
is where the importance of the film VWP derives from. As I argue throughout this study, 
when using film, geographers’ academic investigations are often limited to First World 
cinema or international products that are welcomed in the English speaking world. 
These efforts rarely engage Third World productions that provide alternative 
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geopolitical visions to western (US and the West Europe) geopolitics. Rarely are Third 
World audiences and their meaning-making processes given serious consideration, 
particularly the Turkish audiences. For these reasons, I choose VWP as the case study, 
given the film’s stature internationally and its unique challenge to dominant geopolitical 
discourses.   
1.3 Aim 
The aim of this study is to analyze discursively and empirically, the role of the VWP as 
a popular production with a special emphasis on the Turkish audiences’ geographic 
imagination and their utilization of the film to understand Turkey’s geopolitical position 
in the contemporary world. By examining this film, its reception by Turkish people, and 
their everyday engagement with other media messages (e.g., TV, and internet), this 
study develops empirical and theoretical perspectives for understanding the geopolitical 
dynamics of audience interpretation and the process of making geographical-meaning in 
Turkey.  
1.4 Research questions 
The study explores two related sets of questions. The first set of questions include: what 
is the influence of popular cultural products (particularly the VWP) on Turkish people in 
terms of their understanding of the world and Turkey’s role in it? What socio-cultural 
and spatial dynamics exist through which Turkish people have come to think about the 
world in a certain way and understand these geopolitical exchanges of meaning in 
everyday life via films and other forms of media interactions? What discourses are 
embedded in the film’s storyline?  The second set of questions includes: how can 
Turkish audiences’ interpretations of popular culture (film) be conceptualized, signified 
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and classified? How can we explore the content and reception of the Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine as a source of knowledge and information about the Turkish people 
and their views of the people and places around them? What goals and intentions do the 
producers possess and how (and to what degree) do differently located and socio-
culturally separated groups interpret VWP? How can their meaning-making be codified?    
1.5 Research interest  
The rationale for such a study is derived from the lack of engagement by critical 
geopolitics scholars with popular texts produced outside the Western world. Scholars, 
mainly from political geography and international relations, study how and to what 
extent popular cultural texts represent, produce, and reproduce events, places and 
people in constructing personal and collective identities (Said 1981, Sharp 1996, 
Shapiro 1997, Dodds 2006, Dittmer 2010). Similarly others have examined how 
practical geopolitics has been utilized through popular media productions in the goal of 
setting geopolitical agendas through the invocation of strategic narratives such as the 
‘war on terror’ or the ‘war on drugs’ (Klaebn 2002, Antoniades, Miskimmon and 
O'Loughlin 2010, Lukes 2005), but they left two important lacuna in the literature that 
this dissertation addresses.  
 The first is that few scholars engage in audience-reception studies associated 
with  geopolitical imagination embedded in popular culture, despite calls to consider the 
process of consumption and the creation of meaning specifically audience roles and 
reactions to the text (Sharp 1993, Dodds 2006, Toal 2007, Dalby 2008). Audience 
studies in geography increasingly follow the paradigmatic change called the ‘cultural 
turn’ of late twentieth century (Scott 2004, Peckham 2004, Dittmer and Dodds 2008). 
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Geographers began paying attention to incorporating everyday peoples’ everyday 
experiences and interpretation of popularly consumed cultural products. However, 
geographers’ incorporation of audience into geographic studies is limited and a recent 
development. The primary concern of film studies has been the discursive analysis and 
textual interpretation of selected films (Kennedy and Lukinbeal 1997, Dittmer and 
Dodds 2008, Zonn 2007). This study offers an extensive investigation of audience 
reception utilizing and combining important elements of qualitative and quantitative 
research techniques such as conducting a survey, organizing focus group discussions, 
including two semi-structured interviews and online surveying of viewer comments to 
better understand the dynamics of meaning-making process.  
 The other gap in the literature is that only a few scholars focus on geopolitical 
texts produced in the Middle East (Yanik 2009, Srinivasan 2006, Ghazi, Flint and 
Mamadouh 2006).
4
 Popularly produced western products (films, magazines, journals, 
cartoons, etc.) have received significant attention from geographers while 
internationally produced productions are left out from scholarly examination and 
disciplinary attention. Even though a number of studies are devoted to internationally 
produced films, their point of analysis remained interpretative and did not include 
extensive fieldwork to bring audiences into the focus of meaning-making process. By 
this I mean only few scholars intensively engaged with filmic texts, and examined their 
viewers’ experiences, which is a prerequisite to understanding  the historical, cultural, 
social and technological dynamics of the society  (Dittmer and Dodds 2008, Dodds 
2006, Rose 2007). Therefore, VWP as an internationally produced and consumed 
                                                          
4
 Important studies on geopolitics of global media in the case of Al Jazeera also need to be mentioned.  
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popular cultural product should be considered an important example of non-western 
visual text worth of academic attention.  Non-Western popular culture products by their 
very nature often contain alternative paradigms, messy narrations and chaotic chemistry 
that challenge and resist dominant Western ideologies and their often binary ways of 
explaining current geopolitical events. The Turkish film Valley of the Wolves-Iraq 
(2006) and the Russian action movie Strangers (2008) are examples of film posing such 
a challenge (Anaz & Purcell 2010). Taking into account the lack of comprehensive 
study of non-western cinematic productions and their effects in the shaping of non-
Western audiences’ geopolitical imaginations, and their interpretations of current 
events, this study contributes to audience geographies and popular geopolitics.  
1.6 Organization of dissertation  
This study is organized into ten chapters. The first four chapters include an introduction, 
relevant literature reviews and cover the study’s methodology. The next five chapters 
contain a critical reading of Valley of the Wolves – Palestine, audience analysis (both 
quantitative and qualitative), and a discussion of the results. The last chapter of the 
study combines the conclusions of each chapter and highlights the contributions of the 
study to the discipline.  As stated, the first chapter introduces the research context, the 
problem statement, the research questions and reviews the existing literature on film 
geography and geographers’ engagement with films in different places and for different 
reasons. Chapter 2 broadly examines the ideas of national cinemas, the Turkish cinema 
industry in particular and the features of Turkish media. As part of the literature review, 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of concepts such as visual turn, political geography, 
geopolitics, Turkish geopolitics, popular culture and audience geography. In the 
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Chapter 4, the methodology of the study is outlined. In this chapter, methodological 
strategies such as planning and implementing the study and evaluating the collected 
data are explained. Along with these strategies for executing the methodology, research 
problems and appropriateness of the mixed methods are also discussed. Chapter 5 
includes the critical reading of the film VWP by highlighting the film’s geopolitical 
implications. Chapter 6 brings two interviews (conducted with one of the scriptwriters 
and the Mavi Marmara activists) into the forefront of the discussion about the site of 
production in the defense of the film VWP. Chapter 7 introduces audiences’ engagement 
with the film by including the descriptive online survey results. Chapter 8 observes 
VWP fans’ engagement online. Chapter 9 investigates various Turkish audiences’ 
interpretations of the film in focus group discussions. The final chapter summarizes and 
extends the findings and outlines the contributions of the study for the popular critical 
geopolitics literature and the audience geography.    
1.7 General concepts and theories in film geographies   
This section of the chapter reviews how geographers have analyzed film from the 1950s 
onward. I begin by discussing why and how geographers were interested in looking at 
films and why they were initially reluctant to include films as important aspects of 
geographical knowledge (production). Then I will review the early use of films in the 
teaching of geography. In this section, I will also review the political economy of the 
film industry and geographers’ take on this subject. In this part of the chapter, I will 
include a brief summary of what is commonly known as the first, second, and third 
cinemas. But, the goal here is to bear various scholarly arguments and examples of 
films studies that demonstrate films are not only part of our lives for entertainment 
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purposes, but also they are our part of lives because we remake our geographies through 
films (Diken and Laustsen 2007).  
1.7.1 The discussion of why and how film became important for 
geographers  
Aitken and Zonn underline for emphasis the politics and places of everyday living in 
their investigation of representation and images, which are the earliest characteristics of 
art and theater, and real and reel (Aitken and Zonn 1994). In every aspect of film, there 
is a human factor. Humans produce films, shape them, act in them and consume them. 
For that reason, films are an important constitutive element of geographies wherein 
people, spaces, and places are embodied in the cinematic vision (Aitken and Zonn 
1994). This is not to say that other disciplines such as communication, cultural, and film 
studies ignore cinematic representations of reality and audiences’ viewing experiences. 
Indeed, comprehensive investigations of films and audiences stream forth from media 
and reception studies. For example, a well-known scholar on the sociology of the 
television audience David Morley’s Nationwide study, Tamar Liebes’s and Elihu Katz’s 
The Exportation of Meaning Cross-Cultural Readings of Dallas, Natalie Stroud’s 
investigation on the political influence of Michael Moore’s documentary Fahrenheit 
9/11 and Janet Staiger’s studies on audience reception are just a few exemplary 
contributions among the many (Morley 1980 , Liebes and Katz 1990, Staiger 2005, 
Stroud 2007). As I will discuss some of the works later in this study, these studies 
mainly highlight various effects of media on audiences and socio-cultural dynamics of 
media consumption in different societies.   
16 
 
Given the profoundly visual nature of film it is a wonder why geographers have 
not embraced it from the beginning. As a focus of geographic study, research on films 
first appeared in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Aitken and Zonn 1994). Geographers 
started looking at films when the discipline took visual studies (including landscapes) 
seriously which began with humanist (cultural) geographers (Burgess and Gold 1985). 
Kennedy and Lukinbeal (1997) give four possible explanations for this late interest. 
First, landscape and place geographers mainly focused on textual literatures such as 
novels and biographies rather than paying attention to mass-media productions such as 
films and TV shows (Cosgrove 1984, Baker 1988). Second, geographers, like other 
social scientists, understood the film industry as only motivated by profit and nothing 
else. This reductionist view of film prevented geographers from seriously engaging 
cinema and films, and their significations with human and their environment. Third, 
geographers approached film as an object that was difficult to decipher and extract 
meaning.  Films are considered to be largely a personal activity. By extension, the 
meanings people created were also understood as personal, and contingent on individual 
contexts. Finally, geographers showed little interest in studying films because they were 
challenging to make explicit geographical connections between images and the effects 
of those images on real locations (Lukinbeal and Zimmermann 2006). However, when 
one looks at locations where some of the Hollywood films took place, he/she can see 
that those locations became well-known tourist destinations for global audiences. This 
suggests that audience-location interactions are dynamic and more intimate than early 
geographers thought. Since scholars from different disciplines began considering day-
to-day discourses produced by everyday people, geographers have followed by 
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investigating films -other popular culture products- and their roles in shaping everyday 
discourses.  
Although geographers’ contribution to film studies and their engagement with 
film can be traced back to as early as 1950s , a significant proliferation of articles on 
film by geographers appeared in the 1970s (Kennedy and Lukinbeal 1997, Johnston et 
al. 2000). Film geographers note that the earliest discussions of films appear in The 
Geographical Magazine highlighting the importance of national cinemas and their 
contributions to reflecting the nations’ characteristics. (Johnston et al. 2000). For 
example, Manvell’s articles in The Geographical Magazine about geography of film-
making (1953), geography of documentary film (1956) and Robert Flaherty (1956) are 
worth mentioning. Main point of these articles are to recognize “the value of films as an 
aid to the promotion of geographical knowledge” (Manvell 1953, p. 640). But, as 
mentioned above, studies of popular culture, especially film, became a growing interest 
of geographers (Johnston et al. 2000).  Behavioralist and humanistic geographers 
pioneered the first wave of geographic engagement with film. According to Kennedy 
and Lukinbeal (1997), geographers’ engagement with film arose from two streams of 
thoughts: landscape and humanism studies, and socio-cultural studies. The former 
investigated media portrayals of landscape and place meaning. At its core, this approach 
used cognitive theory and mainly focused on individuals’ responses and aimed to 
understand how individuals make sense of their places, and how places make sense for 
people in their everyday life (Tuan 1977). Personal writings, memories, and fictional 
productions enriched geographers’ horizons in this area. In the latter,  geographers were 
heavily influenced by cultural studies and sociology to understand what gives the 
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meaning to a place. These meaning-making processes can be associated to cultural 
politics; which is “the domain in which meanings are constructed and negotiated” 
(Kennedy and Lukinbeal 1997, p. 34).  
Within both approaches, films have been investigated for their authenticity, 
functionality (effects) and construction of meaning from individual to societal scales 
(Burgess and Gold 1985). Nevertheless, geographers’ approaches to films mainly 
remained within the bipolar framework such as “individual/societal, local/global, 
urban/anti-urban, [and] pristine nature/despoil nature” (Kennedy and Lukinbeal 1997, p. 
34). What Kennedy and Lukinbeal (1997) find problematic with this binary thinking is 
that geographic investigation of film remains complex in its scope and resembles the 
blind describing an elephant. What they suggest is that geographers need to look at the 
film-phenomenon from the tenet of postmodernism which erodes bipolar thinking and 
the perspective of transactionalism which is “the study of change in people-environment 
interactions” (Kennedy and Lukinbeal 1997, p. 36). They note that a totalistic approach 
to film analysis makes the link between physical environment and social system “by 
placing humans as an ‘integral part of the environment, rather than an object in it” (p. 
36). Thus they highlight vitality of looking at film and research on film “from the 
perspective of a continuum –as a whole and as multiple” (p. 36). In their conclusion, 
Kennedy and Lukinbeal (1997) call for different theoretical frameworks to “link the 
multilayers of meaning, materiality, place, space, and scale in new ways” (p. 46), rather 
than looking at the phenomenon from a unifying theory. Furthermore, they suggest that 
the need for further “research within broadened perspectives of space, place and scale 
on the production and the dissemination of film, development of place image in film, 
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film tourism, and the effects of film on audience perception and behavior” (Kennedy 
and Lukinbeal 1997, p. 46). Therefore, their point of argument about approaching film 
phenomena from holistic and multiple points of investigation becomes central to this 
study.  
Similarly Aitken and Dixon suggest we conceptualize film beyond the 
dichotomy of the ‘real’ (what the camera captures) and the ‘reel’ (what the image means 
on screen). They call for critical geographic appraisals that focus on landscapes 
(landscape as a medium, actor, and work and doing work), spaces/spatialities (a 
frame/setup), mobilities (moving images), scales (zooming in from a bird’s eye view 
and local-global contrast) and networks (Aitken and Dixon 2006, p. 328). The emphasis 
here is on the false assumption of the ‘real’ that is believed to exist ontologically and 
represents a stable world. Likewise Lukinbeal and Zimmermann (2006) similarly argue 
that researchers need to move beyond this binary thinking (real-reel, material-
nonmaterial), “because they hold little analytical power when examining the geography 
of film” (p. 317). Lukinbeal and Zimmermann suggest a new field of geography: film 
geography. With this, they outline four major areas for the future of film geography: 
geopolitics, cultural politics, globalization, and science, representation and mimesis. 
They conclude that because the existing body of work on film heavily emphasizes the 
textual reading of films, less attention is paid to materially grounded empirical research 
on “cinema’s cultural power and the resulting influence on the perception of place and 
space” (Lukinbeal and Zimmermann 2006, p. 321). They argue that “film is more than 
just mere re-presentations of some ontological stable Cartesian space. Film, as a 
discursive formation, is a cultural commodity that is produced and consumed in a global 
20 
 
context” (p. 321).  Cresswell and Dixon also point out that film is beyond being “mere 
images of unmediated expressions of the mind, but rather the temporary embodiment of 
social processes that continually construct and deconstruct the world as we know it” (as 
cited in Lukinbeal and Zimmermann 2006, p. 317). 
 Later studies on film furthered the argument that, unlike the realist cinema 
approaches
5
; a camera eye (gaze) hardly captivates objects, people and landscapes in 
their fixed, orderly, and realistic nature (Brunette 1985, Bazin 1971). In other words, 
film does not always reflect unruly, fluid and/or chaotic everyday life in a linear fashion 
for audiences. Therefore, film researchers quickly distanced themselves from this 
reductionist form of understanding cinema and embraced the idea that there is always 
an opening for multiple meanings and directions in communicating. This is to say that 
the production of cinema art is as socially constructed as the realities of everyday life.   
On the lines of ‘real’ and ‘reel’ discussions, Hopkins argues that because of iconic 
images bombarding audiences via the screen, the psychological distance between film 
and spectator wanes. The real time and space fade away and viewer gives up “the notion 
of the ‘suspension of disbelief’ where the boundaries of real-time and space may 
become permeable and blurred” (Hopkins 1994, p. 48). Spectators move into a two-fold 
psychological image-event stage where simultaneous forgetting and not forgetting begin 
unfolding. Inside the dark rooms of cinema theaters, the real time and space portrayed 
                                                          
5
 ‘The art of reality’ in cinema is understood to be the form of film footage that is unmediated and 
unedited for the sake of authenticity. Underlying assumption is that captured material via camera should 
be ‘there’ on the screen (Brunette 1985).  The word ‘directly’ is the key to understanding the realism in 
art. A film that produces the world without interpretation and intervention is regarded as a realist film.  
(see also Andre Bazin’s book entitled What is Cinema? (1967) and Peter Brunette’s article “Rossellini 
and Cinematic Realism”, 1985.) 
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on the screen becomes insomuch imaginary as experiential (Hopkins 1994). To 
Hopkins, this is where the ideological effects of film are found: stereotyping, gendering, 
dominations, subversions, contestations and so on.  Additionally, Zonn’s call for 
investigating films along with their locations where cinema experience take place is 
crucial because, for him, “watching movies is about place and experience, and the 
myriad of possibilities and stories that surround them” (Zonn 2007, p. 64). 
The most salient lesson from the literature discussed above is that a holistic 
approach to the film VWP is needed in order to understand the complexity of Turkish 
audiences’ meaning-making processes. As highlighted, the goal here is to bear various 
scholarly arguments and examples of films studies that demonstrate films are not only 
part of our lives for entertainment purposes, but also they are our part of lives because 
we remake our geographies through films (Diken and Laustsen 2007). 
1.7.2 The uses of film in geography classrooms 
Beyond films’ potential as the subject matter for academic analysis, geographers also 
engage with films in classrooms as supplementary to their conventional teaching 
tradition (see for instance: Smith 2002, Alderman and Popke 2002, Feeney 2003). They 
held that films would enhance students’ ability to think critically, increase students’ 
capacity to better understand the complex issues of the world and help them navigate 
their educational voyage in the dizzying flow of the info-age. Indeed this creative use of 
film in classrooms has roots in the history of film geography. The earliest film focused 
writing for the Geographical Magazine begins in 1950s (Aitken and Dixon 2006). 
Geographers’ initial interest was to utilize films to explain geographic formation of 
landscapes and bring the experience of places to classrooms. In this sense, film’s 
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mimeticism surmounts other visual forms of media such as photography because the 
moving picture would be able to capture motion and form, and that would better explain 
both natural process and the social (Aitken and Dixon 2006).   
Utilizing visual materials such as maps, graphs, films, etc. in classrooms have 
always been an important part of geographic pedagogy because such an approach offers 
alternative perspectives on geographic subjects and eases students’ engagement with 
complex, difficult, controversial and abstract topics (Staddon et al. 2002). For instance, 
physical geographers often used (continue to use) videos in classrooms to demonstrate 
how landscapes form and change their formations from time to time around the world. 
Similarly, human geographers used (continues to use) films to bring local and 
worldwide problems of human and environment to the attention of their students. What 
film topics are picked to be shown in geography classes vary from subdiscipline to 
subdiscipline. For example, Lukinbeal uses films to teach about historical geographies 
of American film production. He uses films in classroom to highlight how, “Hollywood 
juxtaposes multiple geographies of economics, production, distribution, consumption 
and the creation of meaning” (Lukinbeal 2002, p. 250). And this genuinely correlates 
and reflects social and cultural histories, customs and practices of the film industry and 
American market economy in general (Lukinbeal 2002). Alderman and Popke use 
humorous documentaries to generate discussions and overturn students’ conventional 
ways of understanding geographic subjects. Feeney uses interactive multimedia for 
students with dyslexia to teach geography (Alderman and Popke 2002, Feeney 2003). In 
the result part of her experimental study she concludes that interactive multimedia helps 
dyslexic students learn geographic concepts with less frustration.  
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Most commonly and importantly, geographers utilize films in classrooms as a 
supplement to their conventional teaching because they are eager to foster their 
students’ ability to think critically and analytically (e.g. Smith 2002; Alderman and 
Popke 2002; Feeney 2003). Possessing this ability is expected to guide students to face 
and handle the dizzying flows of information and the complexities of the deluge of data. 
As Naisbitt argues “we are drowning in information but starved for knowledge” (as 
cited in Lukinbeal and Craine 2009, p. 177). If knowledge is understood to be 
unorganized and scattered around with no anchor line attached. Thus, geography 
instructors feel obliged to guide students toward critical thinking skills, which will help 
them challenge traditional ways of knowledge production and consumption.  Staddon 
calls this practice a ‘radical doubt’:  “a pedagogy of radical doubt as one that denies 
authority and yields only to engagements about social phenomena forged through 
critical dialogue with others” (Staddon et al. 2002, p. 272). The argument enforces that 
classrooms ought to be converted into an open space for creating environment within 
which critical thinking and independently studying can become fundamental elements 
of learning. In this sense films can play crucial role creating alternative modes of 
communication and teaching in classrooms.  
1.7.3 Political economy of film geographies 
Geographers are interested in studying the political economy of the film industry and its 
spatial and ideological implications in addition to the uses of film in geography 
classrooms and the media portrayals of landscape and place meaning by cultural 
geographers. Geographers understand that the film industry closely relates to cinematic 
capital (labor, location, finance, and entrepreneur), modes of knowledge production and 
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distribution of manufactured imagination throughout the world (Lukinbeal 2002). All 
these economic aspects of the film industry intersect with the creation of images, 
symbols and identities via commodifying cultural products such as films, TV shows, 
and commercials at a global scale. Cinema, especially American cinema considering its 
reach, can function as the site of culture production and an important distributor of 
western ideologies to the rest of the world. The American film industry is financially 
and technologically capable of manufacturing cultural symbols and meanings for 
millions around the world. In this sense, Lukinbeal (2002) identifies three modes of 
production that relates to filmmaking phenomenon in North America. The first involves 
the economics of filmmaking and especially the capital, spatial and historical forces that 
influence where production occurs. The second involves the politics of production, 
which refers to the “explicit processes of contestation, negotiation, and bargaining…” 
(Lukinbeal 2002, p. 251). And the third aspect deals with the production of meaning 
and ideology. The complex process of creating cultural products involves visual 
narration and aesthetic negotiations.  
To comply with these modes of production, the Hollywood cultural industry 
moves from location to location.  The United States’ cinema industry initially was 
located in New York and in other east coast states, but in the 1920s it was moved to the 
west coast to take advantage of a sunny, spacious environment and cheap labor while 
the financial centers of the industry stayed in New York. Following this relocation of 
production, American cinema focused on and produced films for urban dwellers and 
modern cinema-cities. Description of cities and its dwellers was the main subject of 
cinema films from this era. This important interaction between cinema and the city has 
25 
 
continued into postmodern times (not as much however, in many corners of the world) 
to please cinema viewers. Cinema and the viewers were together completing the 
formation of modernity of cities as camera walk through the streets of modern towns 
and neighborhoods. Many urban and cultural geographers study cinema’s economic and 
political interrelations with cities. For example, an edited book by Leo Zonn devoted to 
the topic ‘place images in media’ including essays that are concerned with the portrayal, 
experience, and meaning of ‘place’ in different types of media (Zonn 1990).  
Harvey, for example, draws attention to an important relationship between 
consumerist traditions of capitalism and popularly produced media by which landscapes 
are re-shaped for the need of the ‘condition of postmodernity’ (Harvey 1989). The 
media have the potential to reshape and manipulate the images of cities to ease 
commercial endeavors. Harvey examines two films, Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner 
(1982) and Wim Wenders’s Wings of Desire (1987), to “illustrate how the themes of 
time-space compression” are represented in postmodern works (p. 308). As a science 
fiction film, Blade Runner, for example, sets postmodernist themes “in a context of 
flexible accumulation and time-space compression… with all the imaginary power that 
the cinema can command” (p. 313). Thus the “conflictual and confusing experience of 
time and space” through these films becomes essential features of the condition for 
postmodernity (p. 322). Harvey posits that both films offer the audiences “a mirror, 
which reflects ‘many of the essential features of the condition of postmodernity;’ 
namely, the fragmentation of time, space, history, and place” (Peckham 2004, p. 423). 
But what I am interested in Harvey’s film investigation is that films in their very nature 
can become capable of reducing the complex interactions of daily life of the city into a 
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manageable, fixable jigsaw puzzle-like gamescape. They play fundamental roles in re-
presenting cites in their new cultural forms, which are very much political and culturally 
subversive. The new forms of art and cultural artifacts that are associated with the 
postmodern interpretations are pushed into city life at all costs via films. Thus, for 
Harvey new crises of modernity created a suitable condition to set the stage for inserting 
filmic representations into cities. He notes that “if there is a new crisis of representation 
of space and time, then new ways of thinking and feeling have to be created” (Harvey 
1989, p. 322). Film as a form of art and entertainment can manipulate and reconstruct 
this crisis of representation of space and time by representing powerful images that both 
illuminate and obscure stories and realities.  
Rose, paralleling Harvey’s argument, points out that geographers need to 
consider studying the cultural politics of place because the representational place is a 
cultural place that should be evaluated within relation to structural socio-spatial 
inequalities. Therefore, the question of representation of place inextricably becomes the 
question of ideology and that is very much intertwined with issue of social power and 
hegemony (Rose 1994).  To highlight non-hegemonic place-image making practices, 
Rose examines two films made in the mid-1970s by local community groups in east 
London namely Wapping Parents’ Action Group and Fly a flag for Poplar. Her interest 
of bringing these films into the discussion of cultural representations of place is to 
emphasize that both films are explicitly oppositional, setting out “to challenge the 
dominant image of the East End as a slum peopled either by chirpy Cockneys or 
pathologized degenerates” (Rose 1994, p. 49). By examining these films, Rose 
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highlights that dominant forms of representation can be challenged and alternative 
meanings over space can be reconstructed creatively and in diverse ways.  
Similarly and as in the conversations took place in the 40
th
 volume of the journal 
Screen, Karen and Massey point out important connections between city and films. 
Through these connections, places become the locations of transit and the arena of 
competing representations. Karen’s and Massey’s attention is on the sets of the 
‘mobility’- “massive mobilities of imperialism and colonialism” (Karen and Massey 
1999, p. 230). They argue that cities are constantly on the move, made and 
reconstructed by films, and thus they are vulnerable to the politics of and subject to 
materialistic exploitation and locational hierarchy. Films make this spatial imagination 
available to everyone. Cities are where various flows all come together. Therefore the 
question here is not to ask how space ‘is’ but rather how it ‘works’. Space is not as 
fixed as it looks. All space is constantly in some sort of mobility, connectivity and 
(in)fluence. Films make these social and spatial flows of exchange visible and 
comprehensible via their visual and aural capabilities. Filmic artifacts-the images, the 
screen, the building, and the audience- are also vital to understand the spatial 
significations of cities. Here is the oxymoronic part; if films are representations of 
spatial relations-mobilities, then to (re)present a place, films should capture and 
immobilize space. Massey in her response pinpoints this problem and says that any 
form of representation is a spatialization of sorts, of freezing the flow of experience 
(Karen and Massey 1999). Thus, films freeze space in favor of time meanwhile they 
mobilize and (re)present places in different times for different political and economic 
ends.  
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Table 1-2: Division of the global film industry  
 Represented 
/geography/typified 
Character/purpose 
First Cinema Hollywood/United States Profit driven/advanced cinema 
technology/mass consumption/studios  
Second Cinema Post-World War II 
cinema/Europe 
Neorealist/natural settings used/cinema as 
art/cinema of elite 
Third Cinema Third World/colonized 
states/Latin America  
Ideologist/revolutionary/local and universal 
audience  
Source: Table is adopted from Macdonald (1994). 
 
 Regarding political economy of film, what Macdonald finds vital is how the 
production-consumption matrix of cinema which is intimately connected to the global 
capital industry and movement of personal and ideas has close relations with cinema’s 
geographic implications.  Besides cinema’s central role in the meaning-making 
processes, cinema also claims to be indispensable as an entertainment commodity of the 
material world by occupying a crucial place in the production, distribution, and 
consumption stages of the global cinema market. In this sense, cinema is no different 
than automobiles, computers, or soybeans (Macdonald 1994). From this departure point 
of political economy, Macdonald makes an important connection between cinema 
phenomenon (production, distribution and consumption) to three existing cinema 
traditions: first, second and third cinemas (see Table 1.2). First cinema is mostly 
typified with Hollywood. This tradition is dominated with materialistic incentives and 
global entrepreneurship. Therefore major film corporations’ investments are highly 
observable and their investments are economically, technically and esthetically superior 
to any other cinema productions of the world. Hollywood cinema has been accused of 
colonizing all other national cinema markets and leaving no room for them to emerge.  
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This domination does not only include pioneering the image-making tradition 
worldwide, but also places Hollywood as the main site of manufacturing culture, (de 
facto) setting international standards of cinema in terms of production, distribution, 
consumption, marketing and cinema values (Higson 1989). What this means for other 
countries’ cinema industries is that they should, first and foremost, reach the same 
standards of production, distribution, marketing and consumption of Hollywood 
(international cinema) to be considered as national. Higson (1989, p. 38) highlights this 
argument by stating:  
By Hollywood, I mean the international institutionalization of certain 
standards and values of cinema, in terms of both audience expectations, 
professional ideologies and practices and the establishment of 
infrastructures of production, distribution, exhibition, and marketing to 
accommodate, regulate and reproduce these standards and values...  
If we confine discussion of film production, it makes sense in this 
context to speak of national cinemas as non-standard and marginal 
activities. Part of the problem, of course, is the paradox that for a cinema 
to be nationally popular it must also be international in scope. That is to 
say, it must achieve the international (Hollywood) standard.   
 Higson’s argument, then, forces us to ask this question: how integrative of 
global or transnational a local cinema (e.g. Turkish cinema) in terms of its techniques 
and practices must be in order to become national? This is to say that there are no clear 
boundaries of defining where (inter)nationality of a nation’s cinema begins and ends. 
Regardless, what can the cinema do for a nation and what a nation do with cinema 
remain to be an important question.   
 Macdonald traces the second cinema tradition back the material and ideological 
re-compositions of the World War II. Second cinema emerged to fulfill material and 
social needs of emerging ex-colonial regions as an alternative to the first cinema. This 
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tradition was highly influenced by French neorealist school of thought where the 
discourse of the ordinary was a dominating factor.  Film makers of this tradition 
preferred natural settings such as sunlight as background light, ordinary people as actors 
and stories of everyday life and events (Macdonald 1994). In other words, the second 
cinema came to be a valid alternative ‘art cinema’ to first cinema in its aesthetic form 
and alternative filmmaking techniques.  Film-makers of this neorealist generation 
became vital for development of national cinemas of the Third World. Macdonald notes 
that directors, scriptwriters and producers applied their techniques learned in Europe “to 
the problems of the newly emerged states of the Third World” (Macdonald 1994, p. 33).  
 Third cinema, on the other hand, has deep roots in the colonization period. It 
was during the colonial period that the technology of cinema was brought to colonial 
spaces by investors from colonized country. Films of this time “were limited in numbers 
and tended to be ethnographic studies of the colonized” (Macdonald 1994, p. 35). This 
emerging cinema, in accordance with the originating country’s socio-economic 
conditions, prioritized social change and transformation of society thorough cinematic 
pedagogy. Thus, third cinema (or some call it ‘Third World cinema’) criticized and 
challenged the status quo by engaging in revolutionary film practices (Wayne 2001). 
Films in this tradition mainly tell the story of the socio-economic conditions of the 
Third World, and causes of human misery and oppression. Especially socio-political 
changes of 1960s have an impact on filmmaking practices. Macdonald argues that films 
of this trouble times sought to direct political engagement with the audience 
(Macdonald 1994). It is this important facet of national cinema that government-
imposed censorship on filmmakers became eminent. For instance, Yılmaz Güney’s 
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films in Turkey should be accounted in this cinema trend. As explained in the following 
chapters, his left leaning films question and criticize geographical and social 
inequalities in Turkey during the 1970s and 80s. In this sense, VWP might not be 
classified in the Yılmaz Güney category (leftist or negotiating the Turkish identity), but 
it can be argued that it should be situated in third (world) cinema category for 
challenging and reproducing geopolitical representations of the first (world) cinema 
(and media) productions while defining national narratives and practices that would 
give voice to the geopolitical aspirations of Turkish state.   
1.8 Summary 
Chapter 1 briefly introduced the scope of the study and covered one of the major themes 
of this dissertation:  why and how geographers engage with films.  Film use in 
classrooms and films as political instruments and divisions of labor in the global film 
industry were reviewed to make an argument that films have been and continue to be 
part and parcel of our everyday life. But, more than this, I bring to bear various 
scholarly arguments and examples of films studies that demonstrate films are not only 
part of our lives for entertainment purposes, but also they are our part of lives because 
we remake our geographies through films (Diken and Laustsen 2007). Films are 
sociological, economic and political phenomena through which we seek to find 
orderliness in a chaotic world. They allow us to educate ourselves about our social 
realities, and contest political economies of first world projects by introducing 
alternative national cinemas.   
 In this sense, I devoted the second half of the chapter to explain what 
geographers made of films, how and why they analyzed films, and their geographical 
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implications mainly since the 1970s. The following chapter furthers the discussion by 
extending it to what nations do with cinema and what films do for nations. Particularly I 
focus on the history of Turkish cinema, its political traditions, and cinema’s 
contributions to national narratives in Turkey. As I argue in the following chapter, these 
contributions are not always what the Turkish state desires. Some Turkish films 
famously question and problematize the Turkish nation and its narratives, in opposition 
to the Turkish Ministry of Culture’s intent to maintain a modern, “Kemalist ‘imagined 
community’ through its film subsidies and censorship policies…” (Harris 2008, p. 77). 
However, some other films such as the VWP overtly reproduce and diffuse conservative 
concepts such as Turkishness, nationalism, Turkey’s geopolitical importance in the 
world, and other national narratives. It offers these concepts for everyday use of the 
publics in the similar lines with popular and formal national discourses. Simultaneously, 
the same film continues to negotiate and problematize the first world’s geopolitics and 
cinema (and media) representations of Turkey and the Middle East.  
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CHAPTER 2: NATIONAL CINEMA, TURKISH FILM 
INDUSTRY AND THE FEATURES OF TURKISH MEDIA 
 
“When I think about ‘cinema’ and ‘nationalism’, I think of cinema’s individualizing nationalism…” 
(Meltem Toksoz, 2007, Istanbul) 
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter investigates features that constitute the Turkish public media and its 
discursive rhetoric concerning the continuous process of nationality formation. 
Specifically, I focus on the modern Turkish nation and the role of national cinemas, 
Turkish cinema and Turkey’s public media structures. Concepts highlighted in this 
chapter are the historical background of the Turkish cinema, the dominant political 
maneuvers influencing film making, and the distribution and financing of cinema as 
Turkey’s geopolitical positions change in global politics.  Discussed also are the 
particulars of Turkish cinema’s didactical attempts at reshaping the society which was 
in the stage of rebuilding itself during the new republic. In the Turkish context the belief 
has always been that the public should be educated, modernized, and freed from the 
Ottoman past via societal bombardment with ideological messages that are manipulated 
for the public’s health by state elites (Esen 2010, Iri 2009, Arslan 2011).   
 The expansion of scholarship examining the connection between cinema and 
nation is a comparatively recent intellectual effort (Williams 2002) although the use of 
cinema to maintain and disseminate national narratives date back to as early as the first 
use of the moving images for public screening (Burton 2007) and scholars note the 
connection since the 1930s (Armstrong 1933). Soon after the development of film 
technology, many states quickly embraced this medium as a means of educating the 
34 
 
public and promoting cultural nationalism. Through everyday consumption of films 
(fiction or non-fiction), selective remembering and forgetting became part of a vast 
intertextual mosaic of simulacra undergirding specific national narratives. In this sense, 
audiences engage in redefining and reimagining the past as they reconstruct their 
present and collective memory. As Burton argues, selected films have always been 
“explicitly used and appropriated, both positively and negatively, by politicians, media 
personnel, as well as by the general public in order to advance particular ideologically-
loaded arguments about the present” (Burton 2007, p. 1). In this chapter, I review some 
of the debates about national cinema and its intimate connection with nationalism to 
better understand where the internationally-consumed Turkish film Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine can be situated and how it can be better understood as a nationalist 
text, given the intertextuality of audience consumption and interpretations. As discussed 
later in this dissertation, Turkish audiences engage in reimagining and redefining their 
past while reproducing Turkish national identity (perhaps independently of the formal 
national narratives), as well as Turkey’s geopolitical present through discussing the 
film. Thus, this chapter is written be a bridge for integrating the role of media to 
transmit intended messages supportive of Turkish cinema, ideas of Turkish nationalism 
in cinema discourses, Turkish regional geopolitics, and the audiences’ interpretations 
and imaginations of VWP. To truly understand the audiences’ interpretations of the film 
and Turkish geopolitics, one must engage the historical development of the Turkish 
cinema sector and its relations with current social-economic and political changes in 
Turkey. Therefore, a brief examination of national cinema and nationalized cinema 
becomes necessary. In this sense, VWP is an example of ‘White Cinema’ reflecting 
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conservative values aligned with an idealized Turkish nation. This genre becomes to be 
an important cinematic lens through which to understand Turkish nation formation. As 
discussed in the coming chapters of this dissertation, an important part of the Turkish 
audiences’ conceptualization of VWP coalesces around the white cinema’s 
constructions of history and national values. Thus, including literature on national 
cinema, Turkish cinema, white cinema, and the features of Turkish media becomes 
necessary. Given cinema’s potential of educating national publics and the attempts of 
state sponsored media (e.g. the state TV) and non-state sponsored actors to shape 
national identity, the characteristics of VWP and its connections to the cinema tradition 
need to be explored. 
2.2 National cinema and nationalism 
National cinema is more than just cinema produced by a particular nation-state. Higson 
(1989) argues that the concept of national cinema has four important characteristics (see 
Table 2.1). First, national cinema refers to the domestic film industry and is strongly 
attached to the country that produced it. Ownership of production firms, distribution 
outlets and the exhibition chains becomes a crucial aspect in this category. Secondly, 
cinema’s textual character becomes an important part of the tradition. The subject 
matter, the common style or world view shared and to what extent a film “engages in 
exploring, questioning and constructing a notion of nationhood in the films themselves 
and in the consciousness of the viewers” (Higson 1989, p. 36) become the defining 
factor in this second cinema tradition. Thirdly in Higson’s description, national cinema 
is identified in terms of consumption such as who is watching which films. Fourth, 
Higson identifies a “criticism-led approach to national cinema” (p. 37). This approach 
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highlights cinema of elites and artistic productions that appeal to high-culture or 
“modernist heritage of a particular nation state” (Higson 1989, p. 37).  
Table 2-1: The concepts of national cinema  
Phase 1.  Production based: where are these films made, and by whom? 
Phase 2.  Text based: What are these films about what world view do they share, 
etc.  
Phase 3.  Consumption based: which films do audiences watch?  
Phase 4.  Artistic based: how artistic are these films? What audiences watch 
these films: high-culture or popular audiences   
Source: Table is adapted from Higson (1989).   
 
The process of defining a national cinema “takes meaning in the context of a 
conceptual play of differences and identities” (Higson 1989, p. 38). A national cinema 
is imagined in the plurality of other nations’ cinemas and involves the construction of 
self-consciousness. For Higson, therefore, national cinema “can only be understood as 
histories of crisis and conflict, of resistance and negotiations” (Hjort and MacKenzie 
2000, p. 4). National cinema is a national communicative space that does not simply 
mirror or express the stable future of a national culture as films are, “but are themselves 
one of the loci of debates about a nation’s governing principles, goals, heritage and 
history” (Hjort and MacKenzie 2000, p. 4). Thus, scholars who study nationalism and 
national identity, such as Smith (2000), Higson (2000), and Robins and Aksoy (2000) 
approach national films as a visual representation of a national identity “relying on its 
own visual culture, narrative traditions and capacity for artistic experiments” (Robins 
and Aksoy 2000, p. 210). Additionally, many nationality and national identity scholars 
state that national cinema is not the reason that the idea of national culture exists, but it 
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surely can be part of the process of a culture’s maintenance and renewal (Schlesinger 
2000, Williams 2002, O'Regan 2002, Harris 2008). Schlesinger notes that “the media 
therefore function as a categorical system: widespread public identification with the 
national space is held to be an effect of this form of cultural organization. Media are 
boundary markers, intimately related to the ‘political roof’ that caps a culture and makes 
it into a nation-state” (Schlesinger 2000, p. 22). He points out that Billig’s argument of 
nationalism’s banality has much to do with the question of nation-maintenance than 
Anderson’s account of ‘imagined community’ (Billig 1995, Anderson 1991). In this 
account, Anderson is more interested in the question of nation-formation than that of 
nation-maintenance. However, films are vital to the argument that modern nations are 
‘imagined communities’ and thus are part and parcel of the formative role of cinema’s 
constitutive of the national totality. Smith argues that cinema and historical film can aid 
in the reconstruction of ethnoscapes in which “ethnic atmosphere is closely linked to the 
poetic landscape of distinctive ethnic communities (ethnies), or ‘ethnoscapes’…so that 
the land comes to belong to a people in the same way as the people belong to a 
particular land – creating an ancestral ‘homeland’” (Smith 2000, p. 55). Parallel to this 
argument, Higson highlights two central concepts of national cinema. For him, national 
cinema, on one hand, “[1]seems to look inward, reflecting on the nation itself, on its 
past, present and future, its cultural heritage, its indigenous traditions, its sense of 
common identity and continuity”. On the other hand, “a national cinema [2]seems to 
look out across its borders, asserting its difference from other national cinemas, 
proclaiming its sense of otherness” (Higson 2000, p. 67).   
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 Furthermore, Williams argues that development of nationalism is an ongoing 
process requiring recognition of the constantly renegotiated identities found in cinema 
(Williams 2002). There is little doubt that print-media played a crucial role in forming 
and disseminating the concept of nation and in turn yielded self-consciousness among 
similar ethnicities. However it is the ascendance of modern mass media (films in 
particular) that play a greater role in the process of reproducing, sustaining and 
redefining nationalism
6
 as influenced by the socio-political conditions. In this regard, 
Williams highlights that “the cinema would be an essential part of a process of defining 
nations-and not solely in Anderson’s last, multilingual phase of nation formation” 
(Williams 2002, p. 4, emphasis in original). In other words, cinema reflects national 
values, political tensions, and conflicts providing the backdrop for socio-political 
projects and understanding the current geopolitical events.   
Additionally, cinema and the other forms of media can become a geopolitical 
arena where the contestations of nation and nationality take place. In the case of 
Palestinian (and/or Israeli) national cinema (a cinema of exile), for example, we see the 
ongoing negotiations of home/land and how the place identity become paramount as in 
the example of Michel Khleifi’s film, Fertile Memory (1980). Stated differently, cinema 
not only sustains the nation-state but helps to essentialize a nation to a state, reactivating 
the constant struggle over the definition of a nation-state. In this sense, cinema sets the 
                                                          
6
 According to the instrumentalist view, nationalism is a political construction/project that seeks greater 
power and hegemony over a delimited territory and people. This project is deliberately engineered by 
elites, and legitimized and sustained by cultural products.  Therefore, culture and politics are inseparable 
domains of nationalism and in the construction of national identity (Gellner 1983). Similarly Anderson 
argues that nationalism operates within the idea of ‘imagined political community’ wherein individuals 
believe that they hold certain histories, dreams, narratives, and myths in common (Mountz 2009).  
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stage for post-nationalist or counter-nationalist arguments yielding alternative 
definitions and practices. Ranganathan, for instance, investigates how “national identity 
that is based on differences or diversities undergoes subtle but significant changes with 
some exclusions becoming inclusive over a period of time” through Bollywood films 
(Ranganathan 2010, p. 42). In her study of popular culture as represented by and 
through an analysis of the Bollywood film Swades (2004), she concludes that Indian 
national identity is moving towards greater inclusiveness even though such 
“inclusiveness is still governed by some traditional beliefs and fundamental beliefs 
enshrined in the Indian Constitution” (p. 52). The argument here is that a national 
cinema can function as a medium to define, sustain, or contest concepts such as nation, 
nationality, and national identity, which in turn defines what we are and what we are 
not.  
 To further the argument, cinema, particularly in emerging countries, can 
function as an important visual-language (although Anderson emphasizes print-
language) to formulate an ‘imagined political community’ while creating new ways of 
thinking about the past and present (Anderson 1991). In this regard, cinema allows 
states to disseminate nationalist ideas and traditional values supportive of conceptions 
of the nation as a solid community distinguished from ‘others’ but imagined as 
sovereign and limited. Although the (presumed) effects of cinema on audience attitudes 
remain unclear and problematic, some films can play an important role in the process of 
sustaining of national identities and informing the audience about their nationhood. 
Williams argues that if films “cannot by themselves mobilize nations and give them a 
new direction, they can, apparently, reflect and keep in circulation values and behaviors 
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associated with particular nation” (Williams 2002, p. 8 emphasis in original). In this 
sense, various national cinemas are “an integral part of the process of understanding the 
forces – economic, social, historical, geopolitical, cultural – that shape our present 
existence” (Jones-Martin 2011, p. 15). Thus, through national cinema productions, a 
cinematic thinking of the nation, history and present becomes possible. For instance, 
Jones-Martin highlights that contemporary South Korean science fiction films engage 
with the nation’s emergence from a past under military rule in the form of renegotiating 
and reconstructing of its history. Similarly, Turkish cinema, which will be discussed in 
the following section, reproduces nationalism, national narratives, the nation’s past and 
present that coalesce with ideal images of the nation intended by the nation builders. 
Drawn from discussions above about national cinema and cinematized nationalism 
discourses, this research situates the VWP as a geopolitical text that refashions national 
narratives and claims to become a major source of inspirations for the publics. Thus 
including literature on national cinema and conventionalities of nationalist discourses 
embedded in popular cinema aids this study to better understand the geopolitical 
implications of the film in Turkish context.  
2.3 Turkish cinema 
When the Turkish film Recep Ivedik (2008) was released in theaters, the Turkish 
Minister of Culture Ertuğrul Günay commented on the film saying that it was a 
“rezalet” (scandalous) film (Arslan 2009). The reason why he called the film scandalous 
was partially because the Minister of Culture did not like the ways in which a ‘Turkish 
man’ was portrayed in the film. The film failed to portray the country in a positive light 
to European viewers and misrepresented ideals of Turkishness. In the film, the Recep 
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Ivedik character is portrayed as “a hairy, bear-like and utterly uncivilized man with 
outmoded cultural traits”… representing the “archetypal Other of the Turkish elite or, 
possibly, the stereotypical migrant worker in Europe. In many ways he is similar to the 
Sacha Baron Cohen character Borat” (Arslan 2009, p. 93). The Minister’s angry 
comments, among many other cinema critics’ and commentators’ attacks on the film, 
were focused on the idea that the nation and its people should only be represented 
positively and as modern as possible in order to demonstrate the Turkish people’s level 
of culture and taste. Surprisingly, the public responded to this ‘crisis of representation’ 
by buying 4.3 million tickets, resulting in an all-time high for ticket sales, which stood 
until 2012.  
 In this section of the chapter, I provide a brief history of Turkish cinema and its 
connections with national narratives and state ideologies that have been employed in 
Turkish films (exceptions will also be discussed). It is the argument of this study that 
national cinemas, Turkish or otherwise, have close ties with states, state-favored 
ideologies and mainstream cultural values (in addition to financial relationships). 
Turkish cinema and its political fragmentations (e.g. white cinema) are examples of 
these relations. It is my belief that without reviewing the socio-economic and political 
developments relating to Turkish cinema, a complete understanding of VWP and 
audience interpretations of the film may be difficult. 
 According to Robins and Aksoy, Turkish cinema
7
 “has been structured in terms 
of the progressive emergence of a distinctive national cinema” (Robins and Aksoy 
                                                          
7
 It is important to highlight that the term ‘Turkish cinema’ is problematic as well as the subject matter of 
an ongoing debate among cinema writers and academicians. Central to the debate includes Turkish 
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2000, p. 210). The desired image of the nation, in this case the Republic of Turkey 
whose ideals include the principles of Kemalism,
8
 necessitated the emergence of a 
national cinema to reflect these ideals. Thus, Turkish censorship of Turkish cinema 
aimed to insure the protection and projection of the national culture was accomplished 
according to the state’s wishes.   
The first time cinema was introduced in Turkey corresponds to the Ottoman 
period in late 1890s, with a private screening of a Polish-Jewish-Romanian-citizen 
Sigmung Weinberg in the Yıldız Sarayı (the Sultan’s court) in Istanbul (BYEGM 2010). 
In the developmental years of Turkish cinema, minorities and foreigners played a 
significant role, from opening up private cinema halls to educating future Turkish 
filmmakers. The first film made by an Ottoman citizen was a documentary, Ayastefanos 
Abidesinin Yıkılışı (The Demolition of the Russian Monument at the San Stefano) in 
1914. Since many film producers were either foreign or minorities, little information 
                                                                                                                                                                          
cinema’s reductionist character in which different ethnic group’s cinema productions and the multiplicity 
of Turkey’s geography are ignored. For example an academician Fahrettin Altun argues that ‘Turkish 
cinema’ denies the existence of ‘Kurdish cinema’ and he adds that the term ‘Turkish cinema’ is as much 
imagined and fictive as the term ‘Turkish nation’. Altun states that a German-Turkish director Fatih Akin, 
for example, belongs to both Turkish and German cinema (Altun 2011). Others, on the other hand, such 
as Cihat Arinc argue that unless it is not essentialized to exclude geographic and cultural diversity, the 
term ‘Turkish cinema’ can be used, referring to the cinema produced in Turkey by Turkish producers. 
However, he notes that cinema cannot be reduced to a nation’s geographic borders. Thus, it is hard for 
one to claim that incomplete nation-states can have a complete national cinema. For this very reason, 
Arslan (2011) uses ‘new cinema of Turkey’ instead of ‘Turkish cinema’ to exclude Turkificationist, 
nationalist, and republican characteristics of Turkish cinema that can be disrespectful to the diversity of 
the country.  
8
 “Kemalism, a synonym of Ataturkism, is a political philosophy that highlights western-style 
modernization and rationality (substituting reason for religion). Kemalism includes principles of 
republicanism, secularism, nationalism, popularism, statism and reformism which later became the main 
principles of the Republican People’s Party, CHP. According to Heper, the CHP and the Kemalist civil 
bureaucracy converted ‘Kemalism’ from ‘a way of rational thinking to a political manifesto –ideology- 
and considered themselves its guardian’” (Anaz, Keceli and Shelley, p. 166).   
43 
 
remains about films made before between 1914 and 1923 (Erdogan and Gokturk 2001).  
The new era of Turkish cinema starts with Muhsin Ertugrul’s return from Germany. In 
this period, a number of films were produced based on well-known Turkish literary 
books such as novelist Halide Edip Adivar’s Ateşten Gömlek (The Ordeal)  (1923) and 
Muhsin Ertugrul’s Bir Millet Uyanıyor (A Nation Awakens) (1932) dealing with the 
War of Independence. The 1940s saw an increase in film making in Turkey due to tax 
policies levying higher taxes on foreign versus domestically produced films.  Municipal 
taxes on the earnings of domestic film productions were reduced to 25 percent while 
tariff on foreign films remained 70 percent. This was also the period that cinema 
laborers and other associates began organizing themselves in a professional manner 
marking the beginning of the institutionalization of Turkish cinema. From the 1950s 
until early 1970s, Turkish cinema boomed, producing an average of 200 films annually 
(Arslan 2009). These films mostly dealt with social issues such as consequences of 
mass migration to urban cities (mainly Istanbul) from the countryside, labor strikes, 
industrialization, poverty, and along with -and an always-appreciated subject- love (see 
the trend in Figure 2.1). Popular Turkish cinema of this era also created its Hollywood 
type cinema-locale called Yeşilçam9 cinema (pine-tree cinema), referring to the street 
where film production companies were located and the labor was recruited (Mutlu 
2005). This period’s film industry was greatly influenced by political and economic 
                                                          
9
 Yeşilçam refers to the name of a street in Beyoglu, Istanbul. This street and the surrounding area are 
known for concentrations of minority populations and being the destination for art and cultural activities. 
Since the production of film-making reached to its peak around 1950s, Yeşilçam, commonly known as the 
‘little Hollywood,’ became a famous site of film productions. In its heyday (between 1965 and 1975) the 
place was not only the site of many film productions, but also the place of an agglomeration of movie 
production as well as the offices of important popular cinema magazines and the center of cinema 
journalism.  
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developments. For example, the Democratic Party’s leadership after Turkey developed 
a multi-party system brought relative freedom for private investments in the 
entertainment sector encouraged the diversification of films subject matter. The liberal 
environment that the 1961 constitution built also helped the cinema sector to revitalize 
itself as an art form. During this time, film makers attempted to use cinema to carry 
social problems into the big screen as part of social responsibility that they felt (Esen 
2010). Even though the military interventions of the 1970s brought politization in 
social-realist cinema and human-rights problems in the country, critical artistic film 
making continued to be visible. A great example would be the Kurdish director, writer 
and actor Yılmaz Güney and his alternative cinema works. Güney critically examined 
the politics of everyday life and matters of the lower-class and then brought this into the 
cinema. His lower-class background and stubborn nature was greatly appreciated by 
audiences and earned him the nickname the ‘Ugly King’ of Turkish cinema (Suner 
2010, p. 5). His 1970 milestone film Umut (Hope) and the most internationally known 
film Yol (The Way) (1982) caused Yılmaz Güney to be named one of the greatest male 
stars of all time in Turkey. His realist style and critique of 1980 military intervention 
did not escape from the eyes of the state and he was arrested several times until he 
escaped from prison for France. His critical and realist manner of addressing of social 
problems garnered his films decades of censorship by the Turkish state.  
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Figure 2-1: Urban population in millions in Turkey.  
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute, TÜİK, 2004  
 
In the late 1970s and the 1980s, to borrow Suner’s words, “Turkish film turned 
into a joke, connoting bad taste and banality” (Suner 2010, p. 8) because of the factors 
such as the economic crisis of the 1970s and the ensuing economic hardship. This led to 
disappearing cinema audiences, film production firms shifting their investment into 
different and more profitable businesses, and the military coup of 1980 with 
concomitant state censorship of cultural productions (Suner 2010). During this decline, 
film producers aimed to reach Turkish immigrant workers abroad and the domestic 
young-male audiences by offering cheap pornographic productions. This period 
witnessed the growth of two different paradoxical directions in cinema: individually 
sponsored political films (as in the case of Yılmaz Güney films) and pornography. 
Cinema lost its diversity of spectators mainly because of the latter. Until the late 1990s, 
going-to-cinema could easily mean going to see a pornographic film. Thus cinema 
salons became the concern for public and the sites of immorality because of 
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pornographic shows. With cheap scenarios and pornographic pictures, film makers 
targeted only the young-male population in urban centers. As mentioned earlier, the 
1970s when political and economic hardship hit the most the country, pornography 
became the site of entertainment and place of escape for young-male-urban audiences. 
Much of the hardship was because of the US’s economic embargo on Turkey due to the 
Cyprus crisis and poppy production in Turkey (Arslan 2011). Because of this hardship, 
people in big numbers moved from rural areas to big cities for the search of jobs and 
young males were the first to migrate. As a consequence of this massive migration to 
cities and the economic hardship experiences, culturally mixed metropolitan people 
sought to temporarily escape from the reality of life and flooded in cinemas where 
pornography was shown. In television, the situation was no different than cinema. Soft-
pornography was also available in the homes of millions. The state appeared to be 
unaffected by pornography which was perceived to be less dangerous than political 
films (Esen 2010). Furthermore, people were in need of entertainment, and this form of 
entertainment diverted their attention and caused them not to question political 
instability in the country (Esen 2010). On top of this vulgar film production of the 
1970s, through the early 1990s, globalization and Turkey’s opening its doors to foreign 
investors deepened this cinema crisis. In early 1990s, Hollywood film corporations’ 
direct investment dominated the distribution network in Turkey. The numbers of 
national television and radio stations throughout Turkey increased and brought Turkish 
cinema to the brink of disappearing completely.  During this time not only did the 
number of films produced decline precipitously, but the size of audiences declined as 
well (Esen 2010). Turkey’s shrinking economy, lack of investment, and increase in 
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unemployment numbers throughout the country pummeled the Turkish film sector. 
Foreign companies such as Warner Bros. and United International Pictures increased 
their investment in better cinema technology which in turn resulted in increased ticket 
prices. This then brought down the number of cinema goers and made cinema once 
again the activity of educated, young, middle-and-upper-class city dwellers (Suner 
2010).  
It was during the mid-1990s when Turkish cinema garnered attention in the 
domestic and international markets. The first time a film successfully merged 
Hollywood-style editing technology with classical Yeşilçam themes was in 1996 with 
the film Eşkiya (The Bandit) (1996).  This film attracted more than 2.5 million viewers 
to the movie theaters, a first in the history of Turkish cinema. Turkish cinema gained 
momentum after the late 1990s in the search of the idea of home/homeland. Güneşe 
Yolculuk (Journey to the Sun) (1999) can be a good example of a cinema that 
investigates concepts such as identity, home, urban life, and childhood memories. Suner 
explains films of this era: “revealed tensions, anxieties, and dilemmas around the 
questions of belonging, identity, and memory in contemporary Turkish society” (Suner 
2010, p. 1).  In the early 2000s, political and economic changes followed the AKP’s 
successful integration negotiations with the European Union and consolidated Turkish 
cinema’s domestic and international ascendance (Suner 2010, Arslan 2011). The AKP 
opened the doors for foreign and domestic investments in the cultural industry of 
Turkey. For instance, the Turkish Ministry of Culture increased financial and logistical 
incentives for the films that advertised Turkey’s image abroad and helped consolidate 
Turkish culture and values at home. During this period, not only did the number of 
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cinema goers increase, but also the number of national and international awards given to 
Turkish films increased.   
In the history of Turkish cinema movement, there are close connections between 
the state’s economic, social and political conditions and the volume and characteristics 
of cultural productions. The cinema of a country in the center of Cold War politics such 
as Turkey is not exempt from this relationship. Cinema in Turkey, as in many other 
nations, has always been treated as part of indoctrination, teaching norms or negotiating 
established traditions. There were many movements that wanted to use cinema to 
convey their ideological messages. Among them, one movement commonly known as 
‘conservative cinema’ was and remains one of the important cinema waves. In this 
wave we see Islamic ways of life and moralistic teachings reflected on the big screen. 
This cinematic representation of Islamic culture can be loosely traced to Halid Refiğ’s 
ulusal sinema
10
 (national cinema). Ulusal sinema is thought to be a movement as an 
alternative to the yeni sinema (new cinema) which was influenced from the French 
nouvelle vague cinema (‘new wave’ of 1950s and 60s in French cinema) and the wave 
of third cinema in developing countries (Robins and Aksoy 2000). However, loosely 
named conservative cinema movement lacks a clear definition or description. Many 
cinema writers associate this genre with conservative presentations and nationalistic 
ways of understanding socio-political events, often referencing the Ottoman period and 
the style and motifs of popular Anatolian culture (Robins and Aksoy 2000, Arslan 2011, 
Monceau 2000, Avcı and Kılınç 2009). Furthermore, Avcı and Kılınç argue that this 
                                                          
10 “Ulusal sinema ( ulusal is the modern Turkish word for "national"), which supported the Turkish 
dimension of national identity and milli sinema (milli is the old Ottoman word for "national") which 
promoted the Islamic dimension of national identity by emphasizing the Turkish-Islamic heritage of 
society and rejecting the influence of western cultural imperialism.” (Monceau  2000, p. 1). 
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conservative cinema is more than just filming Islamic themes for audiences. This 
cinema movement also includes other Islamic literature and productions as well, such as 
Islamic novels and music sponsored by groups of investors contributing Islamic capital 
(Avcı and Kılınç 2009). Yücel Çakmaklı’s milli sinema (Islamic cinema) also shares 
similar ideas and concepts of Halid Refig’s ulusal sinema (national cinema) but 
predominantly emphasizes Islamic themes and ideas (see Table 2.2). For Çakmaklı, 
milli sinema identity “could only be achieved by producing films that reflect Anatolian 
realities, which [he maintained] embody the beliefs, national character and traditions of 
Muslim Turkish people…” (as cited in Robins and Aksoy 2000, p. 214). Çakmaklı 
argues that the narratives of Hollywood and Western cinemas in general don’t tell “our 
stories, those of a Turkish-Islamic identity” (Arslan 2011, p. 128). Çakmaklı, similarly 
to Refig, desires a “national cinema placed against Western cinema, incorporating and 
reflecting the traditions and mores of Turks” (p. 128). As seen in his works (commonly 
described as conservative or white cinema), Çakmaklı’s cinema is one that ultimately 
privileges the national unity and Islamic sensibility, connoting the essential, pure and 
original self in relation to cosmopolitan Western cinema, its ‘otherness’ and distance to 
Turkish values and national narratives (Arslan 2011).   
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Table 2-2: Films with Islamic themes on the silver screen 1989-1996 
Year Movie Director Work Producer Sponsor/viewers 
1990 Yalniz Degilsiniz 
(You are not alone) 
Mesut 
Ucakan 
Ustun 
Inanc’s 
novel 
Feza Film 250.000 viewers saw the 
film in the first 4 months 
1990 Alman Gelin 
(German Bride) 
Mehmet 
Tanriseve
r 
Abdullah 
Sadik’s 
novel 
Feza Film  
1991 Cizme (ilk 
Ezan/ezan gunu) 
Boot (the first 
Azan/the day of 
Azan) 
Ismail 
Gunes 
Omer Lutfi 
Mete’s novel 
Feza Film  
1991 Sonsuza Yurumek 
(Walking to 
eternity) 
Mesut 
Ucakan 
Ustun 
Inanc’s 
novel 
Atlas Nehir Yapim YIMPAS 
(chain store) 
1991 Sahibini Arayan 
Madalya 
(The Medal looking 
for its owner) 
Yucel 
Cakmakli 
Tarik Bugra’ 
novel 
Ajans 1400 Turkiye Diyanet Vakfi 
(Turkish Religious Affairs 
Foundation) 
1993 Danimarkali Gelin 
(Danish Bride) 
Salih 
Diriklik 
Salih 
Diriklik 
(Film Script) 
TGRT 
(Used to be a conservative 
TV station owned by Ihlas 
Holding. Now it is owned 
by Fox Broadcasting 
Company and called ‘Fox’) 
 
1993 Kelebekler Sonsuza 
Ucar 
Iskilipli Atif Hoca 
(Butterflies fly to 
Eternity: Atif Hodja 
from Iskilip) 
Mesut 
Ucakan 
Mesut 
Ucakan 
(Film script) 
Atlas Yapim 403.000 numbers of viewers saw 
the film in the first 4 months. 
1993 Garip Bir 
Kolleksiyoncu 
(a bizarre 
collectioner) 
Nurettin 
Ozel 
Nurettin 
Ozel 
(Film script) 
Emel Film Kombassan Holding 
(Islamic Capital) 
1993 Besinci Boyut 
(The fifth 
dimension) 
Ismail 
Gunes 
 Esra Film  
1994 Kanayan Yara 
Bosna 
(Bleeding wound: 
Bosnia) 
Yucel 
Cakmakli 
Ustun Inanc 
(Film script) 
 Ihlas Holding 
(Islamic capital) 
1994 Olumsuz 
Karanfiller 
(Immortal 
gillyflowers) 
Mesut 
Ucakan 
Mesut 
Ucakan 
(Film script) 
Esra Film  
1994 Bize Nasil 
Kiydiniz? 
(How did you 
sacrifice us?) 
Metin 
Camurcu 
Emine 
Senlikoglu’s 
novel 
Esra Film  
1996 Son Turbedar 
(The last tomb man) 
Yucel 
Cakmakli 
Ahmet Efe 
Nurettin 
Ozel 
Esra Film Kombassan Holding 
Source: Table is adapted from Avcı and Kılınç (2009).  
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Similar to Islamic and national cinema movements, a new approach known as 
‘white cinema’ (beyaz sinema) emerged in the 1980s11.  Şen who coined the term ‘white 
cinema’ argues that white cinema is inclusive but broader than both Refig’s ‘ulusal 
sinema’ and Çakmaklı’s ‘milli sinema’. To him, white cinema is more than Islamic and 
national. White cinema deploys universal concepts and values.  White cinema, to Şen, 
“is the intention of reflecting the main purpose of human disposition, accordance with 
needs of the time, into the white screen in an artistic and aesthetical manner” (Sen 2010, 
Culture section, ¶ 11). Further he explains white cinema as “cinematographic works 
which respect the religion, language, culture, traditions and customs of our people, 
which promote and protect lasting values to which we are faithful” (Monceau 2000, 
White Cinema section, ¶ 4).  The conceptualization of white cinema is highly national, 
traditional and ideological. Thus cinema in this approach becomes a form of aesthetic 
work, Islamic propaganda, and a didactic tool. For that reason, it can be argued that the 
ulusal and milli cinema are part of the white cinema movement. A well-known (maybe 
the first) white cinema production is director Yücel Çakmaklı’s Minyeli Abdullah 
(Abdullah of Minye) (1989). Adapted from well-known novelist Hekimoğlu İsmail’s 
book (Minyeli Abdullah, 1967), this film sets a new nation-wide box-office record, 
attracting a half-million moviegoers despite many theater owners’ refusal to show it 
because of its Islamic themes. The film narrates the suffering of a street porter, 
Abdullah. He dedicates himself to Islam and the film depicts his moralistic struggles 
during the reign of King Farouk of Egypt when conservative thoughts were despised, 
                                                          
11
 In this study, I call these three trends in cinema as ‘conservative cinema’ within which one can easily 
find general characteristics of Islamic, national and white cinema and for doing this I would not be the 
first to call ‘conservative cinema’ where is all the elements of these three types of cinema can be found.  
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disparaged, and banned while at the same time western lifestyle and philosophies were 
welcomed and enforced by the Egyptian government (Avcı and Kılınç 2009). The 
protagonist fights against the sabotage of Islamic values by both imported Western 
ideologists and corrupted Egyptian government officials. The film Minyeli Abdullah 
seeks to reorient Islamic values and attempts to educate illiterate and confused people of 
post-World War II Egypt. He becomes an exemplary Muslim within a hostile society in 
Egypt. Even though the stories in the film were supposed to have happened in Egypt, 
the Turkish government expressed strong displeasure at the depictions in the film and 
accused of the film of undermining the Turkish government and statism. Consequently, 
the film was censored for years.
12
 The government censorship of critical cultural 
products, Minyeli Abdullah and other leftist films
13
 caused these films to be reproduced, 
distributed and watched through personal contacts and away from the state’s eye right 
after banning the film from public showings. In other words, people clung to these films 
and watched them passionately because they treated these films as a manifesto and the 
proper way to express what they believed. After the Minyeli Abdullah experience, 
conservative/white cinema directors such as Mesut Uçakan and Yücel Çakmaklı 
produced many documentaries and films that highlighted traditional values, along with 
humanistic and universal themes. Films such as Yalnız Değilsiniz (You Are Not Alone) 
by Mesut Uçakan and Bize Nasıl Kıydınız? (How Did You Sacrifice Us?) by Metin 
Çamurcu are other examples of conservative/white cinema of the 1990s. However, 
                                                          
12
 The author, Hekimoğlu İsmail, was also put in prison because of his book, Minyeli Abdullah, before it 
was adapted to cinema. 
13
 Umut (Hope) and Yol (The Road) Yilmaz Guney films and Otobus (Bus) a Tunc Okan film are other 
few examples of censored films in Turkey.  
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when a general decline in production of quality films in Turkish cinema became visible, 
the conservative cinema production was also affected greatly. The main reasons for this 
decline were Hollywood’s domination of the Turkish film market, increases in ticket 
prices, economic downturn, and the state censorship during the 1990s. It is only recently 
that cinema’s socio-political effects have been rediscovered by conservative cinema 
producers and they have again begun to include Islamic and traditional topics in their 
films (Guven 2008). This new interest for making films about conservative and 
nationalist themes grew exponentially especially when Islamic and/or conservative 
business firms increased their market share in the Turkish economy and began investing 
in the art sector as they used to invest in religious structures and activities. These 
wealthy business people backed art forms that would highlight traditional values, 
enforce cultural unity and advocate for national togetherness as in the TV series Kurtlar 
Vadisi (Valley of the Wolves, 2003), New York’ta Beş Minare (Five Minarets in New 
York, 2010), Hür Adam (Free Man, 2010), and Fetih 1453 (Conquest 1453, 2012). For 
example, the producer and the director of Hür Adam, Mehmet Tanrisever, is also a 
businessman and the owner of the Feza Film company which produced other 
conservative/white cinema films such as Minyeli Abdullah I and II.  Tanrisever’s return 
to cinema as a producer and director after 20 years of absence was because of his belief 
in cinema’s role in educating people. Tanrisever stated this to a newspaper reporter 
about his recent film Free Man: “conservative business people now have money but 
they are hardly motivated to invest in art. I believe that cinema is the best tool to 
educate people… if I knew my film attracts no audience, I would still make this film” 
(Tokay 2010, Pazar section, ¶ 5). His remarks on the film’s significance for a 
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production displays similarities to what the scriptwriter, Cuneyt Aysan, said about his 
film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine. Aysan in an interview with me said that “even if 
one person sees the film, it means a success for us. Quantity is not an important matter 
here; what is important is how successful we are able to present an alternative version 
of the story objectively if we cannot change the perceptions completely” (see Chapter 
6). This demonstrates that conservative cinema producers have different agendas other 
than producing just art and entertainment.   
This recent growing interest in conservative film production, in many cases, is 
understood to have connections with so called the light-Islamist party, Justice and 
Development Party, AKP. A commonly held belief is that the ruling party, AKP, 
supported conservative/white cinema-art sector because they both shared the same 
cause (Ugur 2010). For instance, Ugur claims that the director of New York’ta Beş 
Minare, a Mahsun Kırmızıgül film, enforces AKP-oriented international and national 
policies, and Fetullah Gulen’s14 tendentious world view. The notion that there is a 
connection between the AKP, its policies and number of films made recently by 
conservative film-makers is also brought up by focus group discussants in this study 
(see Chapter 9). Audiences of VWP in this study highlighted their view that if the AKP 
was not in power, the VWP phenomenon would not be as remarkable as it is today. 
Additionally, Table 7-19 in Chapter 7 shows that after combining the results of 
‘definitely agree’ and ‘somewhat agree’, 41 percent of respondents indicate that the film 
                                                          
14
 Often referred to as ‘The Gulen Movement’ or ‘The Fetullah Gulen Community’, it is a social (Islamic) 
movement that originates in Turkey. The movement has millions of supporters in Turkey and hundreds of 
schools and cultural centers, many publication houses, and television stations all around the world. The 
leader of the community, Fettullah Gulen (Hodja Effendi), currently resides in the Poconos of 
Pennsylvania.  
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reflects the current government’s Middle East policies.  Ugur notes that Kırmızıgül 
finds no problem with including Turkish Minister Egemen Bağış’s statement on 
violation of human rights in Turkey in which Bağış claims that there are no human 
rights abuses in Turkey. Ugur finds this propagandist insertion unsurprising because the 
Ministry of Culture financially supported Kırmızıgül’s film. In addition to the state’s 
support, conservative business people and firms were behind his film (Ugur 2010).   
As in the Minyeli Abdullah, New York’ta Beş Minare, Yalnız Değilsiniz, and 
Kurtlar Vadisi, conservative cinema continues to depict Muslim and/or Turkish 
identities as pious, devote, tolerant, sacrificing, honorific, just, forgiving, patient, and 
generous. Thus, the need for conservative concepts in a national cinema is a key for 
conservative film-makers. Halit Refiğ, in one of his interviews, highlights this need for 
a national cinema culture as:  
In order to continue as a nation we need to have a national consciousness. 
In order to … protect our society from external and internal dangers, to 
maintain its unity and protect it from disintegration, we need to have a 
national consciousness. In cinema, this consciousness will be possible 
only through the existence of a conscious National Cinema (as cited in 
Robins and Aksoy 2000, p. 215). 
 
As Refig indicates above, the need for including Islamic, nationalist, and 
traditional themes in films is an imperative, and in parallel with conservative cinema it 
will continue to become a dominant movement in the Turkish cinema-art sector. Often, 
films that narrate conservative views garner the attention of millions of viewers 
nationally and internationally as well as film critics and political actors. It is in this 
context that I examine the film VWP, an example of conservative cinema which 
harmonizes nationalism, heroism and moralism. Furthermore, factors such as changes in 
peoples’ economic conditions, the development of Hollywood-style editing 
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technologies by film producers and the increasing diversity of film subjects positively 
affected the cinema sector in Turkey, resulting in an increase in the numbers of movie-
goers and ticket sales. In other words, political economy of filmmaking positively 
affected Turkish filmmakers broadly and conservative film producers in particular.  
As mentioned earlier, economic developments, improvements in people’s 
purchasing power, the availability of technology, and the transnational movements of 
ideas and film-making techniques changed the landscape of cinema production in 
Turkey. In this atmosphere conservative cinema producers as well as other fractions of 
Turkish cinema found an entrepreneurial nest to put a signature on many films that 
would express old themes in new ways. These films are welcomed by many in Turkish 
audiences and ultimately influenced the way cinema is experienced and thought of. For 
example, the first time in Turkish cinema history that a film included a story that would 
be similar to that of what people would expect to see in James Bond or Rambo movies 
was the VWP predecessors Valley of the Wolves-Iraq. The plot, which saw Turkish 
Special Agents conducting operations within a neighboring country was thought to be 
something ‘new’, an expression of potential extraterritoriality to Turkish audiences. 
Following the former film, VWP also attempted to transcend the aesthetic and thematic 
paradigms of classic Yesilcam cinema, “offering simultaneously a liminal perspective 
on Turkey and making Turkish cinema more relevant beyond the boundaries of the 
nation-state [but loyal to the nation-state] and a serious player on the World Cinema 
stage” (Arslan 2009, p. 89). Films such as these underscore and reproduce the national 
narratives and help to crystallize ways of thinking about Turkey’s contemporary 
geopolitics and its strategic position in the Middle East. In other words, these 
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transnational, action-political films reintroduce a Turkey-centered geopolitical mode of 
thought as they reproduce geographies and histories of the Middle East. That said, films 
are not the only means of nation building or sustaining national narratives and cultural 
forms. As I will discuss in the next section, other forms of communication technologies 
such as television, the internet, print media, etc. can become important parts of the 
meaning-making processes in terms of nationalism. Indeed, the film selected as the 
subject for this study established its brand name as TV series first. Valley of the Wolves 
and its main character, Polat Alemdar, was a well-known phenomenon for Turkish 
audiences through television before this serial was made into movies. Additionally, it 
was the internet that helped to diffuse the Polat Alemdar character’s philosophy, 
becoming the center for discussions about the film and its themes.  Behlil confirms this 
saying “popular television series are uploaded online by channels soon after their initial 
broadcasting, allowing the fans to not only catch up or view shows repeatedly, but also 
to discuss them on the online forums” (Behlil 2010, p. 5). 
I want to conclude the discussion of Turkish national cinema and its meaning 
within contemporary Turkish context by including Dorsay’s description of it, beginning 
with a 1960s new-wave as cited in Harris’s work. Dorsay describes Turkish national 
cinema as “the collective and subconscious search of the Turkish people for identity – a 
people who have been hearing for decades a nationalistic, militaristic and arrogant 
discourse, but which is constantly frustrated by a refusal of its acceptance into the 
European Community – a community which has been presented by generations of local 
politicians as a natural and inevitable ‘promised land’” (Harris 2008, p. 83). This is to 
say that the debate about what constitutes Turkish national cinema will continue as the 
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process of refashioning of national identity and Turkish heterogeneous subjectivity 
continues within Turkish cinema.  
2.4 The importance of selected Turkish mass media forms to Valley of 
the Wolves-Palestine 
There are several reasons to discuss Turkish media, communication technologies, their 
social use, and general characteristics. The first is that media (television in particular) 
have always been an important tool for nationalization processes within the country. For 
that reason and for years, the state did not allow any private media companies that 
might jeopardize the unity of the state and national togetherness
15
. Therefore, Turkey’s 
national radio and television stations have not only been controlled and operated by the 
state, but the national guard has always physically guarded the buildings as well, 
highlighting the state’s interest in media as a strategic asset. The second reason is that 
media are important source of information that shapes, informs, and mobilizes millions 
of minds every day. Television and the internet in particular are the most direct way to 
reach cinema productions making these mediums too important to discard. As I will 
explain later, millions watch movies either on television, computer or illegally-produced 
DVDs at home. Many of my focus group interviewees, for example, indicated that they 
watched the film VWP via illegally-copied DVDs at the same time when the film was 
still in theaters. Another reason why television needs to be included in this study is that 
television and popular cinema have maintained a partnership to retain their sizable 
audience and provide another means of financing film products in Turkey. There are 
                                                          
15
 Turkish Penal Code, 301, should be mentioned here saying that this legal establishment has penalized 
many journalists and thinkers for insulting the Turkish nation and nationality. Famed Nobel Prize-
winning Turkish writer Orhan Pamuk is one of many.  
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many examples of renowned television stars and directors “who have found second 
homes in popular cinema productions” and the Polat Alemdar character highlighted in 
this study is just one of many (Harris 2008, p. 81). Polat Alemdar was and still is a 
popular television character before the production of VWP. Thus the advantages of 
doing cross-market strategies are that directors and actors bring the technology of film 
making and experience with them to another market. Harris points out that the top five 
all-time Turkish box office successes are films that whose actors or producers have a 
television background. For these reasons, I am compelled to include television’s 
structure in Turkey, its contribution to affecting publics, and people’s engagement with 
television media from different angles. 
  I exclude Turkish print media and radio from analysis in this study not because 
they are insignificant to this research; it is because focus of my investigation is set 
around television, internet and film technologies and the attendant narratives. Indeed, 
Turkish-language print and audio-visual media remain the main sources of information 
for millions of Turkish people in Turkey and beyond (e.g Turkish print media in 
European cities). Radio also continues to be the primary distributor of Turkish popular 
culture to mass audiences in Turkey and abroad. For example, the state-run Turkish 
Radio and Television’s, TRT, international radio service Türkiyenin Sesi (The Voice of 
Turkey) broadcasts in 26 languages
16
 all around the world (TRT 2010).  
                                                          
16
 Turkish, German, Arabic, Albanian, Azeri Turkish, Bosnian, Bulgarian, Chinese, Dari, Persian, French, 
Georgian, Croatian, English, Spanish, Italian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Hungarian, Macedonian, Uzbek, Pashto, 
Rumanian, Russian, Serbian, Tatar, Turcoman, Urdu, Uygur, Greek, Armenian, and Kurdish. 
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2.4.1 Television  
Television in Turkey is the most important medium for influencing public opinion and 
conveying information (Aksoy and Robins 1997, Hortacsu and Erturk 2003, Uray and 
Burnaz 2003). According to the Radio Television Supreme Council (RTUK), the 
average daily television viewing time per person is about 5.09 hours in the week days 
and 5.15 hours on the weekends (Baris 2010). 56.9 percent of households own one 
television set while 34.5 percent have two sets (see Figure 2.2) (RTUK 2010). Turkish 
state television, TRT, started broadcasting in 1964 and explains the main goals of 
broadcasting in its mission statement as:  
…to provide its viewers of various age, profession, educational and 
cultural groups with correct, unbiased, comprehensible and up-to-date 
news, producing programs that will promote their educational and cultural 
levels and their integration with the national culture, and raise the general 
educational level of the country. (TRT 2010, Mission statement section ¶ 
8) 
 
As indicated above TRT still continues to stick its purpose of existence. In the 
1970s, TRT was very successful offering the news to millions with, entertainment and 
companionship in their home cheaper than any other forms of media. People were able 
to watch two cinema films a day which ultimately pulled out cinema goers from 
theaters. According to global media statistics, Turkish people are second only to the US 
when it comes to watching television per day. Only in 2007 Turkey’s average daily 
television viewing was ranked in the 8
th
 spending about 4 hours in front of television 
per day (Economist 2009). The German Integration Minister, Bilkay Oney, from the 
state of Baden-Wurttemberg in Germany, publicly announced that Turks in Germany 
watch television five times more than Germans (Semih 2011). This outlook in these 
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statistics is amazing because people watch television even with an increase in 
entertainment choices.  
 
 
Figure 2-2: TV sets per household in Turkey as of July 2010 (%) Average: 
1.52      N= 2.523. 
Source: Radio and Television Supreme Council 
 
 
The first private commercial television broadcast entered the Turkish market in 
1990 through EUTELSAT satellite network in the city of Ludwigshaven in Germany. 
This broadcast company was Star 1, owned by Uzan Group and Ahmet Özal, son of 
Turkish incumbent Prime Minister Turgut Özal. Three years later, the Turkish 
government ended its monopoly in broadcasting and opened up its media market to 
private television companies. This led to the establishment of 24 national, 16 regional 
and 215 local stations. In addition to these national channels, there are approximately 60 
cable TV channels including BBC World, BBC Prime, CNN, TV5, RTL, MTV, 
Eurosport, National Geography and Discovery. When the digital infrastructure is 
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completed, the number of channels on cable is expected to increase to 300. As in the 
case of the print media, the main television stations are owned by a few media groups 
(see Table 2.3). The table below shows what media groups own what type of media.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63 
 
Table 2-3: Dominant Media Groups and their selected activities 
Media Groups TV Channels Radio 
Stations 
Print Media Other 
Doğan Group Kanal D, Star 
TV, CNN 
Turk, Euro D 
Radyo D, 
CNN Turk 
Radyo 
Hurriyet, 
Milliyet, 
Daily 
News, 
Vatan, 
Posta, 
Radikal 
Deutsche Bank 
Turkuvaz Group ATV, ATV 
Europe, 
Turkuvaz 
Radio 
Enterprises 
Inc. 
Sabah, Yeni 
Asır, 
Takvim 
Forbes, Turkuvaz 
Mobile Services, 
Aktif Bank, Oil and 
Natural Gas 
Çukurova Group Show TV, 
Skyturk 
Alem FM, 
Lig Radyo 
Aksam, 
Tercuman, 
Gunes 
Automotive, 
Construction, 
Chemicals, Textiles 
Ciner Group HaberTurk  HaberTurk 
(online) 
Marie Claire, 
Bloomberg HT, 
Ciner Aviation 
Transportation 
Doğuş Group NTV, CNBC-
e, 
NTVMSNBC, 
NBA TV 
Kral FM, 
Radio 
N101 
 National 
Geographic, 
Automotive, 
Banking, 
Construction, 
Energy 
Feza Group  
in collaboration 
 with Samanyolu  
Yayin Group 
Samanyolu 
TV, 
Samanyolu 
America, 
Ebru TV (in 
U.S.), Hazar 
TV (in 
Azerbaijan)  
Burc FM, 
Dunya 
Radyo, 
Dunya TV 
(Kurdish) 
Zaman, 
Today’s 
Zaman, 
Aksiyon 
(weekly) 
Education 
Rubert Murdoch FOX TV 
Turkiye, 
FOX 
Life/sport 
National 
Geographic 
Channel 
   
Source: WowTurkiye.com 
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However, the public broadcaster, TRT, still continues commends the attention of 
Turkish audiences inside and outside of Turkey with its 11 national channels dedicated 
to topics as diverse as culture, sports, music, and art to international news. For example, 
TRT’s two established international channels can broadcast as far as USA and the 
Central Asia. TRT-TURK as one of the two can be viewed in Europe, USA and 
Australia, has used the motto, ‘Watch the World in Turkish’ since 2009. TRT-AVAZ on 
the other hand can be seen throughout the Balkans, Central Asia and Caucasus by 
approximately 250 million people in 27 countries and 13 autonomous regions (TRT 
2010). TRT’s latest move was to dedicate television broadcasting in the Kurmanchi and 
Sorani dialects of Kurdish and in Arabic. For this purpose, TRT-6 began addressing 
Kurdish audiences in 2009 with its relatively rich content that is “made up of children’s, 
women’s, health, economy, drama, documentary, history, nature, sports, music, news, 
culture and art, religion and entertainment programs” (TRT 2010, Televizyon section, ¶ 
2). TRT-Ettürkiye in Arabic also aims to reach 350 million people in 22 countries in the 
Middle East since April 2010.   
As highlighted, television, whether it is privately-own or the state-own, remains 
to be an important source of information that shapes, informs, and mobilizes millions of 
minds every day all around the world. In addition to television being the source of 
information, it continues to be the shortest way to reach cinema productions, 
entertainment shows and soap operas daily. However, more than anything, television 
continues to be an important tool to educate millions and import Turkish cultural norms, 
mores and values across different geographies and nations.   
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2.4.2 Internet  
Since 2004 Turkey has heavily invested in internet and communication technologies to 
catch up with the developed world. Internet connectivity for individuals jumped from 
7.5 percent of the population in 2004 to 34.5 percent in 2008 and 45 percent in 2010 
(see Table 2.4).  
Table 2-4: Internet users as percentage of population in Turkey 
YEAR Users Population 5 Pop 
2000 2,000,000 70,140,900 2.9 % 
2004 5,500,000 73,556,173 7.5 % 
2006 10,220,000 74,709,412 13.9 % 
2010 35,000,000 77,804,122 45.0 % 
Source: Internet World Stats:  http://www.internetworldstats.com/eu/tr.htm 
However, much of the internet access occurs in internet cafes and work-places 
rather than in homes where computer ownership is not high by standards in Western 
Europe.  Internet users among 16-24 age group constitute the majority internet users. As 
of 2009, women in Turkey comprise only 7 percent of the internet users (as cited in 
Baris 2010).  Given the demographic characteristics of internet users in Turkey, which 
will be discussed further in the following chapters, seeing a small number of internet 
users among women is not surprising (see Table 2.5).  
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Table 2-5: Age distribution of Facebook users in Turkey  
Age 
Distribution 
Women Man Total Women 
% 
Man 
% 
Total % 
Below 18 2,343,000 3,225,260 5,568,260 9.91 % 13.65 
% 
23.56 % 
18-24 2,885,340 4,869,800 7,775,140 12.21 % 20.61 
% 
32.82 % 
25-34 2,158,600 4,384,840 6,543,440 9.13 % 18.55 
% 
27.69 % 
35-44 748,440 1,754,840 2,503,280 3.17 % 7.43 
% 
10.59 % 
45-54 247,840 578,440 826,280 1.05 % 2.45 
% 
3.50 % 
Above 55 122,260 313,860 436,120 0.52 % 1.33 
% 
1.85 % 
Total 8,505,480 15,127,04
0 
23,632,520 35.99 % 64.01 
% 
100.00 
% 
Source:  http://www.socialmediatr.com/blog/facebook-uye-sayilari-agustos-2010/ (as 
cited in Kaya and Kimzan 2010) 
 
There is no doubt that wide availability (or unavailability as in the case of 
YouTube for years in Turkey) of the internet affects the ways information is produced, 
distributed and consumed in Turkey. People now can reach any national and 
international news, cultural products, commercial items, and global online activities in 
any time with little or no cost. This is important because technological developments in 
the communication and information sector disturb, change, and challenge the status-quo 
in every society, including Turkey. These technological developments impact the 
traditional ways of understanding events, ideas and norms. Therefore, it is important to 
analyze what communication and information structures are available in Turkey, how 
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technologies operate and what changes they can bring into the lives of individual agents 
who adopt, reformulate, and negotiate technology’s roles in the course of daily life.  
 However, these changes are not a linear progression of technological changes. 
In other words, new media does not cause to become obsolete the old media 
automatically. It is important to recognize that in order to understand the changes in 
society, place and space, we need to observe both the developing technologies and the 
new forms of communication in conjunction (Adams 2009). Thus, we must not fall into 
a trap that a certain technological advancement immediately replaces another. Rather, it 
bears resemblance to the metaphor of a tree that has many branches that are dying and 
many are growing simultaneously. In other words, YouTube is not necessarily capable 
of replacing cinema or the social networking site, nor can Facebook take over the face-
to-face communication overnight (see Table 2.6). Turkey’s official broadcaster TRT 
will continue to be watched by millions and as print media reach remote corners of the 
country perhaps faster and cheaper despite increase in entertainment and news choices.  
As many commentators and critics around the world emphasize important roles 
of social networking sites during the ‘Arab Spring’, use of internet remains to be vital in 
Turkish society as well. Through the internet, particularly the social networking sites, 
Turkish people became more connected (see Table 2.4). Different political and ethnic 
groups in Turkey use internet to disseminate their political messages every day. For 
instance, via Facebook people can easily express their opinions and show their 
(dis)content over current news and events. It is also through Facebook that people 
reproduce their social life and share their likes and dislikes. Again, it is the internet that 
provides the space for the users to reconstruct and present who they are and they are 
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not. The internet becomes virtual space and medium where ‘banal nationalism’ operates 
(Billig 1995). In this virtual space, they form their own community and reinvent 
themselves. Internet users, often without giving their real names, exchange their 
thoughts freely with like-minded other internet users. Polat Alemdar and VWP film fan 
groups are examples of these online discussion forums that take place in virtual space. 
In these forums, film fans share their thoughts about characters, their performance, and 
plot of the film. This becomes important because this study takes seriously these online 
forum discussions wherein exchange of thoughts is freely expressed between 
anonymous VWP fans. This is also why I include the internet use in Turkey and its 
importance to this study.  
Table 2-6: Top 7 countries with highest number of Facebook users in 2010 
Rank Country Number of 
Facebook 
users 1
st
 
July 2008 
Number of 
Facebook 
users 1
st
 
July 2009 
Number of 
Facebook 
users 1
st
 
July 2010 
12 
month 
growth 
24 month 
growth 
1 USA 27,811,560 69,378,980 125,881,220 81.4 % 352.6 % 
2 UK 11,171,540 18,711,160 26,543,600 41.09 % 137.6 % 
3 Indonesia 209,760 6,496,960 25,912,960 298.9 % 12253.6 % 
4 Turkey 3,464,640 12,382,320 22,552,540 82.1 % 550.9 % 
5 France 2,461,140 10,781,480 18,942,220 75.7 % 669.7 % 
6 Italy 491,100 10,218,400 16,647,260 62.9 % 3289.8 % 
7 Canada 9,621,820 11,961,020 15,497,900 29.6 % 61.1 % 
Source: http://www.socialmediatr.com/blog/facebook-uye-sayilari-agustos-2010/ 
(accessed February 24, 2011)  
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2.5 Summary  
In an environment where the finance, labor, cultural material and intellectual 
accumulation in the film-making industry are so global, it is hard to talk about the 
concept of ‘national’ cinema. However, there are common grounds and cultural details 
that can distinguish films that are made in certain socio-cultural settings. Within these 
socio-cultural cinema settings, there are sub-cultures of cinema tradition in a given 
society. The conservative/white cinema tradition in Turkey is one example that this 
chapter briefly investigated. It is also noted that the film VWP a case study of this 
dissertation, can be situated within this tradition, emphasizing that the film rereads and 
reproduces national narratives, cultural values and Turkey’s contemporary geopolitics 
in the Middle East.   
 Additionally, it was demonstrated that cinema tradition in Turkey is not 
completely independent from people’s belief system, ways of seeing the world and the 
socio-political conditions that surround people and the state. In other words, cinema 
became a battle ground where political Islam, leftist movements and the state practiced 
their ideal approaches about how to shape the cultural landscape of Turkey. I explained 
that through dominating information and communication technologies, the state has 
manipulated the public in order to maintain national unity and modernize the country, 
while conservative cinema via films challenged Turkey’s modernization progress as 
unhealthy for the people.  In this framework, the features of Turkish media and their 
broadcasting borders are part and parcel of every day public informing and education. 
Thus this chapter should be understood as a foundational chapter highlighting the 
importance of media’s ideological indoctrination function on the masses as deployed by 
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the state and non-state actors. It should also be pointed out that whether it is a 
conservative cinema (as in VWP) or radical/left cinema (as in Yilmaz Guney’s films), 
one common denominator remains among these films and that is that each film attempts 
to privilege one or another political agenda in a top-down social engineering. As I will 
further demonstrate in the results chapters, Turkish film production firms have never 
cared about solely art or entertainment, rather they always aimed to educate, inform and 
direct audiences’ political views.  Thus, understanding the mindset behind Turkish 
cinema tradition is vital to understanding the film VWP and its interpretations in 
Turkey. This chapter also notes that changing socio-political, economic, and 
technological dynamics within Turkish cinema and Turkish society is crucial to the 
understanding of meaning-making processes, and in turn these changes inform the ways 
in which the cinema and popular culture are experienced and produced.  
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CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING THE VISUAL TURN, 
POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY, POPULAR CULTURE, TURKISH 
GEOPOLITICS AND AUDIENCE GEOGRAPHY 
 
- (Administrator to Polat) “You know you won’t make it out of our Promised Land.” 
- (Polat) “I don’t know what part of this land has been promised to you, but I promise you — six 
feet under.” 
(Dialogue from VWP)  
 
3.1 Introduction  
Earlier chapters briefly introduced geographers’ engagement with film, national cinema, 
Turkish cinema and cinema’s use for (re)inventing and sustaining of national (or 
alternative) narratives, which give us tools to understand the world and our positions 
within it. Films, as other forms of popular culture, are about narratives, and much of our 
knowledge comes from these constructed narratives. Therefore, a state’s national and 
geopolitical narratives, which are highly intertwined, should not be separated from this 
meaning production system. Thus this study pays serious attention to national narratives 
embedded within popular culture that can be adopted, reproduced or negotiated 
thorough their consumption in different times and spaces.  In turn, everyday 
consumption of national narratives informs and legitimizes certain actions and practices 
(of the state and other power dynamics). For this reason, this chapter highlights various 
but related concepts, approaches and discourses, (critical geopolitics, visual turn, post-
structuralism, audience, etc.) and their importance to understanding and mapping of 
audiences’ geopolitical imaginations in Turkish context.  
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 In this chapter I discuss relationships between popular geopolitics and Turkey’s 
foreign affairs in reference to audiences’ meaning-making process. First, I introduce 
how and why political geographers became interested in popular culture and everyday 
discourses of popular productions and practices. Secondly, I briefly talk about what 
critical geopolitics is and what concerns it has about traditional ways of doing 
geopolitics. Then I explain Turkish geopolitics and Turkey’s Israel-Palestine policies. 
Finally, I discuss Turkey’s soft power potential in the Middle East, what constitutes 
audience, and how to conceptualize audience in reference to changing information and 
communication technologies.  
3.2 The visual turn, political geography and popular culture 
During the early 1990s, some political geographers began paying closer attention to the 
importance of language and culture in shaping people’s opinions, their understandings 
of the world and their social interaction with the world. This was inspired by post-
structural theoretical frameworks and through the lens of postmodernity (Dittmer 2010). 
Postmodernity here is understood to be the end of both meta-narratives and the 
orderliness of the Enlightenment-era project of modernity (Ang 1996). If the project of 
modernity is a belief within which “the possibility of a world singularly organized 
around the principles of universal reason, rationality and truth, then postmodernity 
signals not so much a radical end of the modern era… but rather an awareness and 
recognition of the political and epistemological limits of those principles” (Ang 1996, p. 
2). Inspired by this outlook, (critical) political geographers began highlighting the 
impossibility of modernity’s completion as a universal project and began challenging 
modernist ways of understanding the world.  These scholars questioned the utility of 
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grand theories, the completeness of human civilization and traditional, predominantly 
masculinist, ways of producing knowledge that are normalized and naturalized thorough 
everyday discourses of popular productions practices. For critical (and) political 
geographers, e.g., Agnew, Toal, Sharp, Harvey, Jones III, Dixon, and McDowell, 
meaning and identity are presumed to be effects rather than causes. In this sense, these 
thinkers are essentially anti-essentialist and post-Kantian
17
 (if not anti-Kantian). 
Political geographers are greatly influenced by philosophers such as Foucault, Derrida 
and Gramsci, among others, who are commonly linked with poststructuralist approaches 
and critical analysis. For instance, Foucault’s study on how knowledge and power are 
put to work in and by institutions (ideology apparatuses) such as schools, correction 
facilities, and other government agencies for the purpose of controlling, studying, and 
disciplining their subjects, inspired political geographers to explore the ways in which 
geo-graphing was understood to be about categorizing, controlling, disciplining, and 
governing (Gregory 1995, Toal 1994). Integrating Foucauldian perspectives, political 
geographers began looking at the relationships between power and discourses, and how 
those discourses are institutionalized and operationalized upon socio-spatial subjects. 
Without doubt, discourse is a vital concept for political geographers because it 
constitutes a form of knowledge that shapes people, places and social structures and, in 
turn, people via social structures re-organize and re-produce (discursive) socio-spatial 
knowledge. Discourses are considered tremendously powerful because they carry a 
‘regime of truth’ that leaves no room for subjects to question. They are embedded 
                                                          
17
 Kant is considered to be a pioneer of analytic tradition in philosophy which gave birth to (or 
influenced)   logical positivism and its offspring. Kant’s philosophy, Harrison says, crystallized the 
Enlightenment by claiming the sovereignty of reason (Harrison 2006, p. 126).  
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everywhere, shaping our actions and inactions, both thinking and not-thinking. They 
mainly operate in an unrecognized nature and go unnoticed.  
The political theorist Antonio Gramsci is one of the more influential figures in 
unveiling the ideological effects of discourses operating within the unconscious stage of 
human thoughts and everyday practices.  His writings on hegemony and ideology paved 
the way for recontextualizing spatial politics and the politics of space in geography. 
Gramsci argues that hegemony is not limited to state apparatuses; it can also be 
operationalized through non-state actors such as elites, schools, churches, media, etc. 
because hegemony is about establishing ideological domination over marginalized 
peoples. As theorized, this subordination is not always bloody or violent. Plausibly, 
hegemony is fostered and deepened through consent or/and coercion (Gramsci 1971).  
Gramsci notes that the ruling class is capable of inculcating the masses with their 
ideology by embedding it in simple, ‘common sense’ statements that inform thoughts 
and beliefs. For instance, the Hollywood entertainment industry can play an important 
role in the shaping of the public’s mind, disseminating elite’s ideology, and justifying 
the state’s actions/inactions through popularly manufactured productions such as 
blockbuster films, documentaries, and TV shows. These mass-produced productions 
provide a simplified geopolitical language enabling audiences to comprehend and 
internalize complex issues with ease, and to make understanding geostrategically-
important concepts and conflicts similarly easy. These cultural fabrications not only 
inform and convince the citizenry about ‘who they are’ and what makes them ‘who they 
are’, but also alert them as to ‘who they are not’ and what differentiates them from 
‘others’.  Practical geopoliticians (see section 3.3) are very much aware of this socio-
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psychological process and continue to use this ‘common sense,’ easily-graspable 
language to explain the everyday politics of real-world affairs. For instance, when 
Newsweek or Time magazine frames the geopolitics of oil in language that seems to 
necessitate a confrontation between the US and China or Russia, people may suspend 
their disbelief about the validity of the news and adopt a position where US must do 
anything necessary not to let others’ hands get on Caucasian or Middle Eastern oil 
resources. People may even become uncritical about the government’s action so they 
start preparing for further sacrifices and hardships related to the (supposed) upcoming 
struggle. Here we see a great deal of ideological groundwork laid by popular culture 
that helps to link the goals of practical geopolitians with the actions and beliefs of the 
state’s citizens.  
Particularly for researchers in critical geopolitics, popularly-produced cultural 
texts have become important avenues of geopolitical investigation in the last twenty 
years. Drawing from poststructural theory, critical geopoliticians have re-examined 
traditional ways of producing geopolitical knowledge and its subsequent utilization 
throughout national and international political space. These scholars are predominately 
interested in exploring the question of how and why certain places, people, and cultures 
of the world have come to be known in a certain way (Said 1981, Dittmer 2010). How 
do we know them? Why do we study these political subjects? How can we re-read 
influential geopoliticians such as Mackinder, Kjellen, Haushofer, and Spykman, and 
interpret their perceived fixed world geography? These and similar questions sparked a 
wave of critical thinking in the subdiscipline of political geography. These critical 
scholars questioned the ways in which places, people and transnational events are 
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studied and inscribed with meanings. These writers not only tackled the use of state 
power, but also focused on the dynamics of ‘power to’ (something). Power that 
“traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces 
discourse” (as cited in West II 2006, p. 282). Critical geopoliticians’ take on power was 
not limited to blunt applications of force by state apparatuses. Rather they engaged “the 
subtle constructions of knowledge, the assumptions at work within that knowledge, and 
the decisions that are made based on that knowledge” (as cited in West II 2006, p. 282).  
Further West II states that the intellectual entrepreneurship  later known as critical 
geopolitics has shown “a particular interest in how such dynamics of power/knowledge 
are woven through the way geopolitical actors represent and contest material spatial 
practices” (as cited in West II 2006, p. 282).  
3.3 What is critical geopolitics?  
Critical geopolitics concerns a reconceptualization of traditional ways of doing 
geopolitics, which can be found within accounts of justifying geopolitical actions like 
warfare, trade sanctions, or diplomatic negotiations (Dalby 1998, West II 2006). Critical 
geopolitics tends to question and develop criticism about jaundiced state actions and 
goals (West II 2006). In other words, critical geopolitics is about conceptualizing 
politics and political processes differently, moving away from and absolute focus on 
state-centered actors and considering things such as culture as drivers of political 
change. In terms of its theoretic and methodological basis, critical geopolitics is closely 
associated with poststucturalism and postmodernism as a way of understanding events, 
people, places and interrelations between them, but it does not necessarily claim a solid 
way of drawing its intellectual borders. Instead, according to Toal, critical geopolitics 
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“promises both a new degree of understandings of geography and a new degree of 
geographicalization to the study of global politics” (Toal 1994, p. 530). Critical 
geopolitics, thus, challenges traditional ways of framing world politics and concerns 
with conventional ways of inscribing people, places and events.  It does this through 
deconstruction. It unweaves established truths and unveils accepted explanations 
through deconstruction. Therefore, critical geopolitics offers no remedy or any 
prescriptions. For critical geopolitical scholars, deconstructing geopolitics does not 
mean destroying or dissolving the meaning of geopolitics. For them, geopolitics and its 
claim to map the world and politics is understood to be the root of dominant discourse 
in need of radicalization so that the problem of studying and signifying our world can 
be revealed (Toal 1994).   
Geopolitics can be broken down into three areas of practice for the purpose of 
analysis: Formal, practical and popular. Formal geopolitics is understood to analyze 
how places are observed, studied and categorized by scholars, think-tanks, political 
commentators, etc.  For instance, as Toal notes, prominent American political 
geographer Isaiah Bowman, in his book The New World, surprisingly does not include a 
chapter about the United States (Toal 1994). This indicates that the United States is well 
known, and the central part of the world. To Bowman, political geography is what 
American geographers study. In his inscription of earth, his audiences constitute only 
the Americans to whom he provides a detailed map of the discipline through the god’s 
eye view. Thus, Bowman’s well-disciplined science (political geography) establishes a 
regime of truth, objective observation, spatial accountancy, and a hierarchy of political 
order (Toal 1994). As a consequence, studied countries can become the subject matter 
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of an American classification, (allies and foes, for example) control and governance. In 
accordance with these classifications, and from a jurisdictional standpoint, countries can 
then be certified, judged or punished. Practical geopolitics, on the other hand, is 
classified as a foreign policy making process including its institutional subculture, 
within which normatively-cohesive and secretive groups of people (foreign ministers, 
ambassadors, etc.) operate. Their job is very much of the persuasive and problem-
solving type (Toal and Dalby 1998).  It should be noted that there is not much 
scholarship in this vein perhaps it is due to the difficulties of investigating practical 
geopolitical processes. Popular geopolitics, however, occupies an important place in 
critical geopolitics. It tackles all stages of geopolitics in the drama of human history, 
from discursive analysis of texts to geographically-imagined identity-writing practices. 
Popular geopolitics researchers analyze popularly produced texts and interrogate the 
geopolitical understandings operating within mass culture such as films, cartoons, maps, 
comic books, magazines, etc. (West II 2006, Dittmer 2010). Its embeddedness and 
ordinariness in people’s everyday lives provide a special language and culture of 
learning for the masses about the state’s geopolitical vision and its positions in the 
world. As Foucault notes, geopolitical narratives give no truth, but truth effects (West II 
2006). Their performativity and embeddedness in everyday practices are so amazingly 
concealed and entertaining that their informative functions and orienting mechanisms 
go unnoticed. Films, for instance, can function as influential dramas set for projecting 
the state’s political storyline to audiences by normalizing and naturalizing what appears 
to be commonsense geopolitical knowledge (Toal 1994). Thus, many times the 
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inspiration and the dream of what ‘Rambo’ fights for in Vietnam can easily intersect 
with what Washington political elites envision.  
Nyroos, in his article entitled Religiopolitcs: dissident geopolitics and the 
‘fundamentalism’ of Hamas and Kach, brings a new approach to this trilogy of 
geopolitical reasoning by highlighting the importance of dissident counter-state 
discourses such as geopolitics of social movements (Nyroos 2001). The argument is that 
dissident geopolitics pertains to the potential to challenge the political and economic 
programs of states or international institutions (West II 2006). Although Nyroos’s focus 
is more on geopolitical implications of religious organizations and their socio-political 
counter-state activities, the essence of his argument is more or less applicable with 
many popular texts produced alternatively to ideological world views. In this sense, 
post-11 September film productions (of course not all the productions) around the world 
can be analyzed as geopolitical both enforcing geopolitical narrations and challenging 
them. In this sense, the film VWP, as a geopolitical text enforcing Turkish geopolitical 
narrations and challenging western narrations, will be analyzed in Nyroos’ account.  
3.4 Turkish geopolitics and alternative paradigm 
Turkey’s geopolitics is situated between the West and East, bridging the two 
civilizations geographically and culturally (Fuller 2008). On one hand, Turkey bears its 
centuries-old historical and cultural identities of Muslim world and, on the other, desires 
to be seen as European since the Europeanization struggle of the 19
th
 century (Unsal 
1981, Yilmaz and Bilgin 2005/2006). This sometimes-paradoxical aspiration molded an 
important foreign policy of the state and imprinted it on Turkish citizen’s geopolitical 
imagination of Turkey in the region. Turkey, arising from the ruins of the Ottoman 
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Empire, kept this ‘in-between’ identity and geographical positioning in pursuit of a 
global place in the world geopolitical system (Kalin 2009). Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the 
founder of the Turkish Republic, pushed Turkey’s internal and external vision in the 
direction of full Europeanization by setting in motion several radical reforms such as 
abolishing the Caliphate (the supreme religious office for the entire Sunni world) and 
adopting the Latin alphabet, among others (Unsal 1981). Followers of Ataturk, 
especially the People’s Republican Party, (CHP), consolidated his radical pro-Western 
reform in every sector of Turkish institutions and policies. During the Cold War period, 
Turkey continued to be the Western world’s periphery and functioned as the primary 
buffer zone against communist expansion from the Soviet Union southward to warm 
seas. During this period, Turkey joined several European organizations such as the 
OECD, Council of Europe (1949) and NATO (1952). Turkey is also a member of 
Islamic organizations such as the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the 
Developing 8 (D-8) (Dorronsoro 2002). For example, D8 membership was pushed 
through by the leader of an Islamic party, the Welfare Party (RP) and the incumbent 
Prime Minister Necmeddin Erbakan in Turkey. The objectives of the organization are to 
improve member states’ position in the global economy. During the first summit 
meeting in Istanbul in 1997, the following principles were announced: “Peace instead of 
conflict, dialogue instead of confrontation, cooperation instead of exploitation, justice 
instead of double-standards, equality instead of discrimination, and democracy instead 
of oppression.” (Aral 2005, p. 92)  
The D-8 member states included Turkey, Pakistan, Nigeria, Malaysia, Iran, 
Indonesia, Egypt, and Bangladesh. From the Turkish perspective, the D-8 project aimed 
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to restore Turkey’s long-neglected ties with the Islamic world, assigning itself the role 
of leadership in bringing Muslim nations together (Aral 2005). The former Prime 
Minister’s initiatives, particularly the D-8 project to reach the Islamic world, should be 
seen as an example of Turkey’s continuing orientation crisis following the failure of 
Turkey’s attempt to reach the Turkic nations of Caucasus which will be highlighted in 
the following paragraph.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the disappearance of the 
bipolar world system, Turkey found itself facing an identity and geopolitical orientation 
crisis. Regional conflicts mushroomed in the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle 
East, all areas of past Turkish ties. Tense relations with Syria (stemming from the 
harboring of Kurdish rebels) and Greece (a result of past conflict in Cyprus and over the 
Aegean Sea continental shelf), domestic turmoil in the wake of the post-1980 military 
coup, the Kurdish uprising, and economic crises plagued post-Cold War Turkey.   
Turkey needed a road map to get out of this confrontational domestic and regional 
foreign policy orientation (Alessandri 2010). Former Prime Minister (1983-89) and then 
President (1989-93) Turgut Ozal’s opening of the Caucasus, done in the spirit of 
unifying all the Turkic states under the umbrella of Turkish-speaking states, failed, and 
Turkey desperately needed immediate solutions to its domestic and foreign problems. 
At the beginning of 2001, Turkey came to the brink of bankruptcy. Coalition 
governments mismanaged the economy and domestic affairs to the point that it 
weakened Turkey. This hurt the country’s ability to pursue assertive, independent 
policies abroad. Turkey’s relationship with the European Union (EU) was not strong 
due to human rights abuses in the southern flank of the state, the continuing occupation 
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of Cyprus, the Turkish military’s growing influence in civil affairs, and the lack of 
institutionalized democracy (Lesser 2010).  
Since its rise to power in 2002, the current ruling party, the Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), which is inspired by conservative and liberal elements (to 
some extend similar to that of Christian Democrat Union Party of Germany), brought 
new ‘alternative paradigms’ to many aspects of government. The AKP, compared to its 
predecessor governments, managed to stabilize the economy, develop independent 
foreign policies and implement European style democratization in the country (Anaz, 
Keceli and Shelley 2011). The country under the reign of AKP underwent radical 
reformation in areas ranging from foreign affairs to domestic politics. The AKP 
successfully managed opening negotiations for European Union accession in 2005 and 
pushed both political and institutional reforms to comply with Copenhagen Criteria. In 
its first term, the AKP focused on economic issues and financial sectors. During this 
period, the AKP administration stabilized financial institutions and worked on the 
privatization of state assets, making the country seventeenth in the world economy, just 
behind China, with its high production level
18
 (Uygur 2010). In contrast to other 
political parties’ and secular segments’ assumptions, the AKP grew and dominated the 
next round of local and national elections. In its second term, the AKP initiated new 
reforms and policies addressing ethnic minorities and the military. Additionally, the 
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 In 1998 and 1999, Turkey was heavily impacted by the Asian and Russian economic crises. In this 
period, Turkey’s economic growth was negative, combined with an inflation rate of over 60 percent. But 
then, Turkey’s growth rate reached to 6.8 during the 2002-2007 after China which averaged 10.7 growth 
rates annually.  
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AKP government reduced the Turkish military’s influence on civilian matters and jailed 
many generals involved in planning to overthrow the civilian government (Baran 2010).  
Minority issues were also a focus of the AKP, as it launched a process toward 
the Kurds, removing obstacles for them to open their own institutions in Kurdish such 
as television stations and academic institutions. A confident position in domestic affairs 
is reflected Turkey’s international policies. As the architect of Turkey’s foreign policy, 
Ahmet Davutoglu
19
, envisioned independent and assertive foreign policies. He pursued 
a policy that was “a proper combination of realism and idealism…” (Schleifer 2010, p. 
2) incorporating some parts of Machiavelli and Rumi (a 13
th
 century Islamic 
philosopher). His foreign policy vision stretches from Central Asia to Bosnia and from 
Ukraine to Africa and the Middle East, emphasizing Turkey’s cultural and historical ties 
with other states and the advantages of its geographical location to pursue a more active 
foreign policy. This vision merged many notions: independence, nationalistic, Islamic, 
pan-Turkism, global and Western ideals (Schleifer 2010).  
Davutoglu, in his 2001 book Strategic Depth: Turkey’s Place in the World, 
refers to the mindset through which societies take active positions (geographical and 
historical consciousness of self) and discover their own ability (geopolitical capacity to 
act independently) in the dynamic international political structure. These societies turn 
their potential dynamism into a power parameter which derives from their geographic 
and historical depth in the arena of international dynamism (Grigoriadis 2010). 
According to Davutoglu, societies that obtain this self-confidence, itself reliant upon 
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 A former chair of the International Relations department at the Beykent University in Istanbul, senior 
foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his current Foreign Minister.  
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critical recognition of their own historical and geographical depth and the consciousness 
of their own identity and cultural dynamism, develop a proactive foreign policy 
commensurate with their geopolitical potentials (Davutoglu 2001).  Davutoglu 
emphasizes that 
...Turkey enjoys multiple regional identities and thus has the capability as 
well as the responsibility to follow an integrated and multidimensional 
foreign policy. The unique combination of our history and geography 
brings with it a sense of responsibility. To contribute actively towards 
conflict resolution and international peace and security in all these areas is 
a call of duty arising from the depths of a multidimensional history for 
Turkey (Davutoglu 2009, p. 12).  
 
  Davutoglu, as the driving figure behing the AKP’s foreign policies since 2002, 
identifies two conditions for Turkey to move forward in its global strategic ambitions. 
The first involves domestic politics such as the Kurdish question, which includes 
treating such issues as regional autonomy, cultural recognition, political inclusion, etc., 
and bridging the growing rift between the Islamist and secularist elements of Turkish 
society (fear of islamization of the state, government intervening in people’s lives style 
etc.). The second involves Turkey’s relations with its neighbors (Grigoriadis 2010).  
Davutoglu believes that only a problem-free Turkey can harness its strategic potentials. 
Thus, Davutoglu tirelessly advocated for a Turkey that would resolve its bilateral 
problems with its neighbors and strengthen its ties with them via a road map that he 
calls ‘zero problem policy with neighbors’. For this reason, it can be argued that his 
foreign policy agenda is no longer a nation-state agenda. According to Ibrahim Kalin, a 
senior foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister, it “is a regional agenda… a global 
agenda” (as cited in Schleifer 2010, p. 5).  
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 The AKP’s active foreign policies in its southern border area from Syria, Iraq to 
Lebanon, and the mediating role between war-torn Pakistan and Afghanistan, (as well 
as Russia and Georgia) raised Turkey’s position to a regional actor in the post-9/11 
world. Further, Turkey as a country which embraces western ideologies, democratic 
institutionalism, universal human rights, and the rule of law, continues to occupy an 
important place in the Muslim world as an example state. Therefore, Turkey’s peace 
overtures and economic investments in the Middle East and elsewhere are welcomed 
and supported by the European Union and the US. Of course, their evaluation of 
Turkey’s activities in the region is not free from reservations. Turkey’s potentiality to 
become a leading figure in the Middle East is controversial but regarded as possible. 
Paul Salem, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, explains Turkey’s 
potentials in the Middle East: 
Indeed, Turkey is well-placed to make a bid for a pre-eminent leadership 
role within the Muslim and Arab world. Egypt under Nasser set the 
standard. Since then, Egypt has faded. Iran has made headway, but it has 
been limited by its Shiite identity in a mainly Sunni world and by an 
increasingly dysfunctional and unattractive model of clerical rule. Turkey 
is the only country in the entire Middle East that has integrated with 
modernity. It has a functional and democratic political system, a 
productive economy, and has found workable balances between religion 
and secularism, faith and science, individual and collective identity, 
nationalism and rule of law, etc. No other country in the region, from 
Morocco through Pakistan, has succeeded in this way. Iran, Egypt and 
other Arab countries are not the future. Turkey might well be. As a large 
Sunni country with deep historical roots in the region, this could be the 
beginning of Turkey’s century in the Middle East (as cited in Schleifer 
2010, p. 6). 
 Of course, we need to keep in mind that the AKP’s foreign policy initiatives 
eventually belong to a political party and the destiny of the party is unknown. Thus, 
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unless these policies become the policy of successor parties or the policies of the 
country, the sustainability of these policies will always be in question.  
3.5 Turkey’s Israel-Palestine policies 
The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the longest conflicts of the 20
th
 century and it 
continues without a comprehensive solution. Since the establishment of the state of 
Israel, Middle East foreign policy has been linked to these ongoing Israel-Palestine, 
Israel-Arab states, and Israel-non-Arab states conflicts. Mainly the conflict pertains to 
issues such as the nature of final settlements between Israel and Palestine, the return of 
4 million Palestinian refugees, the occupied Golan Heights, the future of Hezbollah in 
Lebanon, terrorism, water disputes, the future of Jerusalem, the faith of Palestinian 
state, the security of Israel, and huge Arab oil reserves and religious disputes.  In the 
history of the Israel-Palestine conflicts, there have been many peace initiatives such as 
the Madrid talks in 1991 and the Oslo Accord of 1993-5, but neither made any serious 
changes in real politics or the conditions on the ground which continue to be the 
concern of the regional and international communities (Fallah 2005). In this sense, the 
conflict is very political and geographical, where the consequences of war and peace 
have visceral implications in everyday life.  
Looking at the causes and consequences of Israel-Palestine conflicts, the 
problem is bigger than what the two parties can deal with. Israel-Palestine has been and 
continues to be the key element of the Middle East peace process. Without making a 
comprehensive solution to the problem, it would be a highly improbable to see regional 
peace in the Middle East or unfeasible to expect the global terrorism comes to an end. 
Fallah argues that for a long-lasting peace, a ‘land-for-peace’ formula has to be 
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operationalized. This formula includes a two-state solution and the demand that Israel 
comply with UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which require that all 
signatories “withdraw from the territories conquered by military force in the June War 
of 1967, that is, the West Bank and Gaza Strip areas, including East Jerusalem” (Fallah 
2005, p. 298). This compromise consists only of 23 percent of the land that was 
controlled by the British Mandate as a Palestine territory before 1948.   
Turkey’s relationship with this land and people is a vital one. Today’s Israel and 
Palestine were under the control of Ottoman Empire from 1517 until these territories 
went to the control of the British Mandate in 1922. Following the declaration of 
independence in May 1948, Turkey, complying with the decision of UN Resolution 
181, de facto recognized Israel, and de jure recognition came in March 1950. Thereby 
Turkey became the first Muslim state to recognize Israel. Turkey’s relations with Israel 
more or less stayed neutral and balanced throughout the twentieth century. For instance, 
Turkey refused to support the resolution that demanded all the participants to end 
diplomatic relations with Israel at the Muslim nations’ conference in Rabat in 1969 
(Aras and Bicakci 2006). In the 1990s, Turkey-Israel relations reached a high point in 
terms of economic, military/intelligence and political cooperation (Szymanski 2010). 
The Turkish military’s role in establishing quality relations with Israel is particularly 
significant. For example, for years Israel had absolute open air space to train its war 
pilots in the central Anatolia and Israeli companies were given privileged access to the 
bidding process for modernizing Turkish military equipment.  Until recently, Turkey 
acted as a ‘facilitator’ in the Middle Eastern matters and became an important actor in 
contributing to the region’s stability and for lasting peace. However, Turkey, as a 
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Muslim country and taking its domestic agenda into consideration, has always been 
critical of Israel’s military actions and its aggressive treatment of civilians in Palestine. 
According to Aras and Bicakci, “Turkey pursued a policy line, from the early 1950s 
onwards, that the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, including their 
right to establish their own state, was the only formula for the solution of the Palestinian 
question.… In fact, Turkey long defended the claims of Palestinians by voting in favor 
of them in the UN and in other international forums” (Aras and Bicakci 2006, p. 370). It 
is important to mention here that Turkey’s official support of the Palestinian cause has 
always been congruent with EU and US policies. This position was taken during the 
conference known as the Declaration of Venice Summit which included the nine-
member economic committee of the European Economic Community in 1980.  In other 
words, Turkey and the EU consider the Israel-Palestine conflict as a threat to the 
region’s stability, and both parties “agreed on the importance of the right of self-
determination for the Palestinians, including Palestinian statehood and the Israeli right 
to exist” (Aras and Bicakci 2006, p. 371).  
Turkey’s attitude toward Israel continued to be progressive during the first term 
of the AKP government. But after a major crisis broke out due to Israel’s offensive in 
the Gaza Strip in late 2008 and early 2009, Israel received harsh criticism from Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Later in Davos, the Turkish Prime Minister stormed 
out of the panel right after clashing with Israeli president Shimon Peres on the issues of 
Israeli air strikes and the invasion of Palestinian territories. In response, Israeli 
politicians signaled the possibility of recognizing the 1915 Armenian genocide and 
Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danial Ayalon deepened the crisis by humiliating the 
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Turkish Ambassador in his office
20
. Already-tense relations between Turkey and Israel 
escalated when a Turkish television serial called Valley of the Wolves pictured a Mosad 
agent as the murderer of a baby. The most severe threat to relations was the 2010 effort 
by humanitarian activists to break the blockade in Gaza, which resulted in nine Turkish 
citizens’ deaths and the wounding of several more. To many analysts, the resumption of 
quality cooperation between Turkey and Israel appears to be unattainable, at least for 
the time being. For instance, a political analyst, Anat, is highly critical of the AKP’s 
foreign policies. He states that Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu’s theory -
commonly known as ‘alternative paradigms- will escalate tensions instead of reduce 
them and that the exacerbation of the problem, not the solution, is the new ‘paradigm’ 
of Turkey’s Middle Eastern strategy, and the actual implications of the AKP’s  ‘zero 
problems with neighbors’ policy (Anat 2010). Despite criticisms such as Anat’s, it must 
be understood that Turkey has already closed its Cold War chapter. Turkey has ended 
its long lasting, schizophrenic approach to its foreign policy in which a hard power 
dominated foreign and domestic policies as opposed to a soft power. Turkey has 
discovered the economic opportunities that a solid peace in the Middle East may bring 
forth. Alessandri notes that “economic opportunity and peace have become the driving 
force of its external action, allowing Turkey to greatly expand its trading relations and 
act as facilitator of dialogue…” (Alessandri 2010, p. 15). This means that Turkey can 
widen its trade relations to embrace approximately 30 million square kilometers of land 
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 This event refers to Israel’s Deputy Foreign Minister’s, Danny Ayalon, expression of his country’s 
complaints about Valley of the Wolves television series’ portrayal of Israeli soldiers as baby killer.  At the 
meeting, Ayalon deliberately had the Turkish Ambassador, Ahmet Oguz Celikkol, sit on a chair lower 
than that of Ayalon. Ayalon, also asks Israeli TV news crew to pay attention to the flag on the table. He 
points out that there is only one flag (Israel) and he is not smiling at his counterpart.  
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and over one billion people in the Muslim world.  If we consider the fact that the 
majority of the population lives in 10 primarily-agricultural countries, Turkey’s chance 
of penetrating these markets is very possible. According to Joel Kotkin, cultural ties 
matter in business because they lower transection cost and supercharge communication 
(The Economist 2012). Kotkin reports that “more important still, no common ‘tribal’ 
link, as expressed by a shared history, language, or culture unites these countries and 
people. This link is fundamental to any powerful and long-lasting power grouping” 
(Kotkin 2011, NewGoegraphy section, ¶ 9). For example, Turkey’s trade volume with 
countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) increased in 2008 from 
18.9 percent to 24.7 percent (Sarrafoglu 2010). According to some financial 
commentators, Turkey (along with China and Brazil) was one of the several countries 
that dodged a bullet during the 2008 financial crisis. It is said that Turkey owes its 
economic survival to its trade relationships with OIC countries. Therefore, Turkey’s 
growing economic ties with surrounding countries should not be ignored, rather it 
should be linked to Davutoglu’s ‘paradigm shift’21 (Davutoglu 1993). Representing a 
country that was economically sound, relatively modernized, and democratic, Turkey’s 
policy makers gained self-confidence in their ability to conduct successful regional 
policies from the Middle East to the Caucasus and from Africa to the Balkans (Aras and 
Bicakci 2006). Within this framework, in the next section I will highlight Turkey’s 
potential to influence regional politics and relations in reference to language that soft 
power can produce. As noted earlier, popular culture (cinema particularly) can form an 
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 ‘Paradigm shift’ refers to Ahmet Davutoglu’s alternative paradigm which is theorized within his book 
entitled Alternative Paradigms: The Impact of Islamic and Western Eltanschauungs on Political Theory 
(1993).  
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everyday image-based language can provide better ways of understanding a radically-
changing geopolitical world (Power and Cramton 2005). Even the most complicated 
and problematic issues of socio-political life can be expressed smoothly through 
cinematic narrations and entertainment forms. Thus the following section is an 
emphasis that underlines the importance of soft power as an opportunity for Turkey to 
strengthen its ties with Middle Eastern states and nations.  
3.6 Turkey’s soft power 
Nye defines soft power as a “country’s ability to influence events through persuasion 
and attraction, rather than military or financial coercion” (Nye 2004, p. 6). He furthers 
his argument to the idea that soft power rejects military or coercive actions on other 
states. For him, soft power can be “developed through relations with allies, economic 
assistance, and cultural exchanges” (Nye 2004, p. 6). As noted in the case wherein after 
the terror attack of September 11, the United States government put more emphasis on 
Hollywood’s possible contribution to the fight against ‘global terror’. This was a 
realization of the incompleteness of military or hard power and a reaction to same. 
Turkey as an emerging power in the Middle East and a peace-maker on the 
periphery of the international system seeks to influence former Ottoman nations and 
geographies in the form of economic and cultural exchanges (Aras 2009). There needs 
to be further investigation about whether Turkey’s foreign policy enables such power to 
be implemented abroad, and it is noticeable that the spread of Turkish popular culture 
into the Balkans and the Middle East neatly falls into the strategy of the current 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu as outlined in his seminal book Strategic 
Depth (2001) (Bugdayci 2011). A Turkish TV-drama Gumus (known as ‘Noor’ in Arab 
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countries) would be a good example of Turkish popular culture’s invasion of Arab 
televisions and everyday conversations. This TV drama is watched by millions and 
debated in many academic and religious platforms as to its suitability to Arab societies 
and whether it undermines family structures in Muslim communities (Buccianti 2010, 
Georgiou 2011).  Since 2001, 65 Turkish TV series have been exported, garnering over 
50 million dollars in revenue (Bugdayci 2011). A recent study shows that about 78 
percent of respondents in the Middle East indicated that a person watched at least one 
Turkish television series recently (as cited in Bugdayci 2011). CEO of Calinos Inc. Firat 
Gulgen, in one of his interviews, explains how Turkish series dominated foreign serial 
programming in Arab countries such as Syria soon after the Prime Minister Recep T. 
Erdogan’s scolding of Israeli President in Davos (Ersanel 2011).  Gulgen notes that the 
number of TV channels in Middle Eastern countries is over 300, and about 60 percent 
of foreign programs watched on those channels come from Turkey.  He explains that 
this popularity is mainly the result of Arab citizens being fed up with the glut of Latin 
American programs that had come to dominate Arab televisions. In those shows, he 
says, churches and other unfamiliar images and conversations occur while Turkish 
shows repeatedly bring Istanbul’s historical silhouette with lots of minarets in the 
background. This geographical and cultural similarity attracted people’s attention to 
Turkish series. Given the popularity of Turkish popular culture in the former Ottoman 
territories, Turkey is able to influence people’s attitudes and bring Turkey’s image to 
international audiences. This privileges Turkey to bring regional issues to international 
attention and in turn makes Turkey a vital actor in the peace process. Although I will 
discuss this subject in following chapters, it is important to highlight that Turkish soft 
93 
 
power is not limited to cultural exports. Istanbul, for example, has become a place of 
vacation and shopping for millions of Arabic tourists.  
It is not a coincidence that the celebrity Polat Alemdar (known as Murat 
Alemdar in the Arab world) is second in popularity in the Middle East only to the 
Turkish Prime Minister (Kujawa 2011). This is not to say that Turkish television 
products are welcomed equally in every part of Middle Eastern society. In particular, 
ulemas (the doctors of the holy law) in Iran and Egypt, and some other conservatives 
around the Middle East, criticize Turkish television series because these cultural 
products are found to be threatening to the fundamentals of family and social relations 
in Muslim society through sultry images, depictions of adultery, and tales of murder and 
crime (Bugdayci 2011). Similarly, Iranian authorities rail against Turkish television 
programs that carry the potential to degrade the Iranian way of life and Persian culture. 
To protect Iranians from western-minded popular culture, Iranian police raid people’s 
homes to deactivate and collect satellite dishes (CNNTURK 2011). To officials, these 
programs must be removed from Islamic soil because they show western-style haircuts, 
women with makeup, and romantic relationships among unmarried couples. However, 
Turkish television programs do not only get criticism from Islamic governments or 
religious authorities in the Middle East, but also from the Israeli government because of 
the problematic way Turkish series such as Valley of the Wolves-Ambush portrays 
Israeli soldiers as murderers, a depiction the Israeli government finds not only 
offensive, but also as a potential threat inasmuch such a depiction might make Israeli 
citizens targets for fundamentalist Islamist groups.  In one of the episodes of Valley of 
the Wolves, Israeli intelligence agents were depicted as baby-snatchers. Right after this 
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infamous scene was aired on Turkish TV, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny 
Ayalon called the Turkish Ambassador to express his government’s discontent with the 
TV series. During this meeting, Ayalon, not complying with standards for diplomacy, 
said this: “The main thing is that you see that he is seated low and that we are high ... 
that there is one flag on the table (the Israeli flag) and that we are not smiling" (CNN 
2010, World News section, ¶ 7). Not unexpectedly, the TV series and its protagonist 
became more popular than ever among people in the Middle East.  All of these events 
helped political and economic actors realize that Arab geographies are not as far away 
as it was thought to be before. In other words, popular culture became a vital asset for 
Turkey to become the ‘soft power’ in the region.  
3.7 Contextualizing audience 
The question of ‘what constitutes audience’ has occupied many scholars’ intellectual 
curiosity (Gillespie 2005, Hay, Grossberg and Wantella 1996, Morley 1980 ). The 
argument of whether there is a self-selecting, naturally formed audience is a matter of 
scholarly questioning and continuing debate in academia. However, in many writings, it 
is said that audience(s) is/are  somehow structured, made, imagined and niched by 
media institutions (or scholars for that matter) (Gillespie 2005). This way of explaining 
audience is open to critique as modern information and communication technologies 
open up new gates into the subject of ‘audience’ and necessitate new ways of 
investigating, contextualizing, and interpreting audiences. An individual as a subject of 
audience can play multiple roles and be the source of information production on one 
side, and the subject of consumption and an agent of information distribution on the 
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other side. An example that Gillespie (2005, p. 2) gives in her book, Media Audiences, 
is important to consider:  
My 17-year-old nephew appears to be able to watch a DVD film on TV 
while receiving and sending text messages on his mobile, and e-mails on 
the computer. He moves fluently between these activities, interspersing 
conversations with his friends about who’s been thrown out of Big Brother 
[a television show], all the while practicing drum beats or guitar riffs…. 
 This is to say that media is neither static as it is believed to be, nor the audience 
a fixed or passive receiver of messages. This anecdote demonstrates how problematic it 
is to conceptualize audience in the postmodern world. The idea of audience is also 
changing in response to new information and communication technologies. Given the 
changes, how to investigate audience is a matter of understanding the contemporary 
conditions of audienceship and, parallel to that, utilizing new qualitative and 
quantitative techniques. To propose such a methodology to investigate a new, active 
audience it is necessary to examine the history of audience studies as the field 
commonly known as ‘reception studies’.  
 Audience studies began with the question of meaning-making processes (Rose 
2007). Roughly after the Second World War, academic curiosity about how and to what 
extent a message is received by radio listeners or TV viewers became the backbone of 
reception studies (McQuail 2005). The early works on audience assumed that the sent 
message is received with no or little interruption, by the receiver, as intended by its 
sender (see Figure 3.1) (Livingstone 2005b).  
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Communication as a Linear Process 
Figure 3-1: Transmission model 
                                  
This linear model
22
 of communication is problematized by scholars of cultural 
studies, and is known as the ‘encoding and decoding model’. Stuart Hall (1974), the 
leading scholar in this area, argues that messages are not decoded as they are encoded. 
Hall challenges tenets of the traditional understanding of reception studies in two ways. 
First, he refuses to believe in messages’ naiveté. He argues that producers of a text 
manipulate the language and supply it with an ideological and purposeful message 
(McQuail 2005). He calls this encoded ideology ‘preferred meaning’. Hall states that 
“…rules of encoding were so diffused, so symmetrically shared as between producer 
and audience, that the ‘message’ was likely to be decoded in a manner highly 
symmetrical to that in which it had been encoded” (Hall 2005, p. 304). However, this is 
not to say that all meaning is fixed, single, or unalterable. “There can never be only one, 
single, univocal and determined meaning for such a lexical item; but, depending on how 
its integration within the code has been accomplished.…” (Hall 2005, p. 304) (see 
Figure 3.2). Since there is no necessary correspondence between the producer and the 
consumer, the encoder can only attempt to ‘prefer’ but cannot guarantee the intended 
                                                          
22
 The uses and gratifications approach needs to be mentioned here as well. This approach puts more 
emphasis on needs and the taste of individuals within which these personal preferences have a social or 
psychological origin. Audiences act in a wide field of needs, which might include the need for 
information, relaxation, companionship, diversion, or escape (McQuail 2005). In this model, the audience 
is more active and selective in their media uses relative to the linear communication models such as the 
‘transmission’ model in Figure 3.1.  
Sender Message Receiver 
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effect on the other end because the decoding has its own conditions of existence (Hall 
2001). Depending on surrounding elements, meanings can remain polysemic but this 
should not automatically imply that meanings are unlimited when they are decoded. 
Second, Hall challenges the conventional treatment of audience, which has long been 
understood a passive decoder of a message. He disputes this notion by stating audiences 
are not passive or static; indeed, they engage with messages in a very active and 
conscious manner. They do this in three ways: they take the connoted meaning as 
encoded, negotiate (partially accept the message), or totally reject it (see Figure 3.3).  
 
 
Figure 3-2: The encoding/decoding approach 
Source: Adopted from Hall’s model. 
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Figure 3-3: Process of communication 
Source: Adopted from Hall’s encoding and decoding model.  
 
According to Hall, if the viewer takes the intended meaning from, say, “a 
television newscast or current affairs program full and straight, and decodes the 
message in terms of the reference code in which it has been encoded” (Hall 2001, p. 
515), it can be inferred that the audience is acting within the ‘dominant’ code. In other 
words, he is decoding the message as it is encoded. In the notion of ‘negotiated’ 
decoding, the viewer takes the position of a mixture of adaptive and oppositional 
stances. In Hall’s words, the viewer “acknowledges the legitimacy of the hegemonic 
definitions to make the grand significations, while, at a more restricted, situational 
level…” (Hall 2001, p. 516), he/she makes her own ground rules, operating with 
exceptions to the rule. For instance, in this study some viewers understand the need for 
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immediate action regarding the Palestinian cause in the Middle East, but are hesitant to 
see Turkey acts upon the case without securing the international community’s 
consensus. In the third way of engaging with the encoded message, the viewer can 
decode the message in a totally   contrary way. He/she detotalizes the message in the 
preferred code in order to retotalize the message within some alternative framework of 
reference. This notion of decoding is called ‘oppositional’ reading (Hall 2001).  
The Figures 3.2 and 3.3, explain the complexity of encoding and decoding 
process in relation to external and internal forces that are expressed throughout the 
meaning-making processes as well as the production of meaning. The argument is that 
there are complex compositions of many variables that operate within the framework of 
the communication process. As argued earlier, visual texts are highly polysemic and 
open to many different interpretations. This should imply that audiences are not passive, 
but actively engaged with what they see. However, one should not fall in the trap where 
our readings of visual texts are understood to be unlimited. Social, political, economic, 
and cultural constraints operate to shape our interpretations of any given text 
(Schlesinger et al. 1992). From this point of view, the adapted position here is to say 
that the audience is active but operates within specific limits.  
In addition to Hall’s encoding/decoding model to understand meaning-making 
process, I briefly included a recent study on audience reception, which has contained 
three primary dimensions in its essence (Jancovich, Faire and Stubbings 2003). The first 
dimension concerns the audience as a market, focusing on how audiences are produced 
for cinematic consumption. Thus, audience preferences and audience demographics 
become an important issue. For instance, in Maltby’s study (1999), Hollywood cinema 
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industry made an assumption that there was a significant difference between the cinema 
taste of urban residents and that of rural inhabitants. To comply with the taste 
difference, the cinema industries needed to readjust their production, distribution and 
exhibition strategies (Maltby 1999). The second audience approach examines the inter-
textuality of film meanings. These researchers believe that “meanings need to be 
understood as the product of specific historical conditions” (Jancovich et al. 2003, p. 7). 
The problem with this approach to the audience is that meanings will differ in different 
time and space since the conditions for the text is not static and clear-cut. The third 
dimension in audience reception studies is the ethnography of film audiences. In this 
category, cinema-going or watching a film is not a simple consumption or a conscious 
engagement with the film texts. Rather, it is a social activity which can be studied 
utilizing ethnographies of film consumption. Thus in order to better understand how the 
Turkish film VWP cinematizes Turkish geopolitics and how Turkish audiences engage 
in the meaning-making process, I am compelled to include different ways of analyzing 
the discourse of online-fan communities formed by film viewers because their meaning 
making processes inform both encoding and decoding practices.  
3.8 Observing online audience activities 
Although this dissertation is not concerned with online ethnography per se, I still find it 
vital to talk about the concept of ethnography and its variations and applications in other 
platforms. While ethnography has been employed by anthropologists and sociologists 
for some time, audience ethnography only gained its momentum when scholars turned 
their attention to producing “insights into the social uses and rules of media and the 
interpretation of meanings in mainstream media texts” (Lindlof and Taylor 2002, p. 24) 
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and began critiquing the limitations of empiricist audience research. Ethnography’s 
essence goes back to the idea of documenting the customs and beliefs of the ‘native 
others’ by observing their everyday practices and social settings (Deacon, Pickering and 
Golding 2007). To successfully describe and interpret observed relationships between 
social activities and systems of meaning production in a given location, a researcher 
needs to spend an extended period of time in the field as a participant observer and to 
conduct unstructured conversational interviews with informants. In conventional 
ethnography, the researcher spends quite a bit of time (months, if not years) trying to 
understand the culture of local people from their point of view (this claim has been 
criticized by many critical scholars for being the researchers’ unattainable fantasy) 
(Moores 1993, Jancovich et al. 2003). An extended stay in the local setting is believed 
to give a researcher first-hand, shared experience with the people who are studied. 
Ethnographic studies on media consumption, however, remain problematic, since the 
amount of time spent in the local setting is relatively short compared to the traditional 
ways of doing ethnography (Gillespie 2005). From this point of departure, ethnographic 
study on audience has been questioned for its validity in academic inquiry.  Moores 
(1993), in his book Interpreting Audience: the Ethnography of Media Consumption   
challenges this and notes: “My own feeling is that   despite these clear differences 
reception studies can still properly be called ethnographies. It is true they are not based 
on extensive fieldwork in distant lands, but they do share some of the same general 
intentions as anthropological research” (Moores 1993, p. 4). Despite the problems of 
accessing local settings and documenting cultural observations, Moores’s approach to 
audience ethnography is still valid and dismissing it altogether may not be very 
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plausible. In other words, ethnographic engagement with audiences provides the 
researcher “the immediate physical and interpersonal contexts of daily media 
consumption” (Moores 1993, p. 5) which stands to be the fundamental prerequisite to 
the reception studies.  
There is always more to studying audiences in their social settings. For example, 
cinema should not be constrained to only viewing a film; it is more than just 
consumption. Cinema is an activity (Jancovich et al. 2003). To Morley, going to a 
cinema is always more than going to a film. It resembles “having sold a habit, certain 
socialized experience…” (as cited in Jancovich et al. 2003, p. 3). When Morley worked 
with television audiences, he was interested in investigating activities that people 
practiced even before they saw television shows and began engaging in interpretations 
of the text. He was aware that the process of the politics of domesticating television 
technologies and the practiced cultural politics during the consumption in the living 
rooms were more crucial for understanding than anything else. In many cases he 
realized that, ownership and usage of various forms of communication technologies 
mattered more than what media programs were consumed in the family. In his 
observations, television consumption for different genders meant different things. Even 
as simple as the detail about who had power over the remote control made a big 
difference in determining what programing is consumed or not at home.  
Gillespie also argues that scholars need to study audiences but for different 
reasons, highlighting three important points. The first is that there is an important 
correlation between power and media. In this argument it is assumed that media are 
preeminently powerful cultural elements of mass manipulation, and are governed by a 
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few elites. That is why many early media effect studies focused on political, economic 
and social effects of media on the masses (McQuail 2005). These studies treated 
audiences as passive, tangible, and confined.  In this sense, media’s power relation with 
audiences is crucial to media-audience studies. The second important point is that “the 
media are cultural institutions that trade in symbols, stories and meanings” (Gillespie 
2005, p. 3). In this argument, media are assumed to be shaping the forms of knowledge 
and ignorance, values and beliefs that circulate in any given society. Media are part and 
parcel of social life, and therefore too important to ignore. If we understand that media 
have powerful effects on how we conceptualize our socio-physical world, then, the 
primary question becomes how this form of shaping is worked through audience. Is it 
imposed from top to bottom, or negotiated by active audiences at the consumption 
level? To answer these questions we must consider Gillespie’s third point. She asks us 
to understand the dynamics of media change and continuity. Media, as cultural and 
technological institutions, are changing in the contemporary world. Communication and 
information technologies are facilitating transformation and globalization every day. As 
these technologies shrink time and space, social responses to these phenomena are also 
occurring. And as these technological and social shifts take place, our values and 
beliefs, national and cultural identities, and political ideologies are also transforming. 
Thus, contemporary scholars studying audiences are compelled to approach this 
phenomenon from multiple positions. It is important to note that ‘media’ include all 
communication apparatuses, from public news channels to personal smart phone 
devices.  
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From this point of departure, in this dissertation I only include one film to be the 
main part of my investigation, but work to explore audiences’ engagement with the 
meaning-making process via surveying Facebook users about the film VWP. I also 
include other forms of studying audience interpretations such as observing online fan 
activities and conducting face-to-face discussions with the film viewers. In other words, 
the internet constitutes a large portion of my data source. It is clear that the internet is a 
unique virtual space that can support users maintaining valuable connections and 
permitting them to keep in touch with their social network even though they are 
physically separate (Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe 2007). Through this virtual 
connection, the internet “facilitates new connections, in that it provides with an 
alternative way to connect with others who share their interests or relational goals” 
(Ellison, Heino and Gibbs 2006, Method section, ¶ 1). The film, VWP’s online fans 
heavily communicate with each other to express and share their emotions, exchange 
information, and provide insights for each other to interpret films by relating the film 
dialogues to the current events of everyday life in Turkey and around the world.  They 
participate in discussions that range from the artistic aspects of the film to international 
repercussions. These online discussion forums by no mean are inactive, one-sided, or 
filled with completely brain-washed followers. In a civil manner, the film audiences 
challenge the film’s narration, credibility of its messages, and hazards of 
(mis)interpretations of the film in many levels. As I mention in another chapter, 
omitting such online audience interpretations and activities may yield incomplete 
conclusions. In other words, these online fan communities can help us understand this 
question: what do viewers do with the film VWP? Therefore, it is this dissertation’s goal 
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to delve into this question and try to better understand what geopolitical narrations are 
presented, sustained and negotiated.   
3.9 Summary  
Popular productions are well suited for projecting political, social, moral and cultural 
views to their audiences around the world (Dodds 2000). For this very reason, political 
elites utilize cinematic productions to (re)form, maintain and market certain cultural 
viewpoints, national identities, narratives and ideological manifestations beyond the 
state’s borders. For example, Dodds argues that the film The Birth of a Nation (1915) 
played a significant role in constructing particular narratives about American national 
identities (Dodds 2000). Other nations around the world were also quick to discover the 
usefulness of cinema’s potential to inform and shape public opinions and prioritize 
particular identities. Moreover, films such as October (1927), and the James Bond and 
Rambo series, do not only inform the audience about who the enemy is, but also 
establish geopolitical truth for the citizens’ of the world. But not all films engage with 
maintaining the existing world order. Some independently produced or made films in 
the world, outside of the Western domain, challenge the dominant view of the world 
representation as in the case of Valley of the Wolves-Iraq (2006). However, the reading 
of these movies’ cultural messages will vary, depending on readers’ socio-political, 
ethnic, and religious backgrounds. Not all messages are decoded as they were originally 
encoded in texts. So, this chapter exclusively pays attention to these important 
connections between practicing geopolitics, popular culture and, contextualizing 
audienceship. This chapter also highlights the relationships between popular geopolitics 
and Turkey’s foreign affairs in reference to audiences’ meaning-making process. Given 
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the vital connection between popular cultural products and geopolitics, Turkey’s soft 
power potential in the Muslim world is significant, thus a critical reading and analysis 
of VWP will have important implications for further geopolitical investigations.  
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction   
Understanding meaning-making processes is a challenging task. They involve 
considerations of subjective ways of looking at images, and classifying them which are 
always personal and complex.  To understand the power of images and the power of 
interpretations of those images, how images work, and what crucial provisions should 
be utilized for image interpretations is an important matter of this study. Borrowing 
from Gillian Rose’s five major points to understanding the nature of working with 
visual images, this study pays serious attention to: images’ ‘own visual effects’, ‘ways 
of seeing images’, visions of ‘social differences’,  ‘social context of viewing’,  and ‘the 
visualities spectators bring’ to their viewing (Rose 2007, p. 12).  
This study aims to answer the question of how a Turkish film reflects the 
geopolitical imaginations of the Turkish people in the post-9/11 geopolitical moment 
within which a series of the global and regional events took place, and further, what do 
Turkish audiences do with such a film in this atmosphere. The study attempts to 
understand how Valley of the Wolves- Palestine constructs and creates codes of 
contemporary Turkish geopolitics in the region, how this political-action film is 
interpreted by different individuals, and what are the geopolitical consequences can be 
brought about from these mediated images. In this regard, this chapter broadly outlines 
the research design, data collection techniques, research issues and appropriateness of 
the methodology. Additionally, this chapter makes the connection between the selected 
methods of investigation and the literature review while providing justifications why 
such a mixed method is used for the study.  
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4.2 Locations of analysis: production, text and audience  
Three sites of investigation are the focus of this study: sites of production (including the 
film-making process and the geopolitical conditions that triggered this new film’s 
production), sites of the image itself (geopolitical discourses that are embedded in the 
film), and sites of consumption (audiences and their interpretations) (Rose 2007). These 
sites are investigated through their technological, compositional and socio-cultural 
qualities and attributions.  In other words and reference to Rose’s model above, the film 
VWP’s material condition, production and peoples’ consumption of it can be better 
understood if it is investigated through the film’s technology, composition, and social 
context.  
This triadic approach to film analysis is not new. Others such as Rose, Dixon, 
Zonn and Bascom also investigate films within broader social conceptualizations rather 
than considering films an expression of the mind because it is thought that films are also 
social texts as well as material artifacts and technological entities (Dixon, Zonn and 
Bascom 2008, Wilkins 2009). In other words, “films are the product of, and in turn 
reproductive of, broader social relations of power” (Dixon et al. 2008, p. 25). As an 
object of inquiry, films should be analyzed within socio-cultural conditions embedded 
in their production, content, and reception.  These scholars frame this approach to film 
analysis as ‘Author-Text-Reader’ approach similar to what Deacon, Pickering, Golding 
and Murdock term a ‘critical realist approach’ which is to understand “audiences as 
both actively engaged in the construction of their social reality and constrained by 
structural conditions, such as social norms, economic conditions, policies, and more, 
which themselves change over time as a result of social struggles” (Wilkins 2009, p. 5). 
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In this conceptual frameworks, Dixon, Zonn, and Bascom focus on the conditions 
surrounding film ‘production’, an approach that can be presented within a political 
economic reading of ‘reality and film’s representation’, ‘content’, and a text-centered 
approach that assumes “the link between signifier and signified is active constructed 
and maintained by ‘real’ world social relations of power” (Dixon et al. 2008, p. 33) 
extracted by an expert reader, and ‘reception’, a reader-centered approach where 
meanings are interpreted by audiences. In all these approaches, Dixon, Zonn, and 
Bascom illustrate that “critical analysis of symbolic texts must then revolve around the 
questions of which discourses are being developed, how they are being effectively 
transferred, and to the benefit of whom” (Dixon et al. 2008, p. 43). Therefore this study 
aims to mobilize several techniques of investigating social subjects which require a 
critical questioning of the ‘production-text-reader’ nexus utilizing comprehensive 
methodologies and developing analytical thinking.   
4.3 Research sites 
One of the data collection techniques organizes focus group discussions in Turkey about 
the film VWP. This component of the study was perhaps the most challenging. 
Conducting such a comprehensive study in order to understand complex public opinions 
of the film requires choosing carefully selected and relatively representative research 
sites. The first task is to identify locations that would be as representative as possible of 
the entire population which is, however, in its nature almost impossible to achieve.  
With the acknowledgement of difficulties of selecting investigation locations, three 
urban research sites were selected for the focus group study:  Istanbul, Ankara and Van 
(see Figure 4.1).  
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Figure 4-1: Map shows the research sites in Turkey. 
  
 These provinces are urbanized and populated enough to represent almost all 
aspects of Turkish population. Within these cities, there are neighborhoods that have 
Kurdish populations and other minority communities (Armenians, Greeks, etc.), low 
income populations, and various religious groups with secular segments which shape 
the geography where they inhabit. These sites comprise the heart and minds of the 
republic in many ways. Ankara is situated in the heart of Central Anatolia, where a 
conservative-nationalist worldview colors the mental map of the majority of citizens 
(see Figure 4.2) (Anaz et al. 2011). This city plays the role of melting pot in which 
migrants from rural places find the conduit for transition to urban life. Van, on the 
eastern part of Turkey, can be characterized as the periphery of the nation but the 
cultural and economic center of the eastern region only second to Diyarbakir. Bordering 
Iran and other Kurdish cities outside of Turkey, Van represents a unique culture in the 
eastern part of Turkey and stands out for its diversity and vibrancy. Istanbul on the other 
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hand is the biggest center of population
23
, comprising to twenty percent of the Turkish 
population (see Table 4.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Of course there were difficulties and challenges to conducting such a study in 
these locations, not limited to these cities’ size. However, being able to access to several 
personal networks in these cities, and the personal knowledge gained from living and 
staying in these cities previously played an important role in minimizing research 
difficulties.  
 
                                                          
23
 Istanbul also has the largest Kurdish population in sheer number but their contribution to shape the 
city’s cultural landscape is limited due to the city’s density and the spatial distribution of the Kurdish 
population.  
Figure 4-2: Map showing the distribution 50% or more party support in the elections of 2009. 
Source: Produced by Anaz, Keceli, & Shelley 
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Table 4-1: Population Distribution, 2010  
Provinces Population Percentage Population 
Istanbul 12,573,836 18% 
Ankara 4,466,756 6.3% 
Van 979,671 1.3% 
Source: Turkish Statistical Institute  
 
4.4 Research design and data collection 
4.4.1 Phase I: Planning 
In the first phase, I aimed to establish close ties with my contact people in the research 
sites in order to build a network and with their help reach possible study subjects. This 
step was crucial because in order to acquire access to potential participants for focus 
group discussions, surveys and interviews, well-organized network settings became 
necessity. Also, to gain participants’ trust and confidence, the pre-established networks 
were vital for completing successful research that deals with people and their social 
interactions with popular culture. These established networks were made possible by 
my friends of friends, providing the ‘snowball’ effects in the process of reaching 
possible audiences. The snowball method works when there is no determined list or 
identified institution to begin with. As in the metaphor of snowball rolling down the 
hill, my initial contacts suggested additional people who in turn brought more and more 
people into the research circle (Biernacki and Waldorf 1981).  This method of sampling 
is widely used when there is “either very closed or informal social groupings, where the 
social knowledge and personal recommendations of the initial contacts are invaluable in 
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opening up and mapping tight social networks” (Deacon et al. 2007, p. 55). Throughout 
this study I counted on local contacts’ help because their knowledge of the social 
structure of their community yielded fewer mistakes and reduced potential serious 
misunderstandings between the researcher and the participants. My personal ties to 
Turkish society also enabled me to reach remote locations of investigation sites and 
eased the process of gaining peoples’ trust throughout the study. My initial contacts 
were mostly composed of friends from my undergraduate years, friends of my 
acquaintances and friends of my extended family members. This pool of people, I 
believe, opened up the doors for a valid sampling and a representative investigation.  
4.4.2 Phase II: Implementation  
The second phase deals with data collection strategies. In this study, I utilized both 
qualitative and quantitative methods of collecting data. I organized focus group 
discussions, collected online fan comments about VWP, and conducted an online survey 
about the film and conducted an interview with one of the script writers and activists of 
the Mavi Marmara flotilla. This goal compelled me to move beyond a simple 
exploratory and explanatory approach of visual images to cross-sectional comparisons, 
empirical categorizations, in-group discussions of narratives, and interviews with the 
text encoder. It is because understanding interpretations of visual images have always 
been integral to the social fabric of our daily experience, which is always embedded in 
different segments of social relations. Therefore, this study is obliged to include several 
ways of engaging with different audiences in different platforms.  
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5.3.2.1 Focus group 
In this part of the study, individuals from different sectors of Turkish society were 
asked to participate in focus group discussions about the VWP. For this part, I used both 
a semi-structured questionnaire and follow-up discussion questions in a conversational 
manner. The protocol of asking questions in the focus groups ranged from general to 
specific such as “What do you think this film is about” to “What happened to Abdullah 
in the film.” But responses did not always follow as planned, and in some 
circumstances, my questions followed respondents’ previous answers. During the 
discussions, I did not dwell on anybody longer than several minutes or embarrass 
anyone for his/her seemingly incorrect reading or misunderstanding of the film in terms 
of factuality (we need to bear in mind that any misreading is also another reading). In 
general, the focus groups consisted of three to seven members and were moderated by 
myself. My initial plan was to include at least 5 people in each group, but for various 
reasons I ended up continuing with three or four participants. As I formed these focus 
groups, I made careful selections of individuals that would represent and include 
multiple aspects of Turkish society (income, education, age, ethnicity gender, etc.). I 
paid close attention to grouping people, thus I grouped them in accordance with either 
their education level or employment status and in one occasion, the grouping was done 
in terms of their gender and ethnicity. To the some level, these focus groups were 
mainly homogenous. However, this categorization did not go smoothly throughout the 
study all the time nor was there an urgency to do that. Indeed, artificially categorization 
of participants does not always correspond the reality of Turkish society because in 
practice people often consume entertainment products together within the family that 
includes –housewife-mother, grocer-father, teacher-daughter, lawyer-son, unemployed-
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cousin and so on- to pass time or they watch films together as an activity. They eat 
together, talk and watch TV together. In other words, they consume things together. 
Thus, forming focus groups out of these social settings solely based on education or 
gender may be misleading. However, there are layers of society that form single-layered 
audience group where the consumption of entertainment shows similarities among these 
group individuals. One example of this group of media consumers can be the youth. 
Young college students who mostly live in different cities other than their hometowns 
and stay in dormitories or apartment buildings go to theaters together. For these 
individuals who may have a similar taste in cinema consumption, going to a cinema 
becomes a weekend activity and an escape from studying and solitude. Additionally, 
these college students also are the heavy users of internet and personalized media 
products (iPhones, laptops, notebooks, etc.) where they can download or watch instant 
films or TV series (gazete5 2012). When they engage in such activities, they become 
important consumers of popular culture and active creators of their own meaning and 
cultural practices. In other words, their consumption of popular culture is private and 
personal as well as social and interactive. Therefore, to read carefully this complex 
ways of performing mediated messages and practicing cinematic consumption by youth, 
I cared about including this section of Turkish audiences to map out what these people 
do with popular culture such as VWP and what the film does for them in their complex 
and dynamic lives.  
Since the length of the film is longer than 100 minutes, I edited the film into 
twenty to thirty minutes sections to fit the purpose of the investigation so that the focus 
group members could recall what the main theme of the film was and its specifics 
116 
 
through viewing certain scenes from the film. This editing was set up in a way that it 
did not disturb (in my view) the general flow of discussion because selected participants 
for focus groups were composed of those who had already seen the film before joining 
the groups. The physical sites where these viewings took place varied. According to 
participants’ current situation and their consent, gathering places were quiet-corners of 
cafeterias, business offices, or homes.  
Regarding the focus group sampling, there were several issues that need to be 
addressed here. One was that I had a hard time grouping male audiences with female 
audiences and grouping female audiences within a single group. There are two primary 
explanations for this difficulty. One was that females did not feel comfortable joining 
groups dominated by male participants (for example, the ratio was 2/6); the second, 
there were few females contacted who saw the film or wanted to see it.  In other cases, 
female participants tended to remain passive even if they agreed to join the focus 
groups. To minimize passive participation by female group members, I either increased 
the number of female participants in a group or formed separate focus groups that 
included female participants only.  
The second issue in focus group sampling was the selection of participants 
which defined the representativeness of the research and ultimately shaped the 
outcomes of the study. To avoid this problem, I selected participants from a variety of 
social, cultural and economic backgrounds. Of course any selection is problematic and 
subject to numerous challenges of working with human subjects, but my preferred 
sampling was the ‘researcher-constituted’ one as oppose to ‘pre-constituted groups’ 
(Deacon et al. 2007). Researcher-constituted sampling refers, to the groups that the 
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researcher creates for research purposes. In other words, I did not automatically select a 
pre-constituted group that would include social and professional groups that already 
existed (for example, sampling employees in a firm). Despite the advantages and 
disadvantages of forming this type of grouping, I believe that the ‘research constituted’ 
sampling technique fit well for the purpose and nature of this study given the fact that 
film audiences are diverse, complex and less organized than professional groupings.  
5.3.2.2 Online survey 
The next step of the data collection included asking direct questions to people about 
their habit of individual media consumption, entertainment activities, their 
demographics, world views and opinions on Turkish politics and the film VWP. The 
goal of designing this survey was to determine: How do people define themselves? Are 
there any relations between who they are and the way they think? What communication 
devices do people possess and how often they use them? What do people do with the 
film? What are their attitudes toward Turkey’s foreign policy? What relations do they 
see between the film and Turkey-Israel relations? What are people’s social 
backgrounds? How do people make political maps in their minds? How do they imagine 
Turkey’s geopolitical borders? With a highly structured questionnaire, I aimed to draw 
plausible conclusions on the basis of peoples’ answers (see the questionnaire in the 
Appendix A).  As described, this was a survey with the intention to collect data about 
people’s demographic information and to shed light on why Turkish people behave, 
think and imagine the world the way they do. In other words, this survey was designed 
to bridge descriptively collected data with explanatory (analytical) and exploratory data 
to understand if there are relations between people’s socio-cultural backgrounds and the 
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way they form their opinions and behaviors via popular culture. However, this 
technique of investigation is neither complete nor flawless. One disadvantage of this 
survey is that people may tend to give answers that they believe the researcher would 
like to hear or may provide what the respondents think is socially acceptable response 
since no question is asked in a social vacuum (Deacon et al. 2007, Berger 2000).  An 
advantage of asking direct questions to people about their activities and their views is 
that people can be more honest with their answers because the structured questioning 
can limit the influence of human factors on the data-collection process. For instance, in 
the latter case respondents may become more honest and straightforward in their 
answers about their worldview when they are not interviewed face-to-face. 
Additionally, outcomes of a survey can give a better ways of categorizing the data than 
other forms of qualitative data collections.  
 
Figure 4-3: Geographical distribution of the survey participants in Turkey.  
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This survey was conducted in the form of the ‘online self-completion 
questionnaire’. In other words, respondents were invited to go to a link that was created 
via the web-based survey company, SurveyMonkey. There, participants were given step 
by step instructions how to complete the survey in Turkish.   Once they entered the link, 
they found a letter of consent and sets of questions. Firstly, they were asked to read the 
letter of consent, accept the conditions and show that they understood the voluntary 
nature of the participation. They were then directed to go to the next section. In the next 
section, they were asked to answer questions that were designed to collect data a) about 
the participants’ demographics and socio-political positions, b) about their engagement 
with popular culture (cinema, TV, Internet, etc.), c) about people’s knowledge on 
Turkey’s geopolitical condition, and d) to identify to what extent the film is transferred 
into people’s everyday life and shaped their geopolitical imaginations, and how people 
evaluated the film VWP.   
This online questionnaire was distributed in a snowball method among those 
who may or may not have seen the film (see Figure 4.3). The link of the survey was sent 
out through my Facebook contacts and several other online sites associated with the 
film. Such sites included the VWP Facebook-fan group and cinema sites wherein the 
film fans could share their opinions and news about the Valley of the Wolves TV and 
cinema productions as well as opinions of people in the film productions. As in other 
methods of investigations of peoples’ opinions, online surveying has its limitations and 
benefits. One important benefit of conducting an online survey is that it is relatively 
convenient for both the respondents and the researcher in terms of accessibility and 
distribution, and less expensive to administer than in-person surveys. The use of the 
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internet in social research has been on the increase not only because it is a cheap tool to 
employ when conducting research, but also because it stands as being a prominent new 
tool to be included in social research if social research involves communication as in 
Hine’s argument where she notes “the introduction of a new communications medium 
provides the occasion for examination of the new problems which might be occasioned 
by use of this new technology. Logically speaking, if social research always involves 
communication, then it is reasonable to ask if changing the mode of communication 
affects any methodological assumptions or practices” (Hine 2005, p. 3). Given the fact 
that today’s Turkey is a highly internet connected country, online forms of data-
collection appeared to be logical tools to use to capture ideologically and geographically 
diverse people’s views. 
 Surveying online has limitations too. Beside the pitfalls of categorizing peoples’ 
opinion in a mathematical way, online surveys also limit the research outcomes to the 
total numbers of internet users in a given population. In other words, the research 
excludes those who have no access to internet to participate in the study. In addition to 
this limitation, since the survey was distributed via my Facebook networks and other 
fan-driven websites, this research carried a potential risk of excluding many other film 
fans and audiences were beyond this network of contacts. Despite these limitations and 
pitfalls, I argue that not being able to reach every single viewer out in the field does not 
affect the overall validity of the research and the conclusions made. Indeed, electronic 
surveying served as a vital conduit for providing opportunities to include geographically 
unreachable samples and population in my limited time in the field. Additionally, online 
survey software allows replication of the study in different locations: towns, cities and 
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countries, facilitating comparison and contrast of different cultures and localities. 
Finally, it is important to recall that this survey was designed not to stand on its own, 
but to work with other forms of data, namely interviews and focus groups, in a 
comparative manner.   
5.3.2.3 Interviews   
Another important part of analyzing a visual text is to pay attention to its production site 
(Rose 2007). In order to answer the question of ‘what can an image do?’, one needs to 
delve into the image’s author(s) be it a producer, a sculpture, or a painter. What is 
known as the ‘auteur theory’ examines the production site of an image to understand 
what its maker(s) intends to show. Although Rose and others argue that in a so-called 
postmodern era, how an image is understood (audience interpretation) is more important 
than what is intended to show (authorship). I argue that in order to grasp the full picture 
in a meaning-making circle, attention to the production side is necessary because the 
viewer as an active reader of an image is not completely independent of other 
modalities that give meaning to the text. It is commonly accepted that socio-cultural 
particularities to a sufficient degree influence the text-reader as well as the author and 
the text within the context. 
Even though the site of production includes computerized technologies, 
production materials and location, finance and authorship, at this point I will talk about 
authorship based on two interviews that I conducted, one with the Mavi Marmara (the 
group that attempted to breach the Gaza blockade) activist and the scriptwriters of the 
VWP. This is important because the way the film is narrated, formed and/or edited 
makes enormous impact on its viewers. For example, the film’s formation is vital to a 
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film production which indicates that its subject (people, place, and the story) is 
representative and corresponds to our experiences and expectations of how that certain 
subject looks. Additionally, a great movie, generally, means that two factors are in play: 
“a good script and a director’s inspiration, vision, intelligence, and his/her supervision 
of all aspects of the film’s production” (Barsam 2004, p. 33). Based on particular 
expectations from the scriptwriter or the director, we make our decisions to go or not to 
go to a movie. In the case of VWP, I wanted to know what intentions were put forward 
on the production side to attract viewers, and what messages were meant to be delivered 
in the film. Two interviews with one scriptwriter and an activist who provided 
information about what happened on the flotilla may not tell the whole story of the 
encoding, but it provides important clues for what messages were coded in the film, and 
allows me to compare and contrast what cinematic codes are encoded and what 
decodings are made by the viewers. For this reason, I completed a short interview with 
one of the Mavi Marmara activists who was on the flotilla sailing to Gaza, and was 
asked to provide details about the Israeli attack for the film makers. The other interview 
was an hour-long, semi-structured, face-to-face interview with Cuneyt Aysan, a VWP 
scriptwriter, about various aspects of the film and reasons behind making the film. 
These open-ended dialogues with the activist and the scriptwriter opened new doors to 
understanding of the site of production and the visual messages of the film. Although as 
an interviewer I established a good rapport with the interviewees, occasionally I felt that 
the conversation was quite often dominated by them and there was a feeling/impression 
that (especially the scriptwriter) they were not only talking to me, but they were also 
talking to a messenger who has ties with Western academics and audiences, and could 
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transfer the message to different receivers and audiences (this notion of sending 
messages to the outside world has been repeated in several other focus group 
discussions as well.) 
5.3.2.4 Observing film-fans on internet fan sites 
Rose talks about two aspects of the social modality of audiencing: “the social practices 
of spectating and the social identities of the spectators” (Rose 2007, p. 25). This means 
that “only certain sorts of people do certain sorts of images in particular ways” (Rose 
2007, p. 25). In her example, Rose notes that she would decorate her college room with 
postcards of modern paintings picked up on her summer trips in Europe to show that her 
visitors would see that she went to European art museums. From this example, she 
comes to an understanding that some people chose to display certain images that they 
like and they also display those images in their room so that they know others will be 
looking at them. In this sense, as she argues, we don’t only display only images; we 
display who we are and how we like to be known. In other words, images say 
something about “who we are and how we want to be seen” (Rose 2007, p. 26). Inspired 
from this piece of analysis, I included online-fan comments in this study to understand 
the practiced audiencing and viewers’ negotiated spectatorship independent of the 
influence of structured examinations. How people interpreted the film, what meanings 
online-fans made through discussions of the film’s messages (perhaps for others to 
appreciate) and what identities they practiced on the virtual space became an important 
component of this study. For this reason, I visited a well-known Turkish cinema 
website, sinemalar.com, to read viewers’ comments for the film and for their comments 
of the other comments. I read several hundreds of comments that were put by the 
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viewers from couple months before the film was released to the year after it was 
released.  
4.4.3 Phase III: Processing 
The final step of this data collection included coding, translating and analysis of what 
was collected from the field. To analyze the data, I transcribed every statement in the 
audio recordings into a written version, and then I translated all transcripts that I found 
relevant to particular topics and questions into English. During this categorization stage, 
I paid careful attention to allow the text to speak for itself. In every aspect of data 
analysis, the awareness of my own reflexivity was present and stayed present during all 
my interpretations and translations. However, this is not to say that no mistakes were 
made. Indeed, I found it very difficult to translate cultural jokes, sayings, and other 
traditional phrases that may not have direct equivalents in the English language.  
Additionally, I have to acknowledge my limitations with English in translating Turkish 
documents into English. I believe that all these factors have to be acknowledged in 
order to highlight their possible effects on the study.  
4.5 Appropriateness of the methodology  
This study uses numbers and visualizations in addition to other methods such as focus 
groups, face-to-face interview and observations of online-fan activities which are 
mostly associated with qualitative studies which have been used by social scientists 
from different disciplines. Notwithstanding, situating this study in the realms of 
quantitative and qualitative geography is very problematic and complex. Therefore, 
there needs to be clear justifications for utilizing both qualitative and quantitative 
methods in this study. In this regard, I discuss several reasons why this study utilizes 
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mixed-methods and why its mixed-method approach should be located at the 
intersection of critical and analytical geographies wherein the stimulation of dialog and 
an appreciation of insights can be woven together.  
Criticism of using statistics and visualization in our discipline (geography, 
particularly the human geography) has a long history (Schwanen and Kwan 2009). 
Mainly such criticisms came from Marxist, feminist, and poststructuralist geographers 
against quantitative geographers for being essentialist, reductionist and objectivist (Rose 
1993). The idea that science should be about representing or mirroring nothing but 
objective truth, which was the main premise of spatial analysis (a positivist approach), 
has been widely challenged and dismissed decades ago. Poststructuralist and/or 
postmodernist scholars strongly disagreed the idea that the real world is too chaotic to 
be captured with statistics and any means of visual models would not mirror the reality 
on the ground. The post-World War II moment became well known with its apolitical 
and mathematical explanations of social changes and problems. This positivist 
academic trend paved the way for a great division between academia and social 
realities. In the following decades when social and political life became more political, 
active and diverse than ever (for example, the civil rights and feminist movements, 
Vietnam War protests, consequences of OPEC crises, etc.), and communication 
technologies opened the doors to compress time and space, geographers –similar to 
other social disciplines- began questioning and dismissing the grand promises of 
positivist science and the objectivity of mathematical models that help to enshroud 
social inequalities and injustices in various communities, countries and regions (Harvey 
1972).   
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Given this historical background, however, the interest in quantitative methods 
in geography has not died away. This study is no exception to this. Indeed, recent 
scholarship notes that utilizing quantitative methods can contribute to progressive social 
changes and human rights in many levels. In this sense, Schwanen and Kwan argue that 
both statistics and GIS can be a mobilizing tool for politically and socially progressive 
causes (Schwanen and Kwan 2009). Moreover, in their article Schwanen and Kwan 
reference various scholars from critical geography who have become concerned with 
(re)considering “the potential contributions of counting, statistics, modeling, and GIS to 
their projects from the perspectives of critical realism, pragmatism, and 
poststructuralism” (Schwanen and Kwan 2009, p. 460). Similarly, feminist scholars 
have become interested in the potential of quantitative methods such as descriptive 
statistics for critical goals and social changes. For instance, feminist geographers argue 
that since we live in a visual world and much of our knowledge comes from and is 
produced by visual materials, quantitative methods such as statistics and  GIS
24
 can be 
utilized to map out broad contours of inequality and oppression (Schwanen and Kwan 
2009). If such quantitative methods are used in combination with qualitative methods 
and self-reflexivity is revealed when outcomes are interpreted and the embodied writing 
style is acknowledged, empirical research techniques such as GIS and statistics can be 
useful instruments to point out various social and spatial problems many places around 
the world face today. Additionally, critical geographers argue that their arguments –in 
this way- would not be dismissed because they lack from a scientific rigor or 
irrelevancy (Schwanen and Kwan 2009). For scholars such as (Schwanen and Kwan 
                                                          
24
 The debate on the GIS whether it is a tool or science or there is a third way to situate it in the academia, 
still continues today (Wright, Goodchild & Proctor 1997).  
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2009, Carter 2009, Madden and Ross 2009, Rose 2007) (to name few), quantitative 
methods can be used in social research as long as researchers do not engage with 
“essentialist categorizations, absolute notions of space and time, and linear causalities 
of more conventional spatial analysis” (Schwanen and Kwan 2009, p. 461). Carter, in 
her study about how “race, quantification, and raced quantification have been used and 
written about in geographies” (Carter 2009, p. 465), provides a good example of 
addressing the race issues in a quantitative geographical inquiry. Madden’s and Ross’s 
project combines “qualitative data of personal narratives with GIS technologies to 
explore the potential for critical cartography in the study of mass atrocity” (Madden and 
Ross 2009, p. 508) in Northern Uganda is another example, a piece of work that uses 
quantitative methods to explore the forced displacement and violence around the world.  
Nevertheless, in this dissertation, I do not claim that statistics, numbers and 
visual techniques are well suited with critical approaches or they are completely 
comfortable with one another. Rather, I argue that these quantitative methods have the 
potential to illuminate matters that qualitative techniques may have difficulties to 
visualize. My assessment is that quantitative and qualitative methods are not mutually 
exclusive of each other nor entirely suited for another. However, I support the idea that 
without falling into the positivist trap, quantitative methods in combination with 
qualitative methods may be utilized for greater understanding of media and geopolitics 
but with caveats as to their application.  
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4.6 research issues 
Doing research in human geography is complex and replete with numerous issues for 
the both sides, the researcher and the researched. This particular study is not immune 
from this reality. Some of the issues can be itemized as follows:  
a. Issues related to selecting research sites 
b. Issues related to reaching out optimal samplings 
c. Issues related to positionality of the researcher 
d. Issues related to power relations  
I explain each of these issues in the following section.  
4.6.1 Problems with selecting research sites/cities 
For this study, three locations were selected. Selecting these locations particular logics 
followed. One was that their size in population. Istanbul, for example, contains more 
than 20 percent of Turkey’s entire population. Considering the rapid internal migration 
to Istanbul in 1980s and 1990s from other Anatolian cities, towns and villages (Keskin 
2010), this city represents a miniature of Turkey’s demographic structure. For this 
reason, selecting Istanbul as a research site seemed reasonable. However, large cities 
present problems for researchers. Determining actual research locations within the city 
is a difficult and subjective activity. This was a matter of who you knew where. This is 
important to discuss as the selection clearly will shape the study data. One example 
would be that if I selected all my participants from the district of Fatih in Istanbul, a 
relatively a conservative/Islamist district, my conclusions would be very questionable. 
The same applies to other districts with varying political and cultural norms in Istanbul.  
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My other criterion for selecting these research sites (Istanbul, Ankara, and Van) 
was because their unique populations. It is relatively easier to find different ethnicity 
and world views in these heterogeneous cities. For instance, Istanbul contains every 
ethnicity of Turkish society while the province of Van in the eastern Turkey is one of 
the biggest Kurdish cities in Turkey. Again, these criteria are debatable and can carry 
many problems. One can never claim that doing a research in large cities such as Van 
automatically qualify one’s research as representative. It is again about ‘who you know 
where’ that determines the outcome of your investigation. One can easily travel through 
the city of Van without even making a single conversation with local residents from its 
Kurdish majority. For example, there are many different groups residing in the city that 
are from former Soviet states and government employees who come from Turkish 
majority provinces serving in government institutions. In this study, I endeavored to 
include major ethnicities of Turkish demographic elements by putting extra effort to 
seek out better representative samples in these three different provinces but also I still 
acknowledge that every choice I made was personal and political in its nature.   
As mentioned earlier, site selection and contact networks are an important 
consideration in audience research, and I understand that this inquiry needs to be 
intellectually justified. In this dissertation, as discussed, I used a snowball method to 
recruit my potential participants. Without having someone in research sites to help me, 
this research might not be able to reach an adequate number of participants for 
relatively different audience groups. Since, my contacts’ role remained limited to only 
providing other contacts who actually organized the grouping of research participants; I 
argue that my samples are relatively representative and remote from the circle of 
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personal influence. This is not to say that I do not acknowledge possible problems of 
relying on my personal contacts (friends of friends) to base my assessments and 
arguments. This is to say that there is a thin line between where personal contacts can 
influence the outcome of a research. This is where personal judgment of the situation 
becomes critical. In selecting the research sites and my contacts, I paid special attention 
to this thin line to have relatively unbiased samples for this study. However, it should 
also be acknowledged that such research would not be possible if the researcher did not 
have personal local connections and contacts on the ground since contacting possible 
subjects cannot easily occur in a parachute sampling.   
4.6.2 Sampling is not simple  
A reasonable goal of a researcher is to reach diverse and representative sample of a 
population. However this goal is not always realistic for many reasons. My biggest 
challenge was finding a representative population that included samples of lifestyle, 
education, income level, occupation, gender, and ethnicity for the survey and focus 
group discussions. In either phases of sampling process (online-survey and focus 
groups), there was a lack of female and less-educated participants. In my survey, I was 
unable to exceed a 30 percent female participation rate. The study did not attract many 
female participants for several foreseen reasons:  one is that had to do with my own 
gender. In the survey case, the starting point to the audiences was through my Facebook 
and similar websites. Even though I have diverse friends on Facebook, my Turkish male 
friends outnumber my female friends greatly (86 percent and 14 percent respectively). 
This snowball-effect as the survey link was shared led to the imbalance of sex. 
However, this does not provide the whole picture.  The percentage of internet and 
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Facebook users in Turkey that are women is smaller (see Tables 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 for 
demographic distribution of internet and Facebook users in Turkey). To support this 
claim, I closely investigated the ratio of male and female participants for the film’s fan-
sites. It was evident that those who commented on the film’s fan website appeared to be 
majority male. This is my estimation of their gender by reading their profile pictures 
and names. In the focus groups case, similar patterns were seen: women tended to not 
see the film while young males tended to show high interest in the film and formed the 
niche audience group for the film. Additionally, some conservative females declined to 
participate in other cases they were reluctant to participate in a group that had 
dominantly male participants. Because of all these factors, female participation was 
limited in my study but by no means, I argue, is this sampling is irrelevant or 
misrepresentative in its entirety. Many studies that investigated the Valley of the Wolves 
TV series came to the similar conclusion that female viewers were not attracted by a 
political-action film such as Valley of the Wolves-Iraq (Yanik 2009, Celebi 2006, Anaz 
and Purcell 2010). Another study published in a Turkish newspaper provides similar 
results in terms of ratios of cinema goers between sexes. Kara reports that 30 million 
397 thousand people went to Turkish cinemas in 2009. Sixty-nine percent of movie 
goers were single, forty-nine percent of them are female and fifty-one percent is male. 
The average age among these cinema goers is in between eighteen and thirty-nine 
which constitute eighty-eight percent of the total (Kara 2009). Again, the sex ratio 
among those who go to films such as VWP is much lower than that of the ratio in Kara’s 
study (see statistics in Chapter 7).   
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4.6.3 Positionality and technology in interviews  
There were two sides that were simultaneously effective and affected during my focus 
group discussions in terms of building trust between the researcher and the subjects. 
Being a male researcher, with a US university affiliation, and studying a political film 
with storylines about a very delicate subject matter created an environment where 
participants and I had difficulties building necessary rapport. From the participants’ 
point of view, there were similar problems such as being a female and talking to an 
out(in)sider with a voice recorder on.  
Generally speaking in Turkish men and women are separated in daily life. This 
space between genders is a cultural phenomenon but varies from region to region and 
within a region. In places such as province of Van and outskirts of Ankara and Istanbul, 
separation between men and women is more visible and any researcher who works in 
these areas must take this cultural factor into account, and generally, this social reality 
affects the composition of any social research that is conducted in Turkish society.  In 
my effort to attract participants, several times female groups of university students in 
the province of Van and Ankara refused to participate because these students did not 
feel comfortable talking to a man while their voice being recorded. These students were 
from small Anatolian conservative cities and some of them were wearing headscarves. 
A conservative culture limited my research. For example, some of my focus group 
participants did not show up the scheduled discussions because I was a male and single 
according to my contact person. On the other hand, however, being a male eased the 
process reaching male populations, especially in Istanbul and Ankara.  
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Another problem encountered was the participants’ employment status. Several 
government employees showed concern when I asked them to participate in focus 
groups or the online-survey where there would be some sort of documenting the 
answers. Their decision not to participate in my study was directly related to possibility 
of the government’s monitoring of their interaction with me which they perceived to 
would jeopardize their employment since the topic of my research was deeply political. 
The same concern was shared by a group of people who would be identified as 
ethnically Kurdish. Finding a group of people who identify themselves as Kurdish was 
extremely difficult even though 20 million Kurdish people are believed to live across 
Turkey. I could only organize one focus group with people who identified themselves 
ethnically Kurdish. Regarding this issue, there are several reasons that may explain why 
I had such a hard time finding Kurdish people to participate in my study. One is that this 
film did not appeal to Kurdish people. When I traveled to towns known for hosting a 
quite number of Kurdish migrants from eastern Turkey, I found no one that had seen the 
film. The second reason is, I think, that people did not feel comfortable talking to me. 
They approached me in a suspicious way. For them, perhaps, I was a spy who could be 
very easily employed by the both governments the US and Turkey (this is not an 
exaggeration because I was asked several times –jokingly at least- if I was going to take 
these recordings to the CIA or if I was working for the US’s greater Middle Eastern 
project). This type of political fear may not be very visible when one talks to a Kurdish 
citizen in Turkey, but when one asks him or her to talk about the Israel-Palestine 
conflict, and then start an audio recording, it then becomes noticeable. However, being 
a student in the US was not always a serious issue. Indeed, I found several groups of 
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people who were willing to talk to me because they thought that they needed to say 
something to and about the US through me so that I could transfer their messages to 
audiences in the US and elsewhere.  
4.6.4 The relations of power  
McDowell warns graduate students and other social science researchers to become more 
conscious about self-reflexivity and positionality as they/we engage in the social 
construction of knowledges and discourses and the relations of power embedded within 
them (McDowell 1992). She also asks researchers to consider how important is to be 
aware of “the positionality of [researchers] themselves and their subjects, and the 
relations of power between them [us]” (McDowell 1992, p.399). During every stage of 
this research, I was always self-conscious about the power that I possessed as the main 
constructer, executer and analyzer of this research. From design of the questions (for the 
survey, focus groups, and interview) to categorizing of participants’ responses, my own 
way of interpreting and analyzing the results were present at all the time. This does not 
mean that I consciously favored certain responses while omitting others. Rather, this 
means that as the conductor of this research, I was aware of the possibility of favoring 
particular discussions, questions or people in the process of data collection, grouping 
and analysis of those responses and the data sources.  
However, the power relations do not always interplay between the researcher 
and the researched but it can also play important roles between participants. During one 
of my focus group studies, there occurred the conflict of interest between an employee 
and his supervisor. The supervisor raised his/her voice when his/her employee 
dismissed his/her thoughts and critiqued his/her views. I was compelled to intervene in 
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the conversation so that everyone had a chance to deliver their opinions freely but 
incidents such as this occur very often in real life every day.  
Finally to this, I have to include that I, myself, felt pressured during my 
interview with the scriptwriter of the film. As I entered the building, I went through 
several security checks and pre-questionings about what I do in the US and what 
purpose(s) my dissertation would have with studying Pana Film’s productions. Also 
during the interview, the interviewee dominated the conversation and steered it to topics 
he wanted to discuss. Of course, this also had something to do with experience of 
dealing reporters and journalists. As an untrained graduate student, I felt powerless to 
ask questions that I would certainly ask in other contexts due to a perceived imbalance 
in power.  
4.7 Summary  
This chapter introduced the methodology of the study. I started off with locating the 
sites of analysis in which the literature and the results of this research can be situated.  
Then, I discussed three phases of data collection, which included planning, 
implementing, and processing. In planning, I discussed pre-execution stage of data 
collection and what methodology of sampling I used and why. In the implementing 
phase, I explained what data-collection techniques I utilized (interview, focus group 
discussions, online survey and online fan-comment analysis) and their possible benefits 
and downsides for the study. In the processing phase, I talked about coding, translating, 
and analysis of what was collected in the field. In the following pages of the chapter, I 
discussed appropriateness of the methodology and the research concerns and issues 
encountered during planning, implementing and data processing.  
136 
 
CHAPTER 5: GEOPOLITICAL REPRESENTATIONS AND 
CRITICAL READING OF THE FILM, VALLEY OF THE 
WOLVES-PALESTINE 
 
- (Israeli Soldier to Polat) “Why did you come to Israel?” 
- (Polat) “I did not come to Israel. I came to Palestine.” 
(Dialogue from Valley of the Wolves-Palestine) 
 
5.1 Introduction   
This chapter discusses geopolitical representations of the political-action film Valley of 
the Wolves-Palestine. Here, I discuss three main readings that can be drawn from the 
film. These include (1) reading the film as a counter-geopolitical text which challenges 
the dominant perception of what is known to be Palestine and Israel state borders, (2) 
reading the film as a geopolitical text that formulates its own representation of space 
and territory, and functions within the realm of contemporary Turkish geopolitics, and 
(3) related to earlier points, reading the film within the genre politics and politics of 
vigilante hero which is often aligned with conservative statist political views.      
 
Figure 5-1: The shooting of arrested Palestinian 
civilians by Israeli soldiers after Polat’s men freed 
them from police buses. 
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As with the previous Pana Film productions (e.g. Valley of the Wolves-Iraq) 
VWP also inflamed international tensions and evoked many criticisms while the same 
time garnered national and international praise in various corners of the world. For 
example, Europe-based Jewish organizations appealed to German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Werner Faymann to condemn the film its glorification 
of violence and inciting anti-Israeli sentiments (JerusalemPost 2011). On the other 
hand, according to Ozdener (one of the script writers), this new film stands to be the 
biggest film in the Middle East. He says that Pana Film will continue to bring out voices 
of oppressed to the big screen and continue to criticize Israel: “VWP will only depict 
what really goes on in Palestine. Israel will be demonstrated as bloody hands, cruel, 
human slaughter, and disrespectful to human dignity” (Cengil 2010, Magazine section, 
¶ 5). The producers emphasize that the film is an effort to draw attention to the ‘human 
drama’ of Palestine for the audiences of Turkey and other nations (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).   
 
Figure 5-2: The neighborhood where VWP was filmed. 
Source: haberimport.com/kurtlarvadisifilistin 
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 Whether the film can dramatically harm Turkey-Israel relations that are already 
troubled more than they have been throughout history is debatable, but this film has 
significant potential as a medium to project social, political, moral and cultural views to 
audiences in Turkey and around the world. This film, ostensibly an action and 
entertainment piece, certainly employs novel forms of geopolitical representations and 
geographical imaginations for audiences worldwide. As the film entertains millions in 
the dark rooms of theaters and in living rooms, it spreads out epic tales of the victorious 
Turkish, confirms Turkey’s geographical and historical responsibilities and challenges 
orthodox geopolitical understandings of the Palestine-Israel conflict and territoriality. 
Hence, the following part of the chapter is an attempt to analyze some of the 
geopolitical implications of the film.  
5.3 Territorial correction in Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
Scholars from various disciplines such as geography, international area studies, 
communication and cultural studies consider popular productions’ capacity to shape the 
opinions of millions of people and the way they understand the world (Sharp 1996, 
Dodds 2006, Power and Crampton 2007, Dittmer 2010). Among them, geopolitics 
scholars concentrate on popular culture’s potential to influence identity construction and 
geographic imaginations of the masses.  Further, they pay special attention to popular 
culture’s ability be it in films, political cartoons, magazines, etc. to abridge the 
complexity of social interactions and to simplify disorderliness of world politics into a 
binary form such as ‘us’ against ‘them’ or ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. Popular geopolitics 
writers argue that popular culture creates abstract and material environments within 
which familiar social, cultural and geopolitical meanings shape and are shaped by 
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millions of people who may have never met (Williams 2007, Dittmer and Dodds 2008). 
Hollywood, for example, almost always actively engages in making cultural and 
geographical representations of the West and the films that do not represent the West 
are produced with an orientalist mindset (Said 1978). In Hollywood films, American 
values such as individualism, sanctity of family, love of democracy, fighting for a right 
cause and the love of hard work are constantly re-produced and displayed for the 
interest of the world as the values of other nations are made secondary and ‘other’ (Toal 
2007). Especially, during the Cold War and post 9/11, Hollywood’s involvement in 
projecting one-sided political, cultural, moral and geographical views for audiences was 
celebrated more than in other historical periods. Films like Rambo (1985), Top Gun 
(1986), Saving Private Ryan (1998), Black Hawk Down (2001), and Behind Enemy 
Lines (2001) successfully brought to consciousness for millions, American 
exceptionalism and its geopolitical responsibilities that parallel to the conjectural 
policies of current administrations (Dittmer 2010). Through Hollywood films, 
America’s geopolitical visions and imaginations are effectively and repeatedly coded, 
presented with little or no emphasis on alternative mappings. VWP, which is produced 
outside of the Western world, came out to present itself as one cinematic representation 
that contests the very fundamentals of geopolitical understandings and geographic 
projections of the Middle East. At the beginning of the film, Polat Alemdar contests the 
idea of the state of Israel’s territoriality and the notions of belonging and non-belonging 
in Jerusalem.  
140 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Polat arrives at an Israeli security 
checkpoint.  
 
 For his audiences and the Jewish state apparatuses, Polat re-affirms where Israeli 
home and homeland begins and ends through the conversations he makes throughout 
the film.  When the soldier who is in charge of the border control asks Polat what 
brought him to Israel, he answers him by correcting his question: “I did not come to 
Israel – I came to Palestine” (Figure 5.3). With this sttement, Polat verifies that 
Palestine does not belong to Israel and draws our attention to the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian lands. In this way Polat engages in territorial correction and geopolitical 
remapping of Palestinian geography. He surely and directly tells the audiences who is 
the occupier and who is the occupied. Polat’s verifications of the geography of 
occupation show similarity to a statement that the Turkish President gave at Colombia 
University in New York about Palestinian territories. To answer one of the questions of 
the students about comparison between Turkey’s Kurdish population and Palestine, the 
President, Abdullah Gul stated:  
These two are different. Kurds are the citizens of Turkey. We have been 
living together for hundreds of years. There are Kurdish people in the 
Turkish cabinet. We are the equal citizens of the Republic of Turkey. But, 
Israelis and Palestinians do not come from the same nation. They are not 
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the parts of the same nation. Gaza does not belong to Israel. Palestinian 
territories do not belong to Israel. The struggle in Turkey and the struggle 
in the Middle East are not the same (Yeginsu 2010, Diplomacy section, ¶ 
17).  
 Perhaps, Polat reaffirms the President’s geopolitical presentment as well as 
engages in making of territorial truth. Short, bold and precise to the point, conversations 
throughout the film continually convey important messages for the audiences. These 
conversations confirm a rhetoric that is vibrant in the minds of millions in the Middle 
East. For example, conversations that take place during a dinner in Palestinian 
Abdullah’s home reveal important messages about the Palestinian struggle over 
remarking the territories and homes.  
ABDULLAH: God willing, I am going to build the second floor in a few 
months.  
HIS WIFE: We built this place six times and Israelis demolished it six 
times and he is still talking about building the second floor. They will 
demolish it again. 
MEMATI: Brother! You studied engineering, established a business and 
made money in Lebanon. Why did you still want to come back here 
[Palestine]?  
ABDULLAH: Brother! If I leave, he leaves, and they leave, then who is 
going to stay here. This is our home, homeland.  
MEMATI: Some will fight while some earn money to support the fighters 
ABDULLAH: I want to spend my money in my homeland. Freely! 
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POLAT: Abdullah, if you knew that they were going to demolish your 
home, why do you insist to build it again?  
ABDULLAH’s MOTHER: If you give up resisting once, Israelis never let 
any one of us live here again.  
 It should be noted the film is deeply concerned about informing viewers that 
continues resistance is the only way to survival in Palestine and retain Palestinian 
homeland. In this sense, one can easily argue that the film VWP is about territoriality 
which deals with the human activities exercised on space and activities of controlling, 
defending, excluding or/and including the demarcated area (Cox 2002). Thus the film 
engages in not only the defense of Palestinian resistance, but also highlights and frames 
discourses justifying why Palestinians belong to the land, and are entitled to control of 
their home and homeland. Therefore the film acts as a cinematic document conferring 
rights and privileges to Palestinians concerning the land. The film also acts as a project 
by which ‘place making’ through contesting and delegitimizing Israeli control of 
Palestine and legitimizing Palestinian resistance is articulated.   
In the film narration, territoriality is an abstract notion. Indeed, it is a very 
active, contested, practiced, and socially constructed process. It is practiced everyday 
and everywhere. Thus territoriality is as much about the control over/of the territory as 
it is about definitions, identifications, and demarcations regarding those territories. In 
this sense, the film also contests and redefines widely used spatial definitions such as 
danger, fear, street, home and jurisdiction that are associated with everyday life of 
Palestinians. The film makers pay special attention to contested terms and reproduced 
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meaning. This is evident in the film because of the way it constructs alternative 
representations of people and places as being just as important as controlling the 
territories. For example, conversations between Ahmet (a disabled Palestinian child) 
and Simone (a Jewish-American tour guide, in Figure 5.4), and between Palestinian 
security forces and Moshe’s soldiers tell the audiences about what it means to be a 
Palestinian in Jerusalem and what it means to be a child in the street of Palestine. The 
conversations highlight how fear and danger are intertwined the definition of everyday 
place and space.  
(These conversations take place at Palestinian Abdullah’s home where Polat, his men 
and Simone are sheltered after the fight at a check point) 
SIMONE: I have to go. I will need to go to my consulate [US consulate] to 
report what happened today.  
POLAT: They are looking for you too.  
SIMONE: Don’t worry! I will explain everyone that you guys are 
innocent.  
POLAT: Outside is dangerous. 
SIMONE: Thanks for the hospitality [to Abdullah’s family]. 
AHMET: Don’t go outside. They will shoot you.  
SIMONE: Why would they shoot me? 
AHMET: They shot me.  
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SIMONE: Why? 
GRANDMOTHER: They shot him when he was coming back from his 
school. They said there was a curfew. They shot whoever was on the 
street.  
SIMONE: [After a pause for a minute] I am really sorry. This violence and 
cruelty has nothing to do with us. A real Jew does not do this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 The camera moves along with her in the dark streets of Jerusalem until a gun 
fires and screams of Palestinians are heard from the corner at the other end of the street. 
Everyone runs for their life. It was Moshe’s men shooting randomly and trying to 
maintain the order. Right then, Palestinian security forces move in and stop Moshe’s 
men: 
PALESTINIAN POLICE: What are you doing here? 
Figure 5-4: Simone looks around nervously, 
scanning the streets. 
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MOSHE’s MAN: There are terrorists here. We are here to take them 
away. 
PALESTINIAN POLICE: This is Palestinian soil, you have no 
jurisdiction. Take your men out of here immediately.  
MOSHE’s MAN: We enter any neighborhood we want.  
(Moshe arrives) 
PALESTINIAN POLICE: This is our soil; you and your soldiers get out of 
here. 
MOSHE: I decide when and where will become whose soil.  
Moshe reaffirms that he is the law and the Israeli army is not bound by any restrictions 
to cross over a boundary (Figure 5.5). He kills Palestinian security officers and move on 
his search for Polat and his men. Meanwhile he kills more Palestinians on the way.  
 
 
Figure 5-5: Moshe and his men kill Palestinian 
forces and move on in search of terrorists. 
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 In the following scenes, Polat and his men again engage in making territorial 
correction for the audiences about where the Palestinian land begins and ends. Memati 
has this conversation with Palestinian Abdullah as they look over the map of Palestine 
and Israel (Figure 5.6):  
MEMATI: Brother! Tell me now, where is Palestine and where is Israel? 
ABDULLAH: [By pointing out the map on the table] here is Palestine and 
there is Israel.  
MEMATI: Sure brother! But, isn’t this Palestine an autonomous state? 
What are Israelis doing here? 
ABDULLAH: They only gave the name, not the land.  
 
Figure 5-6: Abdullah points the map of Palestine 
 
 In this dialogue, VWP reminds the viewers that Palestine not only exists on the 
ground, but it is also demarcated land on the map. The film takes the audiences into the 
world of cartography and suggests that Palestine is real and objective terrain because it 
can be mapped, and maps mirror reality objectively. The scene also reaffirms that the 
Palestinian cause is a struggle for survival and human rights because the land and 
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people of that land exist on the map and on the ground. In this sense, what the film 
attempts to do is to place Palestinians in their homeland by giving absolute locations of 
Palestine and pointing out the coordinates of Palestinians on the ground to establish a 
cartographic discourse by which Palestine and its people become unquestionable, 
scientific and natural elements of cartography.  
 
Figure 5-7: Camera captures selections of wall 
pictures from Abdullah’s home.  
 
 The filmmakers continue reproducing Palestinian territories, but this time 
through the lenses of camera in addition to filmic conversations. Camera slowly, but not 
randomly, moves around the corners’ of Abdullah’s home. It captures children playing, 
sending a message that these children are the future Palestinians and cannot be erased 
from the Palestinian map or the land. Panning through the house captures pictures of 
Abdullah’s family and a certification that confirm the certainty of the past and the 
continuation of the present in the same frame. Figure 5.7, for example, does not only 
register Abdullah’s past, but also Palestine’s and inseparableness of the two. 
Additionally, the Al-Aqsa Mosque in the background of the blurred certification above 
and the picture of Abdullah’s family below it tells us that Palestine, as a homeland, 
comes first. In other words, this film rejects a country without a people and the idea of 
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emptiness of the land.   Through the images captured by camera, the filmmakers 
reaffirm that Palestine is not “a land without people for a people without a land” (Said 
1992, p. 9).   
 
Figure 5-8: The script says in Arabic: “I love you, 
Palestine”. Translated by Rana Jawarneh. 
 
 Similarly, the key holder in Figure 5.8 remains to be one of the most important 
objects that camera captures in Abdullah’s home. On the key holder, which is carved as 
a key indicating Palestinians’ lost homes, it says: “I love you, Palestine”. The key as a 
symbol tells the story of Palestinians’ lost homes under the occupation and 
communicates with the audience that the story is still alive hoping that someday 
Palestinians will go back to their homes. The image of the Al-Aqsa Mosque on the 
handle demonstrates that Jerusalem (where the mosque is located) is a place where 
every Palestinian possesses the key for and, thus, has right to enter regardless of their 
distance. On the other side of the key, there is the figure of the child, Handala, who 
gives his back to us and belongs to a famous exiled Palestinian cartoonist, Naji Al-Ali. 
The figure is now the official logo of the Commission for Freedom and Justice Through 
Humor  (najialali.com 2007). In Al-Ali’s words this child, “is barefoot like many 
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children in refugee camps… an icon… and his hands behind his back are a symbol of 
rejection of all the present negative tides in our region” (najialali.com 2007, Work, 
Interests, and Philosophy section, ¶ 7). The camera does not capture these images 
(playing children, pictures on the wall, and the key holder) in a random manner. Along 
with other scenic documents, these images establish a framework in which the state of 
belonging and the ownership of the land are reproduced. Hence, every Palestinian has 
the right to live in and fight for their home/land. 
 In another scene, the film highlights Palestinians’ emotional attachment and 
visceral connection to their land when Moshe orders Abdullah’s home to be demolished 
on top of the disabled boy, Ahmet (Figure 5.9). After the home is demolished while 
Ahmet is inside the home, his grandmother pulls through the guards and crawls toward 
the rubbles as she helplessly cries out: 
-Ahmet! My Ahmet! God is with you. You sleep in peace. Don’t worry! 
Where you lay is a Palestinian soil.  
 
Figure 5-9: A bulldozer is demolishing Abdullah’s 
home his son inside. 
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 The film continually accentuates this geopolitical discourse that the fight in 
Palestine is not only over the history (the Promised Land), but it is also over the 
geography (the Homeland).  In this sense, the film continues to embody Palestinian land 
with memories, attachments and stories while it carries on the struggle against such a 
project of de-Arabizing and Judaizing the Palestinian territories.  
 However, VWP makes one thing very clear to its audiences: there are two types 
of people in Israel. This trope is seen in many other action/thriller cinema films. There 
are ‘bad’ Israelis like Moshe (corrupt and very cruel) and the ‘good’ Jews as in the 
example of Simone. Without depicting Israel as the place of torture and inhumanity in 
sweeping generalizations, the film parallels the genre politics of action/thriller films. It 
represents Israel as a state that is hijacked by religious fanatics with Zionist colonialists 
striving to establish the greater Jewish state where there is no space for non-Jews. 
According to the film, there are Jewish people who, in contrast, believe in universal 
human rights, Palestinians’ rights to exist and the co-existence. A Jewish-American, 
Simone, portrays this exceptional part of Israel and Jews while Moshe is classified as 
one that respects no tolerance of non-Jews. (These conversations take place before 
Ahmet was killed by Moshe.) 
AHMET: Grandma! Simone is scared.  
GRANDMOTHER: Why is she scared? 
AHMET: Because she is a Jewish. She thinks that she will be killed here 
[East Jerusalem] because of that [her identity].  
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GRANDMOTHER: Those who torture us are our enemy not the Jewish 
people. No one will or can touch her here. 
 The certainty and fortitude in grandmother’s voice makes Simone to put her 
head down indicating that she is ashamed to be a Jewish or at least ashamed of how the 
Jewish state treats to Palestinians. The film makes the point that Israel is the one that 
ignores the human aspects of Palestinian geography and history. Indeed throughout the 
film, there is no single sign that implies Palestinians deny geographical and historical 
existence of Israel all together. There are even numerous references to defective work of 
some orthodox Jews who infiltrated in Israeli military in the film. This highlights that 
Israel is as legitimate an entity as Palestine is in the promised land. The film repeatedly 
makes the point that this land belongs to all occupants including Palestinians, Israelis 
and others, but the idea of ‘promised land’ is a false idea and an obstacle to the 
permanent peace in the region. To enforce this geopolitical statement, the film 
approaches the Sheikh’s (spiritual leader of a Tariqah) knowledge and wisdom. Similar 
to the Wisdom of Solomon, the Sheikh characterizes the problem: 
SHEIKH: I have been thinking for a long time about why these people 
[Israelis] are torturing Palestinians. I have realized that their fear has 
forestalled their rationality and conscience. They have gotten in a 
condition wherein they count all non-Jews as the enemy of Jewish people. 
Islam is a religion of peace. On the land that we live today, the Jews, 
Christians and Muslims have all lived in a harmony for centuries.  
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 VWP also interrogates Jewish identity and opens it up for cinematic discussions 
in which the film attempts to redefine who is a ‘real’ Jew and who is not. Parallel to the 
binary thinking through which peoples, places and cultures are identified opposite of 
each other, this film reproduces the Jewishness in two forms: a good Jew and a bad Jew. 
Thus the ideal Jerusalem should resemble to that of Saladin’s time when Christians, 
Muslims and Jews lived in a harmony under the reign of Islamic kingdom. In this sense, 
the film frames that the bad Jews are those who immigrated from Europe and elsewhere 
to establish the Greater Israel Kingdom, which stretches from the Mesopotamian Valley 
to the Sinai Desert at the expense of other nations and peoples at any cost. And what 
makes these bad Jews bad is that they exclude everyone, except those who believe that 
the world will fall under the rule of this new Great Israel as described in the Old 
Testament. Dialogues between Simone and Moshe reveal details of the film’s binary 
thinking and question what Jewishness is and is not. 
SIMONE: I witnessed all the crimes that you committed. You will explain 
them in the court. I am going to watch you as long as I live. You must 
know that the half of my family are lawyers.  
MOSHE: Your parents should be ashamed that they have a daughter like 
yourself.  
SIMONE: You embarrass all Jewish people. Torah says ‘do not kill’.  
MOSHE: Wrong! It says ‘do not kill Jews’.  
SIMONE: I don’t want to discuss Judaism with you. You are not a Jew.  
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MOSHE: You are an idiot who doesn’t know how this country is 
established. You don’t deserve to live but you are a registered Jew, so one 
Jew is one Jew. [To guards] Take her way so that she can learn 
Jewishness.  
 Certainly with these sorts of dialogues, VWP intends to uncover the presumed 
characteristics of current Israeli sentiments and some of the main intentions that are 
hidden from people by making a Jewish-American citizen (Simone Levy) talk. The film 
repeatedly makes this Jewish-American woman talk as an insider (and outsider) who 
has been able to witness the story of both sides. Through her conversations, the film 
attempts to define the ‘state of Israel’ which can be understood as a political unit, a 
democratic country in which all the citizens are equal as opposed to the ‘Jewish state’ 
which refers to the essentialization of ethnicity and religion. Hence, her job as an 
insider/Jew is to convince the viewers that not all Israelis are the same as Moshe and to 
make sure that she successfully differentiates the real innocent Jews from those bad 
Jews who do not compose the mainstream population. But, she is not very successful in 
completing her task: 
SIMONE: Mister Administrator, you cannot hold me here [prison]. I am 
an American citizen. Please let my embassy come and get me out of here. 
If I am going to be trailed, I want to be trailed in my country.  
ADMINISTRATOR: This is your country. Your last name is Levy. Don’t 
you know what this noble name means? 
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SIMONE: I am not going to learn the history of my parents from you. If 
you know my last name, then, you should know who I am too.  
ADMINISTRATOR: I know very well who your parents are. [Pointing a 
book] open the page 216. There, it is written what your grandfather went 
through in Poland, and it tells in what conditions he sent your father and 
mother to the United States.  
SIMONE: My grandfather did not die just because you could kill people 
easily here. My grandfather was killed by murderers like you. Have you 
found any single Jew who was killed by an Arab in Poland?  
ADMINISTRATOR: It is not easy to find a home to homeless Jews. 
Arabs don’t want us here, here on our soil- the Promised Land.   
SIMONE: It is a lie. Yes, before no one was recognizing Israel, but now 
everyone recognizes Israel. Those who live here are suffering only 
because of your actions [Figures 5.10 and 5.11]. 
ADMINISTRATOR: And they will suffer more. Even rats learn where to 
go and where not to go by suffering. Only animals learn by suffering.   
 It is noticeable that the lines between the good and the bad and between the facts 
and artifacts are very clearly drawn within the dialogues in the film. And it is also 
important to notice that conversations do not last long. Rather, they tend to be short, 
precise, simple and memorable for the purpose of delivering the message so that they 
are unequivocal.  
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Figure 5-10: Moshe’s army moves in Palestinian 
neighborhood to capture Polat and his men and 
destroys everything that stands in between his 
targets. 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Palestinians throwing stones at Israeli 
tanks. 
 
 The film VWP does more than make territorial corrections. It (re)negotiates and 
challenges the ‘territorial truth’ which tends to operate within the realm of imagined 
geographies of the Promised Land. As Quiquivix and Curti point out, Israel repeatedly 
engages in methods of producing ‘territorial Truth’ by applying imagined geographies 
of Israel to establish territorial legitimacy formulated within the rhetoric of the 
‘Promised Land’ (Quiquivix and Curti 2011). In this writing, the Promised Land 
corresponds not only to the given geographic locations that stretch beyond the 
Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan Valley, but the term also accentuates the divine 
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pledging of the land by God to the decedents of Jacob. Imagined geographies by no 
mean are fictional or fabricated, or as Said highlights, they are never the products of 
purely cognitive operations (Said 1978).  Rather, they are concrete, substantial, and 
indeed real (Al-Mahfedi 2011). For Al-Mahfedi (2011), imaginative geography is in 
effect “a precondition for the politics of territorial conquest” (p. 22). Alone the same 
line of reasoning, referencing Nadia Abu El-Haj, Quiquivix and Curti pay attention to 
Israel’s “obsession with uncovering Jewish archeological artifacts as a practice through 
which national identity-and national rights- have long been asserted” (Quiquivix and 
Curti 2011, p. 42).  The authors cite Meron Benvenisti’s study of early Zionist 
cartography and its production of ‘white patches’ on the mental maps of Jewish 
immigrants in Palestine, to argue that Israel often engages the politics of place-making 
through registering material and imagined productions over occupied Palestinian 
territories. In Al-Mahfedi’s words, “such conquests of territory begin with the practice 
of inventing new meanings about territory and re-imagining systems of sovereignty on 
the landscape” (Al-Mahfedi 2011, p. 23). Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 
for example, makes similar attribution to this material and its imagined production of 
Israeli territorial legitimacy during his speech at the United Nations in 2011. In his 
speech, he re-affirms the very Jewishness of the state and its people’s right-to-exist, 
right-to-control the holy land, ancientness of the Jewish aspiration and registration over 
the Promised Land. He states: 
In my office in Jerusalem, there's an ancient seal. It's a signet ring of a 
Jewish official from the time of the Bible. The seal was found right next to 
the Western Wall, and it dates back 2,700 years, to the time of King 
Hezekiah. Now, there's a name of the Jewish official inscribed on the ring 
in Hebrew. His name was Netanyahu. That's my last name. My first name, 
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Benjamin, dates back a thousand years earlier to Benjamin -- Binyamin -- 
the son of Jacob, who was also known as Israel. Jacob and his 12 sons 
roamed these same hills of Judea and Sumeria 4,000 years ago, and there's 
been a continuous Jewish presence in the land ever since.  
And for those Jews who were exiled from our land, they never stopped 
dreaming of coming back: Jews in Spain, on the eve of their expulsion; 
Jews in the Ukraine, fleeing the pogroms; Jews fighting the Warsaw 
Ghetto, as the Nazis were circling around it. They never stopped praying, 
they never stopped yearning. They whispered: Next year in Jerusalem. 
Next year in the promised land.  
As the prime minister of Israel, I speak for a hundred generations of 
Jews who were dispersed throughout the lands, who suffered every evil 
under the Sun, but who never gave up hope of restoring their national life 
in the one and only Jewish state (Netanyahu 2011, at the United Nations).  
 The Prime Minister’s talk surely confirms again the authenticity of the territorial 
claim and concreteness of the imagined geography of the Promised Land, which helps 
to legitimize the idea of the ‘territorial truth’.  The talk also indicates that Israeli 
authorities and geo-graphers do not only engage in the politics of place-making (re-
writing the geography) in Palestine, but they also treat the Palestinian land as an empty 
land that has been awaiting Israeli occupation and ownership for centuries. Unless this 
Promised Land is fully Jewishinazed, this land will stay orphaned and unprotected. As 
Said notes, it is about struggle over Palestinian (in)visibility (Said 2003). Or as Dabashi 
highlights “at the core of the Palestinian historical presence is thus a geographical 
absence” (Dabashi 2006, p. 10).  The VWP comes out to stir a discussion about the very 
Jewishness of the land and contests the idea of Jewish registration of Palestinian land as 
the Promised Land by trying to articulate a counter-narrative and counter-territoriality. 
It questions the legitimacy of the idea of occupied land and neutrality of the Jewish 
settlements on the Palestinian territories. For example, when Polat Alemdar is reminded 
that he could not make it out of the Promised Land, he replies: “I don’t know what part 
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of this land has been promised to you but I promise you six feet under”. Similar to this 
statement, VWP frequently states Israeli occupied land is a contested and unregistered 
place in the eyes of international community and underlines the politics of 
dispossession. Therefore this film can be presented as an attempt to remake and 
(re)document where the Palestinian and Israeli people belong. It is also a cinematic 
attempt to contribute to the Palestinian cause and help to justify Palestinians’ struggle 
over the geography as well as struggle to take over the hijacked imaginations of the 
people of the land. Put differently, VWP is a geopolitical manifesto to reshape what is 
popularly known to be Palestinian and Israeli home-land. As Campbell and Yanik 
argue, this film successfully reproduces material and imaginative representations of 
border, threat, and danger (Campbell 2003, Yanik 2009). In this framework, VWP, as a 
private-sector cultural and commercial enterprise, reconstructs symbolic representations 
of the Palestinian borders and commits to decipher Israeli geopolitics by making 
territorial truth. It contests the very idea of the completeness of the state of Israel and its 
rhetoric over the Promised Land. Therefore, it surely challenges popular geopolitical 
imaginations of Palestine-Israel borders, and underlines the arbitrariness of the 
Promised Land and Israel’s geographical registrations over the Palestinian land (Figure 
5.12). Borrowing Massad’s, words, the filmmakers have, in part, succeeded in 
deploying and instrumentalizing the film VWP as a weapon of resistance in the 
international arena and infiltrating this bastion of Zionist power slowly (Massad 2006).  
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Figure 5-12: The film mocks with the United 
Nations’ attitude toward Palestine via messages on 
the walls of war-like scenes. 
   
5.4 Turkish geopolitics in Valley of the Wolves-Palestine  
Since the 9/11 terror attacks in the United States and the US’s involvement in the 
subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, Turkey’s geopolitical position in the Middle 
East became more critical than ever. The west’s war on terrorism and the ideology that 
feeds terrorism necessitated Turkey’s involvement in any attempt to build global peace 
and fight against authoritarian regimes of the Middle East (Fuller 2008). After the 
current ruling party, Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, 
Turkey went through tremendous changes. These included social, political, military, and 
economic changes. Inspired by conservative and liberal ideologies and supported by the 
majority of citizens, the AKP brought an alternative geopolitics in the Middle East and 
new philosophy of doing international relations with other nations. For example, in 
2005 the AKP successfully managed to open negations for accession with the European 
Union and pushed domestic political and institutional reforms to comply with 
Copenhagen Criteria. The AKP administration also stabilized the financial sector and 
worked on privatization of the state assets making the country largest economy 
seventeenth in the world after China (Uygur 2010).  These and similar domestic 
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achievements gave Turkey the confidence it needed at home and enabled it to transfer 
its domestic self-confidence to its international relations. For instance, as the architect 
of Turkey’s recent foreign policy, Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, implemented 
foreign policies that were independent and more assertive compared to other countries 
in the region, pursuing a policy that was “a proper combination of realism and idealism” 
(Schleifer 2010, p. 2) incorporating some parts of Machiavelli and Rumi (Rumi is a 13
th
 
century Islamic philosopher). Davutoglu’s foreign policy vision, for instance, stretched 
from Central Asia to Bosnia and from Ukraine to Africa and the Middle East, 
emphasizing Turkey’s cultural and historical ties with other states and its geographic 
advantages to pursue a more active foreign policy. This vision in many cases merged 
independent, nationalistic, Islamic, pan-Turkish, global and Western notions (Schleifer 
2010).  
 Diplomatically, the AKP administration has actively engaged its neighbors. 
Turkey has played a mediating role between war-torn Pakistan and Afghanistan, Russia 
and Georgia, and between the west and Iran in addressing the Iranian nuclear efforts. 
This brought the attention of the international community to Turkey’s position in the 
Middle East as a pivotal state and a regional actor in the post-9/11 geopolitical world. 
More importantly, Turkey as a country that embraces western ideologies, democratic 
institutions, universal human rights, and the rule of law, is understood to have the 
potential to be an important role-model state in the Muslim world, incorporating both 
Western values and Islamic life style. Therefore, Turkey’s regional effort to stabilize 
peace and security in the Middle East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Caucasus are 
welcomed and supported by the European Union and the US, particularly after the so 
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called ‘Arab Spring’ social disobedience against one-man regimes. However, this is not 
to say that other regional and western actors welcome Turkey’s regional politics all 
together. Skepticism about Turkey’s regional aspirations remains. Turkey has potential 
in the minds of its leaders and increasingly its citizenry, as the heir of the Ottoman 
Empire, to become a leading figure in the Middle East, Balkan Peninsula, North Africa 
and Caucasus as a Muslim, democratic, and economically strong country. This critical 
role for Turkey is thought to be a necessary one and not an optional. Turkey, at least in 
the eyes of Turkish people, has always been the natural actor in these regions and is 
culturally connected with the nations of these regions. The AKP’s rhetoric about 
geographical and historical togetherness along with the people’s and popular media’s 
embrace of these geographies, created a new socio-political and cultural atmosphere 
wherein new Turkish geopolitics found a position.  Popular culture consumed in the 
Muslim-Arab world and in other nations helps Turkey become a visible destination for 
new economic, cultural and social openings. For example, many commentators find 
strong correlation between the numbers of Arab tourists in Istanbul and the popularity 
of Turkish soap operas in the Arab countries (Cheviron 2009). 
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Figure 5-13: A Palestinian looks through a display of 
cushions featuring the faces of Turkish actors Noor 
and Muhanad in a shop in the West Bank town of 
Hebron. 
Source: Expatica.com (AFP photo by Hazem Bader) 
 It should be noted that cultural productions do not only function as a tool for 
attracting tourists to Turkey but also functions as a medium for Turkey’s geopolitical 
visions in the consumer countries. A film such as VWP is a great example of a popular 
production that can characterize, represent, and legitimize Turkey’s recent geopolitical 
ideas through the circulation and reproduction of meanings in domestic and foreign film 
markets. In other words, this film expands Turkey’s geopolitical affairs beyond the 
state’s formal boundaries to perhaps the borders of the former Ottoman territories. By 
doing this, the film reproduces the geopolitical closeness between Turkey and Palestine 
and expands the zone of Turkey’s geopolitical cultural influence into the Middle East. 
From that perspective, the Palestinian issue becomes no longer Palestinian or Arab. 
Palestine and its problems become internal problems for Turkey and Turkish people. In 
this respect, Polat’s and his men’s departure for Palestine, as Turkey’s best trained 
special agents, should not be understood as a coincidence or be read to be motivated by 
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simple humanism. These men go to Palestine seeing Palestine as Turkey’s backyard. In 
their journey, they never get confused or uncomfortable even though they have never 
been in Palestine. It is clearly demonstrated that this land is not a foreign land to Turks. 
Indeed, the film does not show Polat and his men nervously wandering around 
Jerusalem like tourists or asking anyone for directions. By contrast, they look very 
familiar with Palestinian streets, bazaars, people and customs. No one wonders who 
they are and what they are doing or even becomes suspicious about them. These people 
walk, talk and fight in the Palestinian streets as they walk, talk and fight in Turkey’s 
streets. Israel’s no-man’s land becomes Turkish land. Even when Palestinian roads and 
streets become impassible to Palestinians, Polat and his men go wherever they wish, 
even if this requires killing many Israeli soldiers and results in many deaths among 
Palestinian civilians. If Israeli soldiers do not cooperate with Polat and his men, Polat 
finds another way to get what he wants because only these Turkish men can speak the 
language that Israeli forces understand, not the Palestinians. For example, when Israeli 
soldiers remind Polat and his men that on this land only Israelis have immunity and 
exceptions (when Abdulhey objects to the soldier’s rejection of their entrance to 
Jerusalem because of their diplomatic passport and immunity), Polat and his men make 
their own exception and immunity to enter Jerusalem in their own way even when the 
roads to Jerusalem are closed to Palestinians.  
 Similarly to other television and film productions of Valley of the Wolves, the 
theme of this film is mainly about Turkey, Turkishness, and Turkish geopolitics more 
than it is about Palestine and the Palestinian cause. Through cinematic (re)presentation, 
this film highlights that Turkey is no longer a passive geopolitical actor in the Middle 
164 
 
East. Regardless of what Palestinians think, Turkey believes that Palestine is too 
important to be left to Palestinians and Arab states.  Thus the idea is that Palestine is 
Turkey’s business and Israel has to accept this fact. That is why the film pays greater 
attention to taking revenge on the Jewish general rather than voicing the Palestinian 
national drama, care for some conversations and random filmic scenes. In fact, Polat’s 
and his men’s mission is to kill the Israeli commander, Moshe, who was responsible for 
killing of nine Turkish activists, rather than to overthrow Israeli government or to re-
galvanize the Palestinian intifada. More tragically, the overall characteristic of the 
narration in the film seems to be that Palestinian drama got caught in a camera 
accidentally. Therefore one cannot stop thinking that the film actively engages in the 
making of its own geopolitical meaning and often highlights the fact that Turkey cannot 
tolerate Israel’s unilateral geopolitical actions in the region. Overtly the film makes the 
point that Palestine, as a geographical and historical entity, is more important and 
perhaps holier to Turks than the Palestinians who live in that geography and make the 
history. Otherwise, Polat and his men would not cause the death of so many Palestinian 
lives as they engage in heavy fights with Israeli soldiers to kill one man. In the film, 
more Palestinians die than Israeli soldiers while no Turks are killed. To be more 
accurate, I can argue that this film is more about Turkish drama (lost 9 people on the 
Mavi Maramara) than Palestinian drama (loses of men and women everyday). Hence, 
VWP is a filmic response to Israel’s irresponsible actions and geopolitical aspirations in 
the Middle East. The film reminds Israel’s practical geopoliticians that Turkey is no 
longer the country of post-World War I era and is no longer a passive actor dealing with 
its own domestic problems and striving to survive in a chaotic world order. In the eyes 
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of the film, Turkey naturally wants to come back to its glorious times to discipline 
hellions of former Ottoman subjects and secure peace on their/our land.  
5.5 Vigilante hero and genre politics in Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
Es, in his analysis of the film, 300 talks about ‘vigilante hero’ who is someone that 
embodies a character within which he/she takes the law into his/her hands to serve for a 
greater cause other than his/her own (Es 2011). He argues that vigilante hero is very 
often aligned with certain political ideas or politically ruling group.  He further explains 
that how Leonidas in 300 embodies individualism vigilante behavior which draws 
parallel “with a neoconservative anti-statism combined with eugenistic superhero 
individualism” (Es 2011, p. 15). The vigilante hero engages in fictional activities within 
which borders between villains and heroes become visible to spectators. Moral codes 
and geopolitical visions of a country can be simplified and fitted for the viewers through 
the actions and positions of vigilante heroes. Es, referencing Miller’s other works such 
as Dark Night Returns (1986), points out that vigilante heroes mirror neoconservative 
geopolitics by simplifying the moral universe in similar ways to that of neoconservative 
political groups. He notes the “caricaturized and reduced complexity of the ‘real’ world 
by neoconservatives resonates with the simplistic, clear-cut moral universe of Miller’s 
comics” (Es 2011, p. 15).  
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Figure 5-14: Polat escapes a near-death. 
  
 In this framework, Polat Alemdar as the main character of Valley of the Wolves 
series and films embodies vigilante hero character that takes the law into his hands to 
fight against enemies of the state and fights for the greater mission while aligning, in 
part, with conservative political ruling groups. Even though the Polat-character was 
built when he was the main protagonist in earlier television series, his individualism, 
heroism, braveness and loyalty to the very core of Turkish state and the Turkish nation 
is remarkable in the film VWP. His sacrifice for the love of his country and people is 
one of a kind that resembles heroes of the past Turkish states (from Ottoman’s Kara 
Murat to the Hun’s Attila). He is always someone to be proud of and admired because 
he never fails the mission, harms the weak, or points the gun at his people or the state, 
and he forgives betrayers. In his world, life is about a struggle between the good guys 
and the bad guys and his job is make sure that bad guys are weeded out without 
disturbing the order. In order to stop bad guys from dividing the country and harming 
ordinary citizens, taking the law into his hands is necessary because, to put it simple, the 
good for the whole community is always greater than small benefits for individuals. As 
the tagline on the film Valley of the Wolves-Iraq says ‘those that think of their end 
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cannot become a hero’, Polat never hesitates risking his own life for the greater public 
good (Figure 5.14). Indeed we learn from the Valley of the Wolves series that Polat 
Alemdar is the son of an evil mafia man but kidnapped by a Turkish intelligence agent 
to be trained to –slowly and from the inside- ruin the Secret Council ruling Turkey. To 
do this task, Polat undergoes several plastic surgeries to hide his identity completely. In 
doing so, he completely moves away from his past, friends, family and all 
acquaintances, which may have become an obstacle in completing his tasks. In the film 
VWP, it is not completely clear whether Polat and his men are sent by Turkish 
government to Israel to kill Moshe per se, but what is clear is that they always have 
some sort of attachment to the government. In this case, for example, they carry a 
diplomatic passport as they enter Israel. This tells us that even if they are not sent by 
Turkish government directly, as part of a self-assigned task, they go to Israel to kill 
Moshe. This should be interpreted as it is a mission to take fictional revenge on a non-
fictional event during which nine Turkish activists on the Mavi Marmara flotilla 
(Figures 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17) were killed and many others wounded under the 
command of Moshe Ben Eliezer.  
 
Figure 5-15: A view of the Mavi Marmara 
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Figure 5-16: Press conference on the deck of the 
ship before the attack. 
 
 
Figure 5-17: Clash between Israeli soldiers and 
activists. 
  
 It is also important that we read the film with its political-action subgenre 
categorization in which the film can be positioned. Related to the first reading, the film 
should be read with the audience’s expectations of the protagonist associated vigilante 
hero behavior in a fiction film. Generally, genre refers to the way the story is told and 
includes some sets of conventions such as recurring themes and situations (Barsam 
2004). This is critical because the audience expectations of the protagonist, Polat 
Alemdar, can easily fit in this political-action film (Figure 5.18). As seen in an action 
film, cast within VWP rely on their physical abilities more than their skill in speaking.  
169 
 
 
Figure 5-18: Moshe loses; Polat wins.  Another 
action scene from the film.  
 
 There are few lines written for the actors, and these lines are generally to explain 
the meaning of operations in the film and/or to underline the film’s political messages to 
be absorbed by the viewers. For example, when Polat says ‘I did not come to Israel, I 
came to Palestine’, viewers can easily make visual connections between international 
politics, geography and territorialization in the film. In this sense, we understand that 
subgenre films can follow ideological and geographical conventions. As Barsam points 
out, conventional genre film makers use “genres to arouse and then adapt audiences’ 
ideological expectations” (Barsam 2004, p. 46). In the film VWP, Polat and the 
remaining characters reinforce cultural attributions, spatial stereotypes and gender roles, 
fulfilling the expectations of the viewers. For instance, one of the main female 
characters in the film, Simone Levy (Nur Aysan) fits this subgenre action film 
categorization wherein Simone is portrayed as helpless and needing to be saved by 
Polat Alemdar from being killed by her own nation’s soldiers. In the film, she acts as an 
ordinary Jewish-American citizen, guiding American tourists to visit historical sites in 
Jerusalem until she is stopped at one gate where she meets with Polat Alemdar. At the 
gate, she is refused entry to Israeli controlled Jerusalem and that is when she gets in 
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trouble with Israeli authorities. Her first reaction to this arbitrary decision is to take the 
border patrol officer’s name to make a complaint with his superiors. But rational 
reaction is soon discovered to be an empty struggle because in Israel nothing is 
guaranteed and no one has privileges except real Israelis. From that point on her destiny 
is in the hands of Polat Alemdar. Through the eyes of Simone, viewers witness 
struggles that Palestinian women go through and what it means to be woman in 
Palestine. And in Palestine, a hybrid geography, is embodied in Simone’s feminized, 
alienated, and distanced body. But Simone, similar to the trapped Palestine, cannot 
operate guns nor can she escape from trouble on her own. She needs someone to save 
her perhaps her Saladin from Zionist attacks. Polat, a Turkish Saladin, saves her, and 
once again Jerusalem becomes free of Moshe, a crusader. Hamas leader, Ismail 
Haniyeh’s statement about Palestine’s need for new Saladins therefore is not a random 
statement during his visit to Turkey. As explored more in the interview with Cuneyt 
Aysan later in this study, Polat emerges as the new virtual Saladin.  
5.6 Summary  
Borrowing Yanik’s words, the controversy about VWP is long over, but its imprints on 
Turkish cinema and popular culture make this film worth writing about (Yanik 2009).  
To the best of my knowledge, until today no other Turkish popular cinema and 
television productions beside Valley of the Wolves-Ambush, Iraq, Palestine and Gladio 
have overtly emphasized geopolitical topics or heavily adopted nationalist elements in 
their narrations. Few other Turkish films utilized popular culture to set geopolitical 
agendas that problematize the regional geopolitical order in the Middle East. Moreover, 
no other political-action films produced in Turkey fictively adopted Turkish geopolitics 
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into their stories successfully to simplify Turkey’s friends and foes for the audiences. In 
this sense, VWP is one of the most interesting pieces of popular culture used as both an 
entertainment apparatus and a political tool, in the history of Turkish cinema. VWP as a 
political-action film, incorporating geopolitical representations, helps “Turks envision 
themselves, their country’s and other countries’ place in the new global (dis)order, the 
issues that they perceive as a threat or danger, their yearnings and longings” (Yanik 
2009, p. 167).  In this framework, this chapter provided a reading of the geopolitical 
meanings and representations squeezed between the lines of conversations and between 
the scenes of actions in VWP.  
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CHAPTER 6: TWO INTERVIEWS: DEFENDING PALESTINE 
IN THE VALLEY OF THE WOLVES 
 
6.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I bring in the voice of two interviewees. The first person is from the 
Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (IHH)
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organization. This organization was responsible for internationally organizing nine 
fleets of human rights activists including three from Turkey, two from England, and one 
from Kuwait, Algeria, Greece and Ireland, to break the Gaza blockade in 2010. An 
interview with the IHH activist is important because any investigation about a cinema 
product without including other factors that influence the site of production would be an 
incomplete study. However, it is impossible to complete a study to account for all 
factors of the production site. But considering that this individual was a first-hand 
witness for the Mavi Marmara attack and a consultant during the production of VWP, 
the interview certainly enriches this study. He was also one of those IHH activists who 
was asked to attend the premier of the film. I talked to him about cinema and what to 
make of a film that narrates internationally recognized human drama in Palestine and a 
film that highlights the codes of Turkish geopolitics in the Middle East.  
                                                          
25
  The IHH is an Islamic organization that is based in Turkey and is a member of many international 
organizations including the United Nations’ Economic and Social Council and the Organization of 
Islamic Conference’s Humanitarian Forum (however, some states such as the United States and Israel do 
not recognize this organization). The aim of this humanitarian organization is to deliver relief help 
following wars and natural disasters around the world. They build schools and hospitals in some poor 
African and South East states and provide first aid to communities that are hit by natural disasters. Haiti is 
one example of their humanitarian work after the earthquake of 2010.  
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 In the second part of the chapter, I include an interview with one of the 
scriptwriters of the film VWP, Cuneyt Aysan. In doing this, I aim to better understand 
the production site of the film which constitutes an important part of the encoding of 
messages in the text. With this interview I expect to shed light on the production end of 
the film and how the scriptwriter understands Turkey’s geopolitical role in the Middle 
East and the VWP’s role in mediating Turkish geopolitics.   
6.2 Imaginations are rehearsals of realities 
This interview highlights that cinema is one piece of an account that provides a map of 
Turkey’s geopolitical vision in the world. As the interviewee notes in the following 
conversation, VWP production is one part of a series of events that give important clues 
about Turkish geopolitics and Turkish people’s understandings of regional affairs. For 
him, developments in Turkish cinema, especially the conservative cinema, should not 
be investigated without taking into consideration other socio-political parameters that 
surround Turkey. As he highlights in the interview, Turkish cinema should be read 
parallel to the geopolitical and economic developments in the last decade in the world 
and the Middle East. To him, we can only understand cinema products when we read 
them in relation to regional and global developments that give inspiration to their 
production. Thus our conversation touched on various but related topics from 
authenticity of the film to the roles of non-profit organizations in the film production. 
Our conversation was not structured and interruptions were kept to a minimum.  
Moderator: Was the IHH asked to provide first-hand information about 
the Mavi Marmara attack for the film?   
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Speaker: Yes, some of our friends from the IHH were interviewed by the 
film team. During this meeting, one of the scriptwriters, Raci Sasmaz, 
highlighted that one of the biggest intentions of this film was to contribute 
to this Palestinian cause.  
VWP begins with the Israeli Special Forces’ operation on the main ship, the 
Mavi Marmara that was carrying hundreds of passengers from all over the world. The 
film uses helicopter-viewed images that the state of Israel provided to the world press. It 
is clear that the stories are told by the Mavi Marmara activists are filmed. The actual 
site of the filming partly took place on the Mavi Marmara, after it was brought back to 
Turkey from Israel. Filming (taking some camera shots) in the actual ship indeed helped 
create publicity for the film.  
Following this question, our conversations moved to the relationship between 
the current AKP government’s emphasis on an extroverted Turkey and the increase in 
the conservative cinema productions that no longer constrain themselves with national 
or local borders or subjects. In other words, they make films that are transnational in 
terms of their narration and physical site of production. For example, the film Five 
Minarets in New York (2010) which tells the story about two Turkish anti-terror agents’ 
mission to bring back a very dangerous Islamic leader, Dejjal, to Turkey. It is partly 
filmed in New York City. To note, this used to be the other way around. Meaning, 
Turkey mostly Istanbul, would host the foreign film companies and serve as the 
geographical background for foreign films. Here the speaker addresses the AKP’s 
affects on cinema talks about non-profit organizations’ role in expanding the horizons 
of cinematic and geopolitical imaginations.  
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Speaker: Of course, these are not so separable from each other. But, 
Turkish cinema’s openings to the outside the borders of Turkey should not 
be automatically associated with the current government’s foreign policies 
only. Non-profit organizations’ years-long works should be included as 
well. Through these organizations, Turkish society became aware of the 
outside world especially the geography that we were familiar with once. 
For example, our people went to Afghanistan, Bosnia, Africa, and so on. 
Our people always have been interested in Asia, the Middle East, Europe 
and Africa. Being the heir to the Ottoman Empire necessitated this 
interest. And Palestine is just one out of these places. If films such as 
Valley of the Wolves-Palestine and Iraq are interested in these areas, it is 
because our people are interested in these areas. Jerusalem is no different 
than Istanbul in the eyes of Turkish people. That is also why people 
support organizations such as the IHH and films such as Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine.  
From this statement it can also be inferred that Turkey’s relationship with the 
former Ottoman territories are diverse. It would be too narrow to think we tie Turkey’s 
opening to the former Ottoman territories within the realm of practical geopolitics and 
diplomatic relations.  Different sectors such as non-profit organizations, transnational 
firms, and cultural organizations are also responsible for connecting the historical and 
geographical ties between these places and Turkey.  Thus, the non-state actors’ role in 
providing the webs of connections with former Ottoman subjects living outside of 
Turkey’s formal boundaries is vital and should be counted as part of the soft diplomacy. 
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Films, of course, for this mission are extremely valuable. In this regard, VWP only 
enhances these historical and geographical connections. The interviewee highlights the 
functionality and geopolitical implications of exported Turkish cinema products by 
sharing his experience in Nigeria. 
Speaker: In the past, at borders we would be questioned longer than any 
other nationals. But today, many countries around the world welcome a 
Turkish passport. And people like this [attitude] when they are welcomed 
and treated humanely. Let me share with you a story of mine. When I was 
in Nigeria, I stayed in a hotel that was owned by a Lebanese man. When 
he saw my passport, he asked me if I watch Valley of the Wolves television 
series. First, I did not understand what he was talking about until then he 
showed me the entire CD collection of the episodes. And this was a 
Christian man. I think along with non-profit organizations, Turkish 
popular culture shares is actively represents Turkey. In other words, what 
Hollywood has accomplished that is what Turkish popular culture is 
achieving abroad today like brand naming Turkey.  
However, the speaker avoids holistic explanations of how the international 
perception about Turkish passport has changed overtime and the nature of this change 
in relation to international diffusion of Turkish popular culture. He highlights possible 
effects of other parameters such as Turkey’s growing economy, political instability in 
the country and Turkish people’s increasing mobility. But, interestingly our 
conversation kept coming back to the Ottoman factors. All those socio-economic 
parameters would not make an extraordinary change immediately if Turkey was any 
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other country in the region. This assessment also became a sort of an essential point in 
understanding Turkey’s role in the Middle East for many focus group participants 
saying that along with Turkish soft power, Ottoman influence in the region is critical. 
Although this assessment is not more than nostalgic in the minds of many, Turkey’s 
past becomes an asset and opportunity rather than a burden. Conversations below 
highlight Turkey’s recent position in the formerly colonized geographies and Turkish 
non-profit organizations’ contributions to representing Turkey in those places.  To state 
the matter differently, geopolitical and cultural representations of the non-profit 
organizations and the culture industry should not just be taken as effects; rather their 
activities abroad should be taken as causes and push factors by which Turkey becomes 
an active and extrovert state. In other words, cultural efforts of these civil societies in 
Turkey should not be underestimated as influencing the state to become active in the 
region.  
Speaker: Turkey and Turkish non-profit organizations are active in many 
countries. For example, they restore historical buildings such as mosques 
and bridges, send humanitarian aid and organize cultural events together 
with local people in countries such as Bosnia, Kazakhstan, and Albania. 
These things were used to associate with developed countries like the US, 
England or France, but now Turkey is one of them. Passive and introvert 
Turkey has been agitating Turkish people for almost a century. Now 
people are excited to see active and extrovert Turkey. This means that 
people move beyond their material and mental borders.  
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Moderator: Can we say that Valley of the Wolves-Palestine is a cinematic 
way of saying sorry to former Ottoman subjects?  It is to say that we are 
sorry, because we have ignored this geography for so long but we have not 
forgotten about you. From now on, Palestinian cause is our cause.  
Speaker: Imaginations are rehearsals of realities. In Turkey, there is this 
hope: To embrace and unite the people of all these familiar geographies. 
This is my expectation too. Because, I went to these regions and I saw 
people oppressed, exploited and in hardship as others enjoy their high life 
standards. And this upsets me. For example, I went to many parts of 
Africa. In those countries I saw 400-year-old roads that go to the ports. 
These are the only roads that people still use today. It still feels like slaves 
are being exported on these roads. Perhaps not slaves are moving on these 
roads today but this time their natural resources are moving as new 
commodities and goods are coming back for more exploitation [through 
consumptions of western goods]. Here, our people also see these people 
are still enslaved by these new incoming products and imperial economic 
policies. In this atmosphere, empathy emerges. This empathy feeds our 
imaginations. And our imaginations, first, are reflected in our collective 
culture such as art, cinema, music, and work of scientific investigations. 
Then these imaginations become realities. Therefore, Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine is the reflection of an imagination by the cinema, which 
is yet to be turned into the reality.  
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It is clear that the speaker understands the visual forms of art and popular culture 
such as VWP as the conditions of possibility for a visceral change and prerequisite of 
enhancement in conditions of human beings in the colonized world. He also sees that 
non-profit organizations are no different than cinema products in shaping Turkey’s 
international openings and Turkish peoples’ geopolitical imaginations that go beyond 
their mental and material boundaries. He understands that the focus should be paid to 
the subject, Palestine. But it is the lens of a camera that captures the subject and brings 
it to a focus of reality by the help of the light. In other words, reel and real are very 
much intertwined concepts in our visual world. Thus the activist values the camera 
when it captures the reality and realized the imaginations.  
6.3 Encoding Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
This section of the study is critical for several reasons. First, an interview with one of 
the scriptwriters of the film can help us understand the production site of the message. 
Second, without bringing the voice of the production site, I would not be able to 
compare and contrast what is conveyed, negotiated, or rejected about the film messages 
by solely investigating the consumption site. Thus this interview enabled me to better 
understand what is decoded by the audiences.  
In the later chapters, I will give voice to the site of consumption of the film. In 
those chapters, I will spend a large amount of time on audiences’ interpretations of the 
cinema text because, in the end, meanings are only meaningful when they are 
interpreted by the audience and recycled into the meaning-making system again. But, 
my curiosity does not end with the audiences’ interpretations of the film. I want to go 
beyond the decoding process to see what geopolitical imaginations are employed in the 
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production of such film. Additionally, voicing the production site can help me better 
understand the model that scholars from cultural studies apply in analysis of meaning-
making processes and give important clues about textual codes that are embedded in the 
film. In other words, conversations with the scriptwriter can illuminate dominant codes 
of the text that is argued “supports the existing political, economic, social, and cultural 
order” (Rose 2007, p. 19).  
 
Figure 6-1: Polat Alemdar (left) and Cüneyt Aysan (right) 
Source:http://www.panafilmforum.com/showthread.php/131
15-Cuneyt-Aysan 
 
Following conversations with Cuneyt Aysan, who was one of the scriptwriters 
for the Pana film company, provide important clues about the site of production. Along 
with Raci Sasmaz and Bahadir Ozdener, he wrote several film scripts and action stories 
for television series such as Valley of the Wolves-Gladio, Ambush and Palestine. In this 
sense, he was very much qualified to speak about the site of production. My interview 
with Aysan took place in the main office of the Pana Film in Istanbul. Neither his 
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comments nor my questions followed a specific order or included any previous settings 
for the interview.   
Moderator: What was the aim of this film [Valley of the Wolves-
Palestine]?  
Cuneyt Aysan: The film’s priority is this geography, particularly the 
Middle Eastern geography and then the whole world. With this film, we 
wanted to take people’s attention to the region’s trouble spots [Palestine]. 
We believe that without establishing a stable peace in this part of the 
geography, there won’t be a peace in the world. In addition to that, we 
believe that there is this human tragedy and genocide on this soil. And if 
this tragedy and the genocide continue, the world peace won’t be possible 
or the negative perception of Muslims toward the West will not change 
radically.  A little bit, this is what we wanted to illuminate in Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine.  
The scriptwriter’s announcement is crucial in a way because a possible 
parallelism can be seen in between what is decoded and what is encoded. As repeatedly 
stated by many focus group participants Turkish audiences draw similar conclusions 
about the messages that the film delivers which is to say that Palestine is the place of 
continuing human tragedy which affects the peace process in the Middle East. Thus for 
the Turkish audiences, this film aims to cinematize the Palestinian cause by utilizing the 
tools of filming and entertainment. Aysan’s rationalization for making such a film can 
tell us that the political views of the production about the Israel-Palestine issues are 
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similar to those of the majority of the survey results of this study (see Figure 7.5) 
indicate that a majority of the survey respondents believe that the root of the Israel-
Palestinian problem is the state of Israel. In this sense, I can argue that the dominant 
coding as Hall and Morley note is at play, meaning that media enforce existing 
geopolitical views and order. From this statement, another important argument becomes 
observable as Gramsci points out hegemony becomes functional in a society in relation 
to the culture industry (Gramsci 1971). In other words, the film VWP functions in a way 
that political, social, and cultural order, as well as collective memory and knowledge 
about Israel and Palestine, is maintained without operationalizing any coercive power 
by the state. This film in a self-serving manner, tasks itself to solve or at least direct 
various actors’ attention to the Palestinian cause in parallel with public discourse that 
exists in Turkey and the Middle East. 
Aysan also highlights the power of media and their ability to influence minds 
and perceptions of millions. He is very aware of this aspect of the culture industry and 
overtly acknowledges that through VWP, negatively framed Palestinian perception by 
the Western media can be changed or at least challenged. He believes that the public 
opinion about the Israel-Palestine issue is oriented and manufactured by certain media. 
That is why he thinks that his assignment as the image producer is to unveil different 
possibilities of Palestinian perception even if he cannot reverse the negative image 
completely.   
Aysan: Media perception is also important. Media always have the power 
of presenting the oppressed as the cruel and the just as the unjust. If you 
pay close attention to the information established about Israel and 
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Palestine, you will notice that this information is slanted and 
manufactured. The West understands that the struggle in Palestine is 
between the terrorizer and the legitimate state. But we want to change this 
perception.  
The scriptwriter does not hide the political agenda of the film. He employs a 
mission to his film and that mission is to make changes if not on the ground, it will be in 
the minds of millions.  
Moderator: In this respect, is the film successful?  
Aysan: Even if one person sees the film, it means a success for us. 
Quantitative majority is not an important matter here; what is important is 
that how successful we are able to present an alternative version of the 
story objectively [he claims that the Western media portrays the 
Palestinian cause subjectively] if we cannot change the perceptions 
completely.  As I said, we made this film to explain the problems of the 
region because the Western media are not approaching this issue 
objectively. Their approach has always been in orientalist ways.  
Moderator: Isn’t this approach also the slanted one? How different would 
be your opinion from that of Fox news’, for example?  
Aysan: In the end, we, too, are the children of this land but our approach is 
not a Turkish approach. We believe that the problem of this geography is 
the lack of justice. But for centuries we brought justice to this geography. 
We had established justice on this land in the past, for example, during the 
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reign of Saladin. So what we are saying here is that why not we provide 
justice in Palestine again and end the oppression of the powerful.  
In the following conversation, it is clear that in the minds of the film makers, the 
peace project should start in the leadership of Turkey. Cuneyt Aysan’s reference to the 
glorious times in the past indicates that Turkey’s socio-political policies about the 
Middle East have to be compromised in order to provide security in the region and a 
prosperous life for all. The implied message is that the region’s well-being is contingent 
to Turkey’s role. As an important geopolitical actor in the region, Turkey, then, 
becomes an inevitable new center of justice, security and regional mentoring. This 
supports the idea that this film aids Turkey in promoting an extraterritorial agenda in the 
Middle East. Since the filmmakers advocate for greater geopolitical imaginations 
broadened beyond the comfort zone of the film audiences, I furthered the discussion by 
asking if the geography of the audiences also expanded beyond Turkey’s boundaries 
and Turkish speaking population.  
Moderator: Which audience community is prioritized in this film, Turkish, 
Arab, etc?  
Aysan: I certainly believe this idea: A powerful Turkey means powerful 
Muslims. A rich Turkey means rich Muslims. Turk here should not be 
taken as a certain ethnicity. It should be read as how Europeans 
understood: a combination of Turk and Muslim. The two cannot be 
separated. Now, there is this successful Turkish experience on this 
geography that we cannot ignore. For this reason, of course, our starting 
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point will be our people because we live here, and then the Arab countries, 
and ultimately the entire world. But, because the borders are so artificial 
and media further disrupted these formal boundaries, our natural borders 
then include the boundaries of Libya and Kazakhstan and between the 
two. In other words, there is no project that foresees only the area of 787 
thousand kilometers [the border area of Turkey]. This project addresses 
the entire geography from Bosnia to China. But why I say the priority 
should be given to the people of this geography is because Turkey is the 
driving force. Arab brothers are newly recovering. More or less, Turkey 
has the experience of 80 years. This makes us one step ahead of them.  
Aysan argues that Turkey’s leadership in the region is inevitable. To him, 
Turkey is not a transient lodger of the Middle East, Balkans or the other familiar 
geographies. Turkey is the natural inhabitant of these geographies, if not the owner. For 
that, it is natural and perhaps necessary to centralize Turkey in the making of the 
Middle Eastern geopolitics. In the absence of Turkey, neither Palestinian nor the Middle 
Eastern problems can be solved. This idea of necessitating Turkey’s involvement in the 
remaking of Middle Eastern geopolitics is not Aysan’s alone. The survey conducted for 
this study reveals similar conclusions in which 55 percent of the respondents believe 
that in the absence of Turkey, a fair solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be 
accomplished. And more, 35.7 percent of the same respondents indicate that Turkey is 
the only international actor that can be a fair mediator between Israel and Palestine (see 
Figures 7.11 and 7.13).  
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However, the very root of the argument which highlights the necessity of 
Turkey’s leadership in the Middle East and is promoted by the film VWP, to some 
degree, seems to be problematic. What the film portrays and narrates seems to be 
promoting Turkish heroism and invulnerability. Therefore I furthered the discussion by 
invoking the idea that the film employs Turkish heroism and nationalism more than a 
caring about the Palestinian cause.  
Moderator: I am forming this question from the comments that the film 
viewers made. Considering the story and the filmic actions of these 
immortal three Turkish heroes, some audiences think that the film Valley 
of the Wolves-Palestine is not so much about Palestine as it is about 
Turkey.  
Before Cuneyt Aysan answers my question, the third person in the room (he is 
one of the characters in the television series, Valley of the Wolves-Ambush) challenged 
my question by asking another one:  
The third person: Pardon me! Aren’t there the same things in American 
films?  
His defensive reaction to my question showed that he was very uncomfortable 
with the question, and his response to my question with another question indicated that 
he automatically counted me as someone who questions Turkish cinema and judges its 
characters negatively compared to those of Hollywood.  
Aysan: There is nothing about Turkey’s leadership there, but there is 
oppression and in turn there is this objecting [visualizing via cinema] this 
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oppression. Illumination occurs wherever Polat goes. Before Polat’s 
arrival, those places were in dark and unknown. When those places are 
lightened then the oppression will become visible. Why Polat? Polat is a 
hero here and in Arab countries too. To me, he is a virtual Caliph. People 
also accept him as a Caliph, and wherever he goes people think that there 
is oppression and the hero is going there to eliminate that oppression even 
he does this in the virtual world. He is honoring the places and the people 
of those places by going there, so to speak.  
Moderator: As you know, there are James Bond series and in every series 
he has different missions. During the Cold War, he fought against 
Communism. After September 11
 
terrorist attack, he fought against the 
dark organizations of the East and international terrorism. So we see these 
geopolitical shifts in James Bond scenarios according to the changing 
geopolitics in the world. Similar to this, we saw Valley of the Wolves-Iraq 
then Valley of the Wolves-Gladio and then Valley of the Wolves-Palestine. 
Are these Valley of the Wolves cinema series corresponding conjectural 
changes in relation to Turkey’s changing geopolitics in the last decade?  
Aysan: If our products are seen at that level, we would be very proud. 
Turkey’s problem has always been this: Being a big nation with a short 
horizon. Foreign policy actors have always been an open sore of this 
nation. During the Cold War, they all said that ‘we are defeated. We are a 
small country and so we have to accept being a spare tire of big countries. 
We cannot produce policies independently’. These actors always 
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measured everything from the vantage point of military power. They 
ignored the ability of the soft power. This era has changed. Along with 
military power, soft power has become effective too. They [foreign affairs 
actors] thought that boundaries were drawn in 1923 and that set everything 
for us. No! Borders never end there and won’t end in the future. Beyond 
the 1923 borders, there are collective history, sorrow, experiences and 
victories. The 1923 boundaries are artificial and forced. When these 
artificial boundaries collapse, everything will come to its natural borders.  
The scriptwriter challenges Cold War psychology that has long dominated 
Turkish foreign policy and the minds of actors. As discussed in earlier chapters (3 and 
5), Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu also puts emphasis on the invalidity of these 
material borders and Turkey’s willingness to nullify these artificial boundaries. Indeed 
Davutoglu in one of his speeches about Syrian crisis signals about Turkey’s de facto 
exterritorial jurisdiction on Syria and notes that Syria cannot be left to its own destiny 
announcing that “Syria issue is our issue” (Cihan 2011, Politics section, ¶ 1). Parallel to 
what Aysan highlights, Turkey’s foreign policies in the last ten years have been 
increasingly active and inclusive of problems and matters in the former Ottoman 
territories and places where there are Turkish imprints. Thus it is not surprising to see 
this discursive marriage in the language used by both popular culture and practical 
geopolitics. As discussed earlier in this study, cinema is a vital language that can be 
used to simplify and signify geopolitical visions and events of the world for the viewers.  
Moreover, cinema language helps practical geopoliticians to codify foreign policies and 
geopolitical priorities for the public comprehensibly. Thus, very often codes of cinema 
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and the state overlap to idealize favored national projects in the eyes of the public. For 
years, cinema has successfully played its role in this regard. 
In the following conversation, Aysan continually references Turks’ military 
victories in the past and geographies of justice in the former Ottoman territories. To 
him, the world is about fighting between the good and evil. To be on the good side of 
the history, symbolic figures have to be reproduced and popularized. Polat becomes one 
of those immortal cinema figures inheriting the genes of undefeated historical Turkish 
heroes like Alparslan who opened the doors of Anatolia to Turks and allowing Mehmet 
II (another hero whose story is also filmed, Conquest 1453 in 2012) to take control of 
Constantinople in 1453. Thus, Polat is not just an actor to entertain the viewers. He 
represents Turkey and naturally the entire Islamic world.  
Aysan: James Bond is not one man; he is a symbol. He is the symbol of 
Britain. Polat is the same. He is not a man, he is a symbol. First, he is a 
Turkish hero and then he is a hero of the Islamic world. When he enters 
Iraq or Palestine, he does not go there alone. He goes there in the name of 
the entire Muslim world. By doing this, he tries to say when Muslims fight 
together, no one can resist against that force. An important thing to note is 
that this unites these geographies. When this unification is formed, then no 
other state would intervene in any Islamic geography. Polat has 
undertaken this mission [to unite Muslims]. What is seen virtually is the 
reflection of this mission. To come back to the main point, attention 
should be paid to what is behind this [Polat] metaphor.  
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Aysan believes that lack of heroism in this part of the world for years has caused 
collective disorder and weakness of will to question policies and practices imposed. For 
him a solution necessitates a collective education and awareness. In today’s dynamic 
population, what can provide this education and awareness is cinema productions -films 
and television series. As one participant of the focus group discussions brought up 
earlier, the aim is to fight against the enemy with their own weapons and tactics. In the 
example of cinematic heroes, this geography can get rid of invaders and establish 
authority and order. Polat has accomplished it in the virtual world, so will others in the 
real world.  
Aysan: We provide an idol for people and say that we can do this because 
Polat did it. This might be virtually correct but our real heroes have done it 
in reality in the past.  
Polat is not a simple character in this case. He is the symbol of resistance and 
the brand name of the success. Unlike James Bond, his mission is to defeat fears and 
self-despair in the minds of millions first so that possibility of conditions for defeating 
real enemies in real conditions becomes probable. This way Polat transcends any given 
boundaries and becomes a universal hero: A hero of hope, the past, and the present.  
Aysan: Why do you think a kid in Libya, Bosnia or Kazakhstan wears 
Polat’s T-shirt? Because he also thinks that Polat is his hero?  
Putting it differently, VWP or other cinema products by Pana Film are not 
merely produced to entertain people or provide economic benefits only. These 
entertainment sets are made to become a bridge between the modern and the traditional, 
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present and past, today and tomorrow, and here and there. These products are not 
random choice of art productions; they are made out of necessity, responsibility and 
imagination. It is clear from the scriptwriter’s conversations that Valley of the Wolves is 
a phenomenon that connects generations and traditions. From the producers’ point of 
view, this entertainment set is not only an alternative to Hollywood’s favored cultural 
importations, but also alternative to the locally produced popular culture. For them, 
eighty years of disconnection between generations and traditions should be brought to 
the fore front of the people. That is why, in the film VWP Polat not only does combat 
against the Israeli general, but also he goes to the invocation in a mosque. And, that is 
why Polat takes a moment during ongoing full-speed action scenes to eat and make 
conversations with local people showing the viewers that the message is not only to kill 
an Israeli commander, but also to show that Polat is as superhero as an everyday man. 
As an (extra) ordinary model, he can successfully integrate many -the past and the 
present, history and geography, modern and traditional, and heroism and ordinariness- 
in one. Therefore, Polat and Valley of the Wolves cinema products effectively lay out 
the reference codes for Turkish people to reconnect with their glorious past in order to 
dominate the future.  
Aysan: There needs to be found new ways of recovering the taste [of 
power, glory] lost in the last 80 years. And Valley of the Wolves television 
series and cinema films are one of the vehicles to do this recovery. Here 
particularly the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine is to fix this 
disconnection. It functions as a kind of cable to reconnect generational 
disunity in history, identity, and culture [reference here is to the Ottoman 
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time and lost years of the republic]. It reconnects the past and the present. 
Because of this, Valley of the Wolves films and television series have been 
very successful. People said this: ‘I know this taste from somewhere’. 
That is what we wanted to give to our viewers with our cinema films and 
weekly television series.   
6.4 Summary  
This chapter introduced two important interviews. Even though the first interview 
cannot be situated within the site of production per se, it still reveals important insights 
about how cinema culture and social developments can give each other a helping hand. 
This is to say that a cinema cannot expand its horizons in a closed society or in an 
introverted political atmosphere. If Pana Film is producing such a film, which includes 
regional tension spots beyond Turkey’s formal boundaries, it is because Turkish 
people’s geopolitical imaginations, mentally and materially, expand beyond the borders 
of the state also. Therefore we see that the interviewed activist constantly highlights the 
point that socio-cultural changes among the people of a country correspond to the 
developments in that countries fantasy culture. In other words, any cinema product 
cannot be fully understood without taking into consideration the socio-political 
developments in a given place and VWP is not immune to this argument. The film VWP 
is not more than cinematizing Turkish people’s geopolitical imaginations, which 
resumes being rehearsals of realities in the eyes of the interviewee.  
In the second interview with Cuneyt Aysan, I aimed to seek out the voice of an 
insider to better understand the geopolitical codes and coordinates employed in a 
cinematic text. The conversations with Aysan highlighted to some extent geopolitical 
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coordinates and cultural codes that the film VWP employed corresponds to the same 
map that the many viewers drew from the film highlighted in this study (see Chapters 7, 
8, and 9). In this regard, the message that the film has sent is mainly encoded within the 
area of dominant coding. This is to say that the Mavi Marmara moment and Turkey’s 
active involvement in the Middle Eastern geopolitics helped Turkish audiences decipher 
the geopolitical and cultural codes in ways similar to how they are inscribed in the film 
VWP. Therefore, realizing that films are rehearsals of realities and the tools of 
geographical education, an interview with the author(ity) certainly enriches this study to 
better understand the site of production and consumption.  Until now, I covered related 
literature on geopolitics of film and audience along with critical reading of the film. In 
the following three chapters, I aim to explore what the film means to the participants of 
this study utilizing online survey, fan comments and focus group discussion.  
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CHAPTER 7: ONLINE SURVEY: GEOPOLITICS ‘FROM 
BELOW’ AND VALLEY OF THE WOLVES-PALESTINE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapters, I examined the film, Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, from 
personal point of view reflecting my own interpretations and critical readings of 
cinematic scenes and dialogs, and included voice of the production site. Drawing on 
empirical data collected from an online survey, in this chapter, I explore the Turkish 
speaking audiences’ interpretations of the politically-charged film, placing it within the 
discourse of geopolitical text wherein micropolitics of local/global interactions occur. 
To put it differently, this chapter focuses on geopolitics as practiced from below, that is, 
“by exploring the geopolitical perceptions and practices of broader segments of society, 
rather than those of state officials and elites alone” (Gokmen, Socio and Fallah 2008, p. 
19). To do this, the chapter is structured in three parts: (1) demographic characteristics 
of the participants, (2) what Turkish people think about Turkey’s relations with the 
Israel and Palestine, and (3) how the film is read in relation to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict and Turkey’s position in the region.  
7.2 Demographic characteristics of survey respondents 
In this study, an online survey was conducted via the social networking site, Facebook, 
three months after the film was released in theaters in Turkey and abroad.  This online 
questionnaire was distributed in a snowball method to those who may or may not have 
seen the film. The survey was distributed through personal Facebook contacts and 
several other internet sites associated with the film.  
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The survey was completed by Turkish speaking audiences from 38 provinces of 
Turkey and 15 countries around the world. 359 respondents started the survey and 333 
people completed it.  226 people indicated that they did not see the film and 115 
reported that they watched the film.   
 
Figure 7-1: Self-reported locations of respondents in Turkey 
 
As seen in Figure 7.1, participants are concentrated in regions with larger cities 
such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir. However, there are several important points 
regarding the distributions of the respondents. One is that respondents group in 
metropolitan areas that are large in size and population, e.g., Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, 
and Konya. The second point is that respondents’ geographical distributions positively 
correlate with the distribution of internet usage in Turkey, e.g., Izmir. For example, the 
availability of internet connection in western Turkey and provinces where there is at 
least one college is higher and naturally the use of social networking sites such as 
Facebook, though widely diffused, is more common in these well-connected areas. 
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Finally, taking into consideration the snowball effect, this map in Figure 7.1 moderately 
reflects general distributions of my personal Facebook connections in Turkey, e.g., 
Aksaray.  
 
Figure 7-2: Locations of respondents around the world 
 
As mentioned earlier, anyone who spoke Turkish was invited to participate in 
the survey. Therefore, quite a large number of people from other corners of the world 
took part in this online survey. Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of those respondents 
around the world in numbers and demonstrates some parallels with the distribution of 
my personal Facebook friends and the density of Turkish populations around the world.  
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Table 7-1: Gender profile of survey respondents 
Gender n % Skipped
26
 
Female 108 30.2  
Male 250 69.8  
Total 358  1 
 
Table 7.1 shows the gender profile of survey respondents. It is apparent that 
female participation in the survey is relatively low because of the limitations of the 
snowball method and general female distribution of internet users in Turkey (see Tables 
2-4 and 2-5). In Turkey, internet usage among men is much higher than that of women 
(63 percent and 37 percent respectively) (see Table 2-5 for the details). Related to this, 
my personal Facebook connections are predominantly male. Thus, these two factors 
limited the numbers of female respondents in general.   
Table 7-2: Marital status of survey respondents 
 n % Skipped 
Married 113 31.7  
Single 233 65.3  
Divorced 11 3.1  
Total 357  2 
 
                                                          
26
 ‘Skipped’ refers to respondents who did not answer the question.  
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Table 7.2 shows the marital status of survey respondents. Again the results 
correspond to the map of my personal contacts and general age distribution of the 
internet users in Turkey, which continues to be under the thirty-five-year-old 
demographic, which closely parallels the Facebook users in Turkey and abroad (see 
Table 2.6). Table 7.3, similar to marital status table, indicates that survey participants 
are generally under 35 years old.  
Table 7-3: Age distribution 
 n % Skipped 
18-25 148 41.3  
26-35 173 48.3  
36-45 32 8.9  
46-55 5 1.4  
Total 358  1 
 
Table 7-4: Education profile of survey respondents 
Completed/current degree n % Skipped 
Middle school 6 1.7  
High school 35 9.9  
College (2 years) 62 17.5  
College (4 years) 150 42.3  
Master 82 23.1  
Doctorate  20 5.6  
Total 355  4 
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Table 7.4 shows the education profile of survey respondents. It is necessary to 
highlight that the education profile of survey respondents does not accurately reflect the 
general education distribution level in Turkey. According to the Turkish Statistical 
Institute, middle school graduates (15,709,975 about 19 percent) comprise the plurality. 
High school graduates (11,374,336 about 14 percent) follow this number and then the 
college graduates (4,566,049 about 5 percent). However, what this chart correlates with 
is that Table 7.4 shows significant similarities with the table of internet users in Turkey 
according to their education level. 
 
Figure 7-3: Occupation Chart 
 
Figure 7.3 tells us that majority of survey participants hold at least some of level 
of college education. This result closely correlates with the sectorial map of internet 
users in Turkey.  
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Table 7-5: Ethnic description of survey respondents 
Ethnicity n % Skipped 
Turkish 302 84.6  
Kurdish 16 4.5  
Turkic Republics 1 0.3  
Bosnian 4 1.1  
Arab 5 1.4  
I don’t want to answer 5 1.4  
Other 23 6.4  
Total 357  2 
 
Respondents’ ethnicity, as seen in Table 7.5 and Figure 7.4, is diverse and 
colorful. However, the total number of Kurdish participants in this study appears to be 
lower than the relative estimated proportion of Kurds in Turkey. Possible explanations 
for such an outcome might be that people did not want to identify themselves as 
Kurdish or Kurdish people’s access to the internet is limited compared to that of 
Turkish people. The snowball method may be another explanation for this outcome.  
In addition, a possible answer can be found in the ‘other’ option that is given to 
the respondents to identify themselves other than my categorization. Figure 7.4 
illustrates that people in Turkey do not easily go with simple ethnic definitions; rather 
they negotiate their identity, and produce alternative identities to categorize themselves 
differently. Figure 7.4 clearly indicates that some respondents define themselves in 
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ways other than their ethnicity. They either put forward their religious identity or show 
inclusive citizenship to reject ethnic essentialism.   
 
Figure 7-4: Answers that are given to the ‘Other’ 
 
 
Figure 7-5: World-view profile of survey respondents 
 
In order not to limit respondents’ choices regarding their worldview, I adjusted 
the survey questionnaire in a way that respondents could find enough room to describe 
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their world-view. It is noticeable in Figure 7.5 that a fairly large number of respondents 
indicate their world-view is to the right-of-center which includes rightist, nationalist, 
conservative, and Islamist. This worldview map generally reflects the political 
composition of Turkey (GENAR 2011). However, one problem arises regarding 
identifying people’s worldview, and that is how to define these worldviews and who 
defines them. In this respect, I provided more than several preferences and the ‘Other’ 
option for respondents to identify themselves independent of my selection. 
Additionally, I included some of the classified worldviews that GENAR Survey and 
Consultant firm uses for public opinion research in Turkey.  
In addition to the demographic characteristics of respondents, I wanted to 
include respondents’ entertainment activities, their frequency of accesing news and their 
rate of internet use. Table 7.6 demonstrates that a significant number of respondents 
either do not watch television or watch it less than two hours a day.  
Table 7-6: How many hours do you watch television in a day? 
 n % Skipped 
I don’t watch TV 81 22.8  
Less than 2 hours 174 49  
2-4 hours 88 24.8  
4-6 hours 9 2.5  
6 and more 3 0.8  
Total 355  4 
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This result does not quite correlate with the avarage time spent in front of 
television in Turkey. According to a study conducted by the Foundation for Political, 
Economic and Social Researh (SETA), 26.5 percent of people watch television more 
than four hours a day in Turkey (SETA 2011). Considering other characteristics of the 
survey respondents, a possible explanation for this outcome would be that respondents, 
regardless of their education, can easily subsitute their television time for the internet. 
Indeed, according to SETA’s recent report, 79.6 percent of people aged between 15-29 
use the internet. 71.5 percent of these internet users connect at home and only 12 
percent connect at their work place. The SETA report also highlights that the majority 
of these users connect to the internet for entertainment and communication purposes 
(SETA 2012, Suer 2011). Of course, accesibility to an internet connection remains 
uneven between cities and provinces.   
 
Figure 7-6: Distribution of TTNET’s 6 million customers’ internet traffic.  
Sources: shiftdelete.net 
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Table 7-7: How many hours a day do you use internet excluding work-related usage 
times? 
 n % Skipped 
Less than 2 hours 104 29.5  
2-4 hours 137 38.8  
4-6 hours 68 19.3  
6 and more 44 12.5  
Total 353  6 
 
Table 7.7, however, demonstrates that almost 70 percent of respondents use the 
internet more than 2 hours a day beside their work usage. For the obvious reason, no 
participants of this survey indicated that they never use internet since this survey is 
conducted via online, but the [over all] volume of internet use beside work hours is 
reletively high.  
Table 7-8: How often do you watch films (in theaters, on TV, internet, etc.)? 
 n % Skipped 
I don’t watch films 21 5.9  
1-2 in a month 195 54.9  
1-2 in a week 94 26.5  
3-4 in a week 31 8.7  
5 and more in a week 14 3.9  
Total 355  4 
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By looking at the Table 7.8, we understand that a majority of the respondents 
watch films at least once every two weeks, and some of them indicate that they watch 
films every day. These consumption patterns are influenced by the market for illegal 
reproduction of films in Turkey. An average ticket for a film in Turkey is about 14 
Turkish Lira (7 US dollars). An official DVD version of a film can be priced from 20 
Turkish Lira to 30 Lira. This is beyond many people’s entertainment budget. 
Underground organizations turn this economic reality into a profit by reproducing 
DVDs priced as low as 1 Turkish Lira (approximately 50 cents). Additionally, these 
black-market producers are very quick, and sophisticated enough to produce bootleg 
copies of a film almost at the same time of the film’s official theatrical release. 
Moreover, if one does not want to pay that much money, he/she can always go online 
and watch any newly released or old film instantly with no charge, no credit card, or 
any other obligations. According to one estimate, 70 percent of CDs and DVDs that 
circulate in the market are produced by the blackmarket (Ozlem 2010). Taking this 
market reality into consideration, going to a cinema becomes more of a social activity. 
As I will discuss in the following chapters when I examine online audiences’ comments, 
paying attention to online audiences becomes critical because many Turkish people now 
watch films through the internet on their laptop or wide screen television connected to 
the internet (see Figure 7-6). Therefore, analyzing online reviews becomes an important 
part of this study because viewers leave online feedback after they see the film. 
According to their reviews, other online film trackers decide to watch reviewed films or 
skip to other movies. Also on these sites, political discussions about the film take place. 
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Table 7-9: How often do you read news about the Middle East (from newspapers, 
internet, etc.)? 
 n % Skipped 
Everyday  126 36  
Several times in a week 140 40  
Several times in a month 66 18.9  
I don’t read 18 5.1  
Total 350  9 
 
By asking the question of ‘how often do you read news about the Middle East’, I 
aimed to understand how well the respondents are informed about the events that take 
place in the region. The results revealed that a significant number of respondents were 
aware of news that came out of the Middle East.  
7.3 Audiences’ responses: the nature of Israel-Palestine issues 
Public opinions have been vital sources and forces in structuring national and 
international affairs. Turkey’s relations with Israel have always been moderate until the 
Mavi Marmara raid by Israel Special Forces in 2010. The current Turkish governments’ 
(AKP) international policies also played important roles in shaping the relations 
between Turkey and Israel (Tur 2009, Inbar 2010). As explained in earlier chapters, the 
AKP’s ‘zero-problem’ policies with its neighbors necessitated good relations with the 
Middle Eastern states, including Iran and Syria (Ayhan 2009). In light of Turkey’s 
economic, political, and cultural interests within the Middle Eastern states Turkey was 
compelled to support the Palestinian cause at the expense of its relationship with Israel. 
Israel’s military actions against Gaza Strip and continued expansion of settlements in 
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the West Bank created a huge public outcry in Turkey against Israel, ultimately pushing 
the AKP government to change its policies against Israel. This policy shift against Israel 
became the turning point in Turkey-Israel relations as well as public opinion. The Mavi 
Marmara incident which saw Israel’s killing of nine Turkish activists in international 
waters brought Turkey-Israel relations to a historical low.  
 In this part of the chapter, I will discuss survey results of public opinions about 
the Israel-Palestine issues and Turkey-Israel relations. Questions that highlight these 
issues were asked to every respondent regardless of whether they had seen the film. In 
doing so, I aimed to get a sense of whether the film VWP made a significant impact on 
shaping people’s opinions toward Israel, the Israel-Palestine conflict, and Turkey-Israel 
relations.  
Table 7-10: In general, which of the following terms best describes Turkey-Israel 
relations? 
 n % Skipped 
Allies  21 6.2  
Friends 19 5.6  
Shared interests 213 62.8  
Enemies 59 17.4  
Other 27 8.0  
Total 339  20 
 
 As Table 7.10 indicates, 62.8 percent of respondents define the relationship 
between Turkey and Israel as one that is based on shared interests. People believe that 
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there are common interests that bring the two states together. As seen in the same table, 
very few people think that Turkey and Israel are friends or allies. Moreover, the total 
number of people who think that the two states are enemies is higher than the number of 
people who think the two states are friends and allies combined. In the ‘other’ option, 
people demonstrated that their opinion on the relationship between Turkey and Israel is 
not limited to the given choices in the survey. Some of the respondents’ answers 
included these statements: “they are two competitive countries that cannot tolerate each 
other but they are bound by their geography and politics”, “Israel is the boss and Turkey 
is her tool”, “to me they are enemies but according to the Turkish government, they are 
partners”, and “from Israel’s point of view, Turkey is an enemy country but from 
Turkey’s perspective the relationship is a partnership”.  
 
Figure 7-7: The nature of the problem regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict 
 
 When I asked what was the source of the conflict between Israel and Palestine, 
respondents clearly indicated that the state of Israel is the leading problem-making actor 
in this conflict. There are also significant numbers of people who think that the Western 
209 
 
world is also responsible for this conflict. In the ‘other’ categorization, Zionism is 
thought to be the leading problem for the conflict. Even so, quite a large number of 
people indicated that the Torah and its teachings are the source of this territorial 
conflict, with respondents referencing the Torah’s ‘Promised Land’ idea. Other 
respondents blamed capitalism and globalization for widening the gap between the 
poor/weak and the rich/powerful.  Several respondents, on the other hand, look at the 
root of the problem in terms of historical accounts claiming that the region is prone to 
the all kinds of conflicts because of Arab nationalism in the 20
th
 century and the 
consequent Arab resistance against the Ottoman Caliph that was coupled with sympathy 
for the British occupation.  Some respondents said that “the root of the problem is the 
British who gave the Palestinian land to Israelis and the Palestinians who betrayed 
Ottomans at the first place”. Another respondent wrote this as the root of the problem: 
“If there was a Rashid [noble leader] Caliph, Palestine would not be as it is today”. 
These are some of the important details of audience responses. These details are 
important because as I explain in Chapter 6, the production side of the film VWP also 
makes similar contentions about why Turkey (at least the Turkish cinema) should care 
about this part of the region, which is always understood to be culturally and politically 
qualified Ottoman territories. In the focus group discussions, this point will come up 
again.  
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Table 7-11: Which state or international organization can be a mediator to solve the 
Israel-Palestine problem? 
 n % Skipped 
The United Nations  40 11.7  
The European Union 6 1.8  
The United States 16 4.7  
Turkey 122 35.7  
The Arab states 4 1.2  
Russia 1 0.3  
China 0 0  
Israeli and Palestinian authorities only 54 15.8  
Israel and Palestine problem cannot be solved 99 28.9  
Total 342  17 
 
 Several important points can be drawn from Table 7.11. One is that the Turkish 
audience is not optimistic about possible solutions to the Israel-Palestine problem. 29 
percent of respondents indicate that this conflict is destined to continue. Furthermore, 
significant numbers of people do not think international organizations are able (or have 
the power and will) to solve this problem. The EU, for example, does not seem to have 
that potential according to respondents. Non-western actors, on the other hand, have no 
authority to involve in this conflict in the eyes of Turkish people. A large number of 
respondents think that the problem can be solved only by the two parties working 
together. But, significant numbers of respondents think that Turkey is the main actor to 
solve the Israel-Palestine problem. This is not just a political answer. Indeed, as 
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discussed in earlier chapters, Turkey has long enjoyed being a moderator in the region. 
For example, Turkey has been the key negotiator between Israel and Syria, Israel and 
Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, and, until recently, between Western countries and Iran. 
From time to time, Western powers continue to offer Turkey the opportunity to become 
a moderator and role model in the Middle East as a secular-western and Muslim-eastern 
country (Kirisci, Tocci and Walker 2010). Recently Turkey also showed willingness to 
become a main actor in resolving regional conflicts in order to establish a secure and 
free trade zone that would ultimately serve Turkey’s regional and global geopolitical 
interests (Taspinar 2008). Whether Turkey has the capability to do this is yet to be 
determined, however. Importantly, the people buy into this. 
Table 7-12: Do you think Turkey should become involved in the Israel-Palestine 
conflict? And if so, how should Turkey become involved? 
 n % Skipped 
Turkey should support only the Palestinian side  185 54.9  
Turkey should support only the Israeli side 1 0.3  
Turkey should follow only the United Nations 42 12.5  
Turkey should follow only the European Union 8 2.4  
Turkey should stay neutral 101 30  
Total 337  22 
 
 To the question of which way Turkey should direct its support, significant 
numbers of people indicated that Turkey should be on the Palestinian side. Quite large 
numbers of people think that Turkey should stay neutral or follow the United Nations. 
Parallel to the question on Table 7-11, Turkish people have no confidence in European 
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Union to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. The respondents do not even think that 
Europe has that power to push Israel to negotiate with the Palestinians. To follow up 
this question, I asked, ‘if you think Turkey should become involved in the Palestine-
Israel conflict, and why do you think Turkey should become involved itself in Israel-
Palestine conflict’. I asked them to rank their answers from the most important reason to 
the least important reason. The result revealed that important numbers of people 
perceive the Palestine cause as a case of human rights (see Figure 7.8).  
 
Figure 7-8: Why should Turkey be involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict? 
 
 73 percent of respondents agreed that if Turkey takes part in this conflict, it 
should support Palestine cause because it involves human drama and human rights. 
Those who think that Turkey should be a regional player in the region also support 
Turkey’s intervention in the conflict. People who support this idea are too numerous to 
ignore. 52.8 percent of people indicated that this is a ‘somewhat important’ reason for 
Turkey to become involved in Palestine-Israel issues. A sizeable number of respondents 
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also think that Turkey should be involved in this conflict because Palestine is a holy 
land for Muslims, and it is part of the former Ottoman territory.  
 In the ‘other’ category, respondents’ answers varied. Some insisted that Turkey 
should stay out of the Israel-Palestine conflict, as some indicated that what has been 
happing in Palestine is a crime against humanity. One respondent wrote: “If there is a 
human crisis there [Palestine], this should be the problem of all humanity that has 
rationality, conscience and self-respect. I am saying this without taking anybody’s side 
–religion or race. If Palestinians had done the same thing to Israelis, I would have 
reacted the same way. To me, humanity is the essential here”. As this quote 
demonstrates, participants closely follow the Palestinian conflict. It can also be inferred 
from this response that respondents negotiate geopolitical meanings created by different 
political actors about Palestine-Israel issues. They also question and negotiate options 
that I provided as possible answers. They find that my options are limited and therefore 
they need further explanations and arguments to express themselves.  
Table 7-13: A fair solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be established in the 
absence of Turkey. Do you agree?  
 n % Skipped 
Definitely agree  101 29.4  
Somewhat agree 88 25.6  
I am not sure 43 12.5  
Disagree 81 23.5  
Definitely disagree 31 9.0  
Total 344  15 
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 When I asked: ‘A fair solution to Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be 
accomplished in the absence of Turkey. Do you agree?’ More than half of the 
respondents agreed with the statement. However, people who disagreed with the idea of 
Turkey’s involvement made up a large majority of respondents (see Table 7-12). This 
indicates that quite large numbers of people are still uncomfortable with Turkey’s 
intervening in the conflict for different reasons. As shown in Table 7-11, 28.9 percent of 
respondents disagree with the idea that the Israel-Palestine problem can be solved. At 
the same time, 15.8 percent indicated that Israelis and Palestinians are the only 
authorities that can solve their problem.  
Table 7-14: In your opinion, how do you describe the Mavi Marmara Gaza flotilla 
activists’ sailing to break the Gaza blockade? 
 n % Skipped 
It was a human rights motivated movement  202 60.1  
It was a religious motivated movement 98 29.2  
It was a nationalism motivated movement 8 2.4  
It was a violence motivated movement 8 2.4  
It was an anti-Semitism motivated movement 20 6.0  
Total 336  23 
 
 Since the film, VWP, bases its story on the subject of the Mavi Marmara flotilla 
attacked by the Israeli Special Forces, I wanted to know how Turkish people saw this 
incident. Predictably, a majority of respondents agreed that the Mavi Marmara 
movement was a humanitarian one. Even the activists’ counter-attack with knives and 
sticks on the deck of the Mavi Marmara did not change people’s perception of the 
215 
 
incident from being a humanitarian-based movement to an activity motivated by 
violence. But, large number of respondents also thought that this movement had 
religious motivation.   
 
Figure 7-9: Effective events (5 is the most effective and 1 is the least) 
 
 I also asked what other actual events that took place before the film was released 
would affect their opinion about Israel-Turkey relations. A majority responded that, 
again, the killings of nine Turkish activists was the number one event that agitated 
Turks (see Figure 7.9). Since this question was rated by the respondents where 5 is the 
most effective and where 1 is the least effective, the second most important event that 
affected Turkish people’s opinions about Israel was Israel’s embargo against Gaza. In 
the ‘other’ option, respondents again discussed different agendas of theirs, from water 
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geopolitics to Israel’s ignorance of the United Nations’ resolutions on the settlements in 
the occupied zones.  
Table 7-15: In terms of cultural closeness, where do you think Turkey belongs to? 
 n % Skipped 
Europe 21 6.2  
Middle East 86 25.4  
Caucasus and Central Asia 47 13.9  
Eurasia (Europe & Asia)  162 47.9  
Other 22 6.5  
Total 338  21 
 
 At the end of this survey section, I wanted to know where people would situate 
Turkey on the cultural map.  As Table 7.15 shows, 47 percent of the respondents 
located Turkey in between Europe and Asia. The result correlates with Turkey’s official 
rhetoric saying that Turkey is a ‘bridge country’ between Europe and Asia, between the 
East and the West. Those who only see Turkey as a European country seem to be 
insignificant in numbers. In the ‘other’ option, however, people renegotiate Turkey’s 
cultural closeness in their own words. Some respondents indicate that Turkey “has its 
unique characteristics,” while some define Turkey as a ‘hybrid country,’ synthesizing 
all, which is not so different than to say Turkey is a bridge or Eurasian country. The 
others reposition Turkey as being a country of Europe and the Middle East. These 
results demonstrate that Turkey’s imagined geography is ‘in between’ places and 
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cultures, meaning that Turkey, with its material and mental borders, is a cross-road 
country in between Europe, the Middle East and the Mediterranean.  
7.4 Film content: ‘déjà vu all over again’ 
Questions on this part of the survey were directed to those who indicated that they had 
seen the film. Those who did not see the film were excluded from completing this part 
of the questionnaire. By doing this, I wanted to find out what possible roles the film 
played in and affecting people’s interpretations of Israel, Turkey-Israel relations, and 
Israel-Palestine relations. Additionally, I wanted to find out what people make of a 
political-action film which was produced during a time when Turkey-Israel relations 
reached their nadir. Initial results indicated that the film did not affect people’s 
perception of Israel. Turkish audiences already had ideas about Israel-Palestine relations 
and Israel’s Palestine policies. To put it differently, people thought that the film was just 
repeating the known and familiar, déjà vu all over again’ in other words.   
 
Figure 7-10: Have you seen the film VWP? 
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 Figure 7.10 shows how many of the respondents indicated that they watched the 
film. Regarding Figure 7.10, one can easily conclude that compared to other cinema 
productions of Pana Films, VWP did not attract as many spectators as expected
27
. As the 
figure indicates, only 33.4 percent of respondents said that they have seen the film. Out 
of 33.4 percent, 78 percent were male and 40 percent had some combinations of 
primary, middle or high school education.  
Several reasons might explain why this film did not attract many viewers. One is 
that people thought the film was too political, rigid, and unpleasant. At the time of the 
film’s release, the already hostile relationship between Turkey and Israel was at its 
peak. Day and night, people were talking about Israel-Turkey relations (Dumanli 2010). 
Even though people supported the Palestinian cause and some of the Turkish 
government’s political sanctions against Israel, they still did not want to spend 13 
Turkish Liras on a film that was mainly filled with politics and hostility. As some focus 
group participants mentioned in another part of this study, this film is thought to be very 
ideological, addressing a certain social segment in Turkey. People who did not associate 
themselves with certain worldviews- namely conservatism, Islamism, or nationalism- 
preferred not see the film (according to some focus group discussants of this study).  
The second reason why this film did not attract a large audience might be that people 
did not want to go to theaters because they knew that the film’s DVD would come out 
on the black market soon, so that they could watch it at home instead of paying 13 
                                                          
27
 If online comments provided by Polat Alemdar fans are investigated, it will be noted that the film fans’ 
expectation from VWP in terms of ticket sales and publicity was higher than earlier VW serials. Despite 
this high expectation, approximately 2,023,000 people went to theaters to see VWP. Source: 
forummoral.com/showthread 
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Turkish Liras at the box office. And the final reason why many people did not go to this 
film is that during the release of the film, there were other thrilling and stimulating films 
in theaters, such as Eyvay Eyvah 2, which grossed about US$22,892,691 (VWP grossed 
about 10 million US dollars)
28
.  
As mentioned earlier, this part of the survey was conducted with 115 
respondents who watched the film. The respondents had several options, such as to 
answer each question or skip to the next one. In some questions, they had an option to 
give their own answers other than given choices. In this case, they were asked to type in 
what they thought would be the best answer.  
Table 7-16: After watching the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, has your perception 
toward Israel changed? 
 n % Skipped 
After watching the film, my opinions toward Israel 
has changed negatively 
12 11.4  
After watching the film, my opinions toward Israel 
has changed positively 
2 1.9  
After watching the film, my negative opinions toward 
Israel has  stayed the same 
84 80.0  
After watching the film, my positive opinions toward 
Israel has stayed the same 
0 0  
I have no idea  7 6.7  
Total 105  254 
 
                                                          
28
 Conclusions drawn in this section mainly comes from face-to-face conversations with focus group 
participants and my fieldwork observations.  
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Table 7.16 clearly demonstrates that the film did not greatly affect audience 
opinion. 80 percent of the respondents indicated that their negative view of Israel stayed 
the same. In other words, Turkish audiences had negative preconceptions about Israel 
and Israel’s actions against Palestinians. Seeing a film about Palestine did not affect 
their views on the matter.   
Table 7-17: In your opinion, do you believe that the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
reflected reality? 
 n % Skipped 
Definitely agree 30 28.6  
Somewhat agree 52 49.5  
Neutral 11 10.5  
Disagree 5 4.8  
Definitely disagree  7 6.7  
Total 105  254 
 
 When the respondents were asked whether the film reflected what they thought 
had been happening in Palestine, almost 78 percent of the respondents indicated that the 
film (somewhat) reflected what really goes on in Palestine. Reality here is based on 
news and information that come from media, and events that are internationally 
monitored, such as the Mavi Marmara incident.  It is important to highlight here that 
similar results came from the focus group discussions conducted for this study.  
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Figure 7-11: Please rate the following scenes in terms of affecting your opinions about 
Israel. 
 
 Figure 7.11 shows which film scenes were conceived effective by the 
respondents. These scenes were picked with no particular order in mind. But these 
filmic events were repeatedly pushed to the fore during my pilot studies as eye-catching 
scenes. I highlighted five of them for the survey and provided the ‘other’ option if the 
respondents had different ideas about film scenes that they think are more effective. As 
Figure 7.10 shows, the scene in which the handicapped boy, Ahmed, is crushed under 
the debris of his home in front of his parents captures the attention of the spectators the 
most. Since this question was rated as being the most effective scene (corresponds to 
the number 5) to the least effective scene (corresponds to the number 1), Moshe’s 
testing of a special bullet on a Palestinian civilian is the second most disturbing scene 
according to respondents. The other scenes seem to be fitting with the film’s genre of its 
own such as killing, shooting, and exploding. On the other hand, some important 
discussions were raised when the respondents were asked to put their own evaluations 
in the ‘other’ option. For instance, several respondents indicated that certain lines of 
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dialogue were very effective such as, when Polat said: “I did not come to Israel, I came 
to Palestine”. But some other respondents were very skeptical about the film’s 
effectiveness altogether, saying: “this film had nothing to do with Israel or Palestine. If 
there was, then, I missed it”. Another viewer argued that “film is a film. It did not affect 
my views”. However, when I asked if this film became the voice of Turkish people 
more than 60 percent said that the film reflected Turkish people’s views (see Table 
7.18).  
Table 7-18: In your opinion, do you think that the film Valley of the Wolves- Palestine 
became the voice for Turkish peoples? 
 n % Skipped 
Definitely agree 23 21.9  
Somewhat agree 44 41.9  
Neutral 13 12.4  
Disagree 18 17.1  
Definitely disagree  7 6.7  
Total 105  254 
 
 23.8 percent of the respondents disagreed with the statement saying the film did 
not become the voice of Turkish people.  
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Table 7-19: Do you believe that the film mirrors the current government’s Middle East 
policies? 
 n % Skipped 
Definitely agree 13 12.4  
Somewhat agree 30 28.6  
Neutral 31 29.5  
Disagree 25 23.8  
Definitely disagree  6 5.7  
Total 105  254 
 
Table 7.19 shows possible connections between the film’s messages and the 
current AKP government’s Middle East policies. By looking at the table, people’s 
opinion about whether this film reflected the current AKP government’s policies in the 
Middle East is unclear. The respondents’ choice seems to concentrate in the middle of 
the diagram. 29.5 percent indicated that they are not so sure about the film-government 
relationship. However, after combining the results of ‘definitely agree’ and ‘somewhat 
agree’, 41 percent of respondents indicate that the film reflects the current government’s 
Middle East policies.  
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Table 7-20: Who is your favorite character in the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine? 
 n % Skipped 
Polat Alemdar 35 34.3  
Moshe Ben Elizer 9 8.8  
Memati Bas 10 9.8  
Simone Levy 5 4.9  
Abdulhey Coban 3 2.9  
Abdullah (Palestinian) 30 29.4  
Other 10 9.8  
Total 102  257 
 
Table 7.20 shows the respondents’ favorite character(s) in the film. From 
looking at this table two film characters seem to be the most liked in the film: Polat (the 
main protagonist) and Abdullah (Polat’s Palestinian contact). It was surprising to see 
that Polat did not rate higher (34.3), because Polat is the central phenomena in these 
films and television series (Celebi 2006).  When the respondents put down their own 
evaluations in the ‘other’ option, the Sheikh (spiritual leader) appears as one of the 
other liked characters in the film. But several respondents criticized the entire film team 
(film characters and the makers) because of their intimate connections with the current 
AKP government. One respondent notes: “I used to be a big fan of these people but 
when I see them getting closer to the AKP, I feel like spitting on their face”.  It should 
be noted that as viewers make their own meaning and reading, they negotiate and often 
challenge the dominant meaning in any given text.  VWP viewers are no exception to 
this.  
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Figure 7-12: Overall, how do you describe the film? 
 
 At the end, when I asked respondents to categorize the film in terms of what 
cinema-political position this film can be placed in, a large number of people indicated 
that the film features some realistic presentations as well as nationalist and provocative 
ones. The question of what counts as realist representations depends on how people 
define the term ‘realistic’ within the politics of cinema. However, in the following 
chapters, some focus group discussions about the real and the reel will be able to shed 
light on this unclearness.  
7.5 Summary  
Results of the data reveal that peoples’ opinion about Turkey’s geopolitical role in the 
Middle East is complex and multifaceted, and the –perception of- effects of the film in 
shaping the audiences’ opinions are insignificant. But the respondents’ pre-existing 
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negative perceptions about Israel are firm. Significant numbers of people think that 
Turkey should be involved in Middle East politics but, on the other hand, they maintain 
their skepticism and pessimism about Turkey’s capability to resolve the conflict 
between Israel and Palestine. However, taking into account the fact that 75 percent of 
people imagine Turkey in the east of Europe, public opinions about Turkey’s 
involvement in the Israel-Palestine issues as an active mediator can be foreseen, and, 
expected to be more radical in the future. As seen in the results and detailed audience 
opinions in the ‘other’ sections, respondents is very dynamic (young), relatively well 
informed about Turkey’s international affairs (SETA 2012), and active in reading about 
the geopolitics that surrounds Turkey (Chapter 9). In this sense, decoding filmic 
messages and making geopolitics from below constitute an important part of spatialized 
politics of audienceship.  
 As mentioned earlier in this chapter, a clear majority of the audiences 
demonstrated that they had pre-conceived notions about Israel and its policies toward 
Palestinians before they had seen the film. It should be remembered that this survey is 
designed to investigate if the film VWP influenced respondents’ perceptions about the 
Israel-Palestine conflict. In this sense, I argue that the film’s ability to change people’s 
opinion about the conflict remained limited. For example, the study results suggest that 
58.5 percent of those who did not see the film identified Israel as the prime problem of 
the conflict. Additionally, 67.8 percent of respondents who did not see the film 
indicated that Israel’s Mavi Marmara raid influenced their opinions about Israel 
negatively while the same notion reached to 79.2 percent among those who indicated 
they saw the film. But, it is important to highlight that those who did not see the film 
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did not automatically identify Israel as the hostile state to Turkey. Viewers’ opinions 
about Turkey-Israel relations remained moderately positive. 65 percent of them 
identified Turkey-Israel relations as ‘interest-based relations’. In this respect, it can be 
argued that the film did not affect people’s opinions about Israel, but it served as a 
conduit to have their voice be heard. Meanwhile, many people agreed with the idea that 
the film presented real events that supposedly really took place. To complement these 
findings and to better understand the factors that affect audiences’ interpretations of a 
text and their meaning-making behaviors, critical readings of online audience comments 
and face-to-face conversations with the audiences in the following chapters will be 
provided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
228 
 
CHAPTER 8: ONLINE AUDIENCE COMMENTS: ENGAGING 
VALLEY OF THE WOLVES-PALESTINE 
 
8.1 Introduction  
In this chapter, I analyze online fan comments for the film Valley of the Wolves-
Palestine. The aim is to broaden critical readership of the film beyond the realms of 
controlled field of investigation. Earlier chapters exclusively focused on critically 
reading the film, the site of film production, and quantitatively classifying audiences’ 
engagements with the film regarding the film’s geopolitical nature. To supplement the 
survey and critically reading the film discussed earlier in Chapters 5 and 7, this chapter 
brings online film readership to the fore-front in order to shed light on online audiences’ 
engagement with VWP while adding their critical reading of a text within their 
network(ing) context. To do this, Sinemalar.com -a widely referenced movie website in 
Turkish- is the source of audience comments. In this membership-only website, viewers 
freely leave their comments and respond to the comments of others. Viewers are not 
forced to use their actual identity or provide an actual picture of themselves to become a 
member. Two things immediately surface on this website to make their comments 
important for this study. First, comments are anonymous; there is no authorship 
associated with the comments because no real names are used which encourages people 
to speak freely with each other. Second, viewers on this internet site take films seriously 
and assess them critically for others (producers, viewers, etc.). They assess films by 
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discussing scenes, actors/actresses, and scenarios critically in addition to rating the 
films between 1 and 10
29
.  
Related to the recent developments in the communication technologies, these 
two characteristics of the site (Sinemalar.com) make boundaries between producers and 
consumers transparent, fluent and active. Through these changes, online audiences 
enjoy being both the author and the reader by critiquing and being critiqued. Thus, this 
constant dialogue continues between the viewers regarding many aspects of a film. The 
nature of online fans’ activeness, then, forces us to ask the question of whether online 
fan groups should be counted as a community. This study is not about making this claim 
but it suggests that fandom in the age of well-connected world remains important. In 
this sense, Wiatrowski notes that “as technology progresses and participation increases 
in these virtual modes of community imagination, formation and maintenance one must 
wonder what is at stake for these newly minted online fandoms. It seems obvious that 
fans congregate online as a method for creating a space wherein they can cheaply 
consume, create, and share their culture, much as they had done prior to the 
implementation of online media only with a greater connectivity and speed” 
(Wiatrowski 2011, p. 1). In this chapter, therefore, it is my intention to highlight the 
online audience’s comments as they are an important source to recognize in the 
reproduction of micro geopolitics in everyday discourses. The examined comments are 
taken out of a total of 2025, which were posted before and after the film was released. I 
only read and included comments that were long in length. From reading through 
                                                          
29
 Valley of the Wolves-Palestine’s overall score is 7.6 out of 10 rated by sinemalar.com viewers. This is 
slightly higher than those of Valley of the Wolves-Iraq and Gladio which both received 7.4 out of 10. 
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several hundred of these comments, I included the arguments that can mainly be 
categorized in two opposing groups: arguments that are in favor of the film and 
arguments that are against the film.  
8.2 Valley of the Wolves-Palestine: A monument to bravery  
One of the immediate categorizations that can be drawn from reading these online 
comments is how people’s appreciation for the film being bold and aggressive against 
Israel. This group perceives Israel to be hostile state toward the entire Muslim world, 
Palestinians in particular. Online comments on this online discussion board mirror those 
held by the survey respondents and focus group participants against Israel. One viewer 
shared the following comment after outlining several problems with the film:  
After all, there is one thing about this film that made me be happy about 
the Turkish cinema, and that is that this film brought different perspectives 
on understanding of the ‘East’ and the ‘West’. For years, Asian people 
have been portrayed as hostile and belligerent by Hollywood and 
European cinema.  In the history of Turkish cinema, this film reverses this 
perception by repeating catchwords between the lines over and over again 
without fearing from anything. Just because of this reason, I recommend 
everyone see this film (posted by TheManiac on 9/10/11).  
 Another viewer wants to draw people’s attention to cultural imperialism. In fact, 
he/she does not only want to grab people’s attention, but also he/she wants to inform 
and warn other viewers to be aware of this cultural imperialism trap.  After giving a 
paragraph-long definition of what cultural imperialism is, and explanations of how 
indigenous cultures disappear while American culture dominates, he/she adds:  
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Why I am sharing this with you is just to say that one of the important 
vehicles of cultural imperialism is cinema today. Look at films. In them, 
white is always good and saves everybody’s life. Was not the white who 
saved Japan in the Last Samurai? Therefore, when we watch films, we 
always have to have this consciousness in our mind first and foremost. 
And when we make films, we have to calculate this factor as well. In other 
words, the best strategy is to hunt opponents with their own weapon. 
Watch this film immediately with this piece of information in your mind 
(posted by Edipdemircan on 10/10/11).  
 One viewer uses a different analogy to support the idea of why this film should 
be watched by everyone. The poster wants people to check out a Turkish newspaper 
that talks about a critical session held in the European Parliament about VWP. He/she 
references the newspaper regarding the importance of the news and the film:  
The European Parliamentary, Stefan Fule, gives resolution of a question 
about the danger that what Valley of the Wolves-Palestine can cause in 
Europe. Fule wants the EU to discuss the matter of whether the film 
should be allowed to enter European countries or not. The impression I got 
from this development is that there must be something about this film that 
they don’t like to see or are afraid of. Otherwise, Europeans would not be 
panicking like that (posted by Veronicasue on 8/10/11).  
 There are other viewers who congratulate Pana Film for even thinking about 
producing films such as this -very anti-Israel and bold in criticizing Israel.  These 
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viewers think that Israel is the most influential state in the world with strong ties among 
networks of power around the world including governments, non-governmental 
organizations, media and commercial institutions. As observed during the focus group 
discussions, Jewish conspiracies remain a popular notion in Turkey which, in turn, 
feeds further anger against Jews. The viewers believe that it is almost impossible to 
confront Israel and its power networks. These posters praise the Pana Film as the only 
group bold enough to stand against Israeli power and welcome the film’s 
representational and ideological confrontation with Israel. For example, one viewer 
expressed: 
I congratulate the team just because of their extreme courage for making 
such a film without worrying about the presence of Israel and its 
collaborators around the world (posted by hitm11 on 6/5/11).  
 In the same framework, another viewer blames Turkish diplomats and 
government officials for failing to follow the path of the Ottoman Empire and its 
mission. For the poster, this film, even though it has many cinematographic flaws, 
succeeds to glorify Turkey’s name at the global scale. The viewer also congratulates the 
film for being the first anti-Zionist film in Turkey. He/she notes: 
Even though the film is terrible in its many aspects, it still should be 
watched just because of its ideological stance and how it cinematizes the 
story of an oppressed people. I don’t think any other film company could 
have ever dared to produce such a film (posted by blade44 on 9/10/11).  
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8.3 Valley of the Wolves-Palestine: An exploiter and a heart hijacker  
The opposing point of view, highlights a series of serious criticisms of the film. 
Criticisms of the VWP look evidential and mature in nature. This means that viewers 
explain why they dislike this film in long paragraphs by questioning its authenticity 
recognizing its deliberate exploitations of emotions that were intensified immediately 
after the Mavi Marmara incident. In the following discussions, viewers highlight how 
the filmmakers exploit public sensitivity and how this sensitivity can be turned into 
profit. To note again, viewers in this discussion forum seem to be well informed about 
the Pana Film products and political economy that operates within the film sector. One 
viewer notes: 
Polat and his men finished America in Iraq [referring to the film Valley of 
the Wolves-Iraq] and now they are heading to Israel to finish them without 
any casualties. They go to Israel to avenge the Mavi Marmara attack, so to 
speak. At first, they act like they are there to protect the oppressed but 
suddenly you see the art of killing [Figure 8.1].  Numbers of Israelis and 
of course many Palestinians are killed.  What do they think? To kill 
several Israeli, they cause the death of hundreds of Palestinians. 
Palestinians die like pears falling down from the tree. Is this how they 
protect the oppressed? Is this what the cinema is for? And look at their 
dress. They dress suit and so called Palestinian scarf around their shoulder. 
Is this how much you know about Palestinians? No one in that region 
wears that kind of scarf if you want to know the fact. That scarf is Turkish 
made for Kurds in Turkey [Figure 8.2]. This film is nothing more than 
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stroking Turkish sensitivity and nationalism. The Palestinian cause should 
never be exploited like this (posted by mtiske on 10/30/11).  
 
Figure 8-1: Polat in one of the shooting scenes. 
 
 
Figure 8-2: A movie poster showing Polat 
and his men. 
Source: Yerlifilmizle.blogspot.com 
  
 Viewers who criticize the film note that the film inadequately addresses the 
point, which should be to vocalize the Palestinian cause worldwide. They argue that the 
235 
 
film contains no subject, no story and no point from the beginning to the end. One 
viewer says: 
This was the most absurd, ridiculous, dumb, aimless and subjectless film I 
have ever watched (posted by XlasisMatthew on 9/30/11).  
 Critics not only criticize the film and the film makers, but also critique the 
critics. They accuse posters for thinking ideologically, or viewing through a 
nationalistic lenses rather than rationally. It should be noted that viewers do not just 
write their thoughts randomly and fade away. They read each other’s comments and 
respond to them with serious discussions. In this regard, viewers are not only the simple 
consumers of the text but also are the active authors. They affect others and are affected 
by others in these ongoing anonymous exchanges. They are not passive readers; they 
actively contribute to the meaning making of the text even if their participation in 
creating the original text is limited. The participants are well aware the power of such 
online discussion forms to influence other viewers’ opinions. One viewer shares his/her 
thoughts: 
I read many comments. Except few of them, they were all written with this 
mindset of nationalism and chauvinism. The excuse is the film’s 
ideological stand point and reflecting reality. What a nonsense excuse. 
What is stopping you from filming Palestinian realities? Do it. To me, 
what is described in this film is not even the tip of the iceberg. But, 
making a film about reality has nothing to do with making a watchable 
film. I criticize films from artistic and cinematic qualities. If the film lacks 
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quality, who cares about if the film mirrors the reality. You just cannot kill 
team of army with your 4 men. Is this how you reflect the reality (posted 
by Hijyenik on 09/27/11)?   
 In some other comments, viewers show impressive knowledge of Turkish 
contemporary cinema. They investigate, read related news and do background research 
about the film before they see it. It can be said that their comments can be qualified as 
mature reviews and their reading of current Turkish cinema trends is an instructive one. 
These viewers situate the film VWP in the conservative cinema tradition in which 
Islamic and nationalist world view is promoted. Even one viewer connects this tradition 
and the film to the currently increasing political Islam and the Fetullah Gulen 
movement. One viewer calls this film ‘outrageous’: 
What kind of mind can write such a scenario? Why are people dying? 
What is the reason for? And why are Palestinians dying all the time? Why 
are they dying for Polat and his men? …here this is the end point of the 
conservative cinema. Here are the fruits of congregationalism in the 
country and the film industry. Why is there this desire to comfort 
nationalist sensations in this latest Turkish cinema film? Even 
exaggeration has to have its limits (posted by Tiensanli on 9/19/11).  
 As seen in the comment above, viewers are very critical of the film not because 
of its agenda but mainly because of unrealistic fictionalization of the scenario. They 
point out that neither art or aesthetic should be sacrificed in the name of publicizing 
human tragedy in Palestine. The two are not mutually exclusive. They also note that the 
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message of the film itself cannot qualify the film as watchable unlike other opinions 
which highlight that although the film is dramatized; it still addresses the heart of the 
geopolitical issue.   
 To see what expectations the film fans had from VWP, I gazed through viewer-
comments posted before the film was released. From those comments, I came to the 
understanding that viewers’ expectations of this film were higher or at least on part with 
what the earlier Pana Film production Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, represented to cinema-
goers. Fans were expecting to experience at least similar pleasure from VWP since the 
producers invested more money in this film. One viewer shares the rumors:  
It is said that they were going to build a Gaza Plateau in the eastern 
Anatolia.  They were going to spend more money than they did for Valley 
of the Wolves-Iraq. This means that they plan to spend more than 10 
million US dollars. Yeah! This film is going to be the best of the east. 
New records will belong to this film. (posted by alpagut01 on 1/17/2010).  
 As the comment above indicates, the viewers appreciated the quality and 
perceived realistic settings of Valley of the Wolves-Iraq and expected even more as 
producers’ gained expertise would be reflected in this new product. However, as this 
study indicates the VWP did not satisfy expectations of its fans.  
8.4 Summary  
This chapter mainly highlights two types of film readerships for VWP by analyzing 
online film discussions via sinemalar.com. From analyzing viewers’ comments, there 
are mainly two opposite views of the film. On one hand, some viewers see this film as a 
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popular geopolitical text that defies the power of Zionism and as a text that restores and 
remake the Palestinian nationhood and territoriality. In this framework, viewers 
appreciate the story (the story of Palestine) VWP communicates more than how the 
story is told (filmic quality). Viewers dismiss their artistic and cinematic criticism just 
because of the film’s boldness to tell such a story of human drama in Palestine and the 
Zionist oppression of Palestine. In this sense, the viewers believe that the film 
indubitably serves the purpose.  
  On the opposite end, viewers decry the film for being extremely political and to 
unrealistic with no decent story attached to it. They challenge the film producers for 
being chauvinistic and extreme in fictionalizing the Palestinian story. Viewers find no 
reason for being cinematic extreme in the geography of the film where no place is safe 
for Palestinians. They indicate that whatever the message might be, a film should never 
disconnect itself from the filmic reality even if the expectations of extreme actions from 
political-action subgenre films are high. Moreover, some of the viewers point out that a 
film should never be a vehicle for a certain political agenda if it wants to stay in the 
limits of cinematic taste.  
  However, what seems to be in common in both sides’ comments about the film 
is that both parties share their discomfort about Israel’s actions against Palestinians. 
Viewers acknowledge the film’s necessity to publicize the human drama that continues 
to take place in Palestine and value the indispensability of bringing it to the attention of 
international movie audiences. However, as mentioned, what separates each view from 
one another is that the lack of film quality and the dissatisfaction with the fictional 
characteristics of the film versus the importance of the story. In other words, the core of 
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the online discussion comments centers around the arguments in which one side 
emphasizes the importance of the message while other is critical of the quality and 
factuality of (re)presenting the story. To put it differently, the online discussion 
comments mainly tackle with the question of whether the authenticity and cinema art 
should be sacrificed in the name of sending political messages. In this sense, the 
audiences’ responses are contradicting and overlapping.  
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CHAPTER 9: FOCUS GROUPS: NEGOTIATED 
SPECTATORSHIP, MEMORIES, IMAGES AND 
ASSOCIATIONS 
  
9.1 Introduction  
The survey I conducted for this study suggests some confirmation of thoughts about the 
movie, VWP and its interpretations by Turkish audiences, but underscores the difficulty 
of researching audience reception of geopolitical texts empirically. For this very reason 
I was obliged to include face-to-face group interviews with various segments of the 
Turkish population in three cities in Turkey.  As an important part of qualitative 
methodology, techniques using focus groups have several advantages (Philo and Berry 
2004). The first advantage is that focus groups enable “the investigator to check the 
responders have really understood the questions and that the answers given do reflect 
what is actually believed” (Philo and Berry 2004, p. 205).  A second advantage is that 
follow up questions and small details from the conversations can unveil related issues 
that can be pursued. Focus groups “enables a rapport or level of trust to develop 
between those taking part and the moderator, so that people become less guarded and 
more prepared to say what they really believe” (Philo and Berry 2004, p. 205). This is 
not to say that use of focus groups is immune to problems.  
The protocol that I follow in this chapter is that I give extra voice to the focus 
group participants rather than cloaking their interpretations under my own analysis. In 
other words, I let people talk for themselves by adopting their full conversations and 
analysis in the chapter. On the basis of the participants’ location and occupation, focus 
group conversations are organized into subgroups. These face-to-face group discussions 
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share important patterns in their interpretations and disclose unique particularities that 
should be analyzed together. However, this form of research presented challenges. I 
have to acknowledge that because of some logistics and various fieldwork issues, the 
number of groups in each research site and number of participants in each group varies. 
For example, there is only one focus group interview in the province of Van and three 
people in that group due to limited time I had in this city and several last minute 
cancellations by expected participants. Similar problems apply to female participation 
levels. As explained in the methodology chapter, last minute cancelations complicated 
the research. However, the overall number of participants in the study from various 
sectors of Turkish society provides important clues to understanding patterns of the 
film’s interpretations. Apart from the concerns above, it should also be noted that this 
study of audienceship is different than the study of the film spectatorship derived from a 
cognitive perspective, which includes its own theoretical and methodological properties 
(Oakley 2003).  In this study, I focus on geopolitical, social and cultural dynamics of 
the text interpretations within the practicality of meaning-making process.  In the 
conclusion chapter of this dissertation, I will weave together the survey results, focus 
group discussions and critical readings of the film to explain possible patterns and 
understandings that can be drawn from these conversations and data collection.  
9.2 A student group in Istanbul 
This group was formed from students of different universities in Istanbul. Individuals’ 
age ranged between 20 to 25 years old. Face-to-face conversations took place in one of 
the student’s apartment at his invitation. The conversation was not structured and did 
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not follow a specific order. All participants indicated that they watched the VWP in 
theaters right after it was released in Istanbul.  
When I asked them about their overall evaluations of the film, I received 
different answers from different individuals depending on their previous film 
experiences and familiarity with the Valley of the Wolves phenomenon. As discussed 
earlier, the Valley of the Wolves television series and the films that are made under the 
same name and thus already established certain forms of recognition and expectations 
among Turkish audiences. Many viewers already knew the limits (perhaps 
limitlessness) of Polat Alemdar and his men, and what they can do for their country in 
the virtual world. In other words, many spectators were familiar with the ultra-action 
scenes and immortal characteristics of the Turkish heroes before the release of the film 
VWP. Here the focus group participants talked about their expectations of the film and 
observations of other cinema goers during the interview.  
First speaker: In the beginning of the film, for example, when Polat made 
that famous exchange with an Israeli guard at the gate, -I did not come to 
Israel, I came to Palestine- there were applauses and bravos in the hall, but 
later on laughter began dominating the theater.  
Moderator: Why? 
First speaker: When there are big exaggerations; that is what happens.  
For example, when I saw Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, I would jump in a bus 
that is destined to go to Iraq if there was such a service right outside of the 
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theater after viewing the film. But this film was not like that at all. I found 
this film very humorous, funny.   
 Third speaker: I had the reverse reaction. I had heard many conversations 
about the film such as how it was so exaggerated and fictionalized. People 
told me that how Polat became the Matrix and finished the entire Israeli 
military and so forth. So I went to the cinema with these expectations in 
my mind, but the film turned out to be not all that was said, but an 
effective one. I enjoyed it. And this was probably because my expectations 
were so low before going to the film.    
Here in these conversations, we see how cinemagoers’ expectations play 
important role in decision making. It is important to note that there are many variables 
to attract moviegoers to go to a certain film while avoiding others. For example, viewers 
are sometimes attracted by publicity, advertisements, reviews, and friends’ 
conversations about the film or the genre that appeals to them. In this case, Pana Film’s 
previous films played an important role for people to go to this film despite other 
viewers’ discouragement.  
Fourth speaker: This film was way different than the previous one [Valley 
of the Wolves-Iraq].  
Moderator: How so?  
First speaker: In that film, there was a story, for example. In Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine, there is no story. There is no beginning or a 
background. These three men are all of a sudden ascending at an Israeli 
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border and beginning to fight. I mean there are no clues why they are 
there.  
Fifth speaker: I think that taking revenge was the basis of both films. In 
the Iraq-film, Polat and his men were taking revenge on an American 
general who put sacks on Turkish soldiers in Iraq and in Palestine-film 
Polat and his men are taking revenge of death of nine Turkish activists on 
the Mavi Marmara.  
In the following passage, the participants engage in reading the film makers’ 
mind by speculating why such political-action films are produced in Turkey dealing 
with Turkish military engagements abroad. These participants understood that films 
such as VWP have a functionality of (in)forming the public sensibility and populism. 
This group was also aware of propaganda politics and how the relationships between 
the state apparatus and the culture industry interplay and how these entities support each 
other. Another important nuance that needs to be highlighted here is that in almost all 
focus group discussions, participants hold the notion that the film affects everybody 
else. Discussants talk about how films affect this or that type of person other than 
themselves. Often, focus group discussants exclude themselves from being subjected by 
films when they talk about film effects on viewers. Hardly there is this inclusion of 
oneself, I think, probably because admitting the fact that film can affect oneself is a sign 
of weakness or uncertainty. 
Fifth speaker: Here is why Turkish people like this film. The Turkish 
people could not do anything in Iraq or Israel, nor could Turkish 
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government. Meaning, the Turkish government could not enforce any 
sanctions against the US or Israel. This feeling of not being able to do 
anything has built a big social hysteria and trauma in Turkish society. 
Now, in these two films [Valley of the Wolves-Iraq and Palestine] the 
pressure that has been built inside the Turkish people is being released via 
these virtual revenges. So now, we are saying that Polat went to Iraq and 
Palestine and took our revenge and came back victoriously. In Israel, he 
killed the general Moshe Ben Eliezer and in Iraq, he killed the American 
general, Sam William Marshall.  
Moderator: As an audience member, do you feel relieved?  
Fifth speaker: No, because I was aware of this. For example, Valley of the 
Wolves-Iraq was supported by the state [Turkish]. Many of the state 
officials went to the film’s premiere and made supportive statements. 
What this means is that Polat went to these trouble zones and finished 
what we wanted to do as a state or people.   
 The participants then went into discussions about the film’s possible anti-
American sentiments. They argue that the film VWP is not so anti-American or anti-
Israel as it has been publicly accused of. Participants note that the film elegantly makes 
this binary identity construction wherein the good guys and bad guys are defined very 
clearly.  
First speaker: By giving such a role to Simone [Jewish-American], the 
film implies that Jews are not that bad people like the general, Moshe. I 
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think this is a success because the film makes the point that a Jew can also 
be a victim of another Jew.  
Fifth speaker: As Israel was not portrayed badly in Valley of the Wolves-
Iraq; Americans are not portrayed badly in Valley of the Wolves-Palestine.   
Even the Jewish-American woman is in a very positive role in the film. 
With this, the filmmakers want to send a message to the international 
audiences saying that: Hey look! We can see this nuance [not everybody is 
bad].  There might also be another message here to be extracted and that is 
this: Israel does not care about anybody or any country in the world when 
it comes to protecting Israeli interests. Even the Americans have to 
comply with demands of Israelis. Thusly, the Jewish-American woman’s 
complaining about the guard at the gate becomes an empty struggle and 
the guard’s ignoring of her demands proves the notion above.   
Forth speaker: That is probably correct too but the important message in 
the film is clearly there which is to say that we are not the enemy of 
America or Israel. This is the message of the film for Americans and 
Israelis.  
Authenticity has been a big part of any debate made about Pana Film’s film 
productions. From there, participants move to the discussion of the film’s depiction of 
real events in Palestine and the authenticity of VWP compared to that of Valley of the 
Wolves-Iraq. There is one thing about these productions that a majority of focus group 
participants, survey respondents and online commentators also paid attention to. It is the 
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question of what is ‘real’ and what is ‘reel’ that had to be clarified and described. 
People think that the ways in which the film VWP portrays the filmic reality which is 
understood to be the collection of real events that are supposed to take place in Palestine 
is mostly fictional, unreal and exaggerated. But the story that the film bases its narration 
is mostly real and based on the real events that took place in Palestine and elsewhere 
such as the Mavi Marmara raid. In other words, Polat’s and his men’s Rambo-like 
operation in Israel is fictional (reel) but the cause that their mission is based on is 
factual (real). Put differently, the Palestinian drama is real but Polat and his superman-
type actions are fictional. Of course, this is not something new. Films are fictions and 
human constructed socio-cultural texts in the end. What is important here is that many 
Turkish audiences concentrate on what is expressed (the message) in the film. In their 
judgment, the factuality of the message is (the Palestinian cause) overcomes the 
factuality of the actions (Polat’s Rambo-like actions in the film). This is the same 
reason that Turkish audiences welcome the Valley of the Wolves television series. In 
these television series, everyday politics and current events are included in the series’ 
weekly episodes. The viewers re-visit current political developments inscribed within 
these television texts. Through the intertextuality of the Valley of the Wolves television 
series, current political developments actually make sense for the viewers. In other 
words, the show interprets, visualizes and puts into context the current political 
developments for the viewers. Hence, Turkish audiences focus on the message inscribed 
in the film VWP instead of worrying too much about its construction/fictional logic.  
Fifth speaker: I don’t think that events take place in Palestine as described 
in the film. They are much exaggerated.  
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Second speaker: Yes… the boy dies under the debris, Israeli soldiers 
opens fire indiscriminately on men and women and so on.   
First speaker: Actually, I did look up the internet to see if what film 
portrays is true. What I found was that Israel has done crimes that are 
similar to what the film depicts.  
Second speaker: I think the film Valley of the Wolves-Iraq was more 
realistic and its story was more satisfying. In addition to that, as 
fictionalized in the film Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, a well-trained Turk can 
go to Iraq and possibly accomplish the given mission in the film, but in 
Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, there is not even a slight possibility for 
Polat to finish the given mission in Israel. In this film, Polat is transformed 
into an extraordinary Turkish figure which made him a comic Rambo.  
First speaker: I mean to me, the scenes from the film looked similar to the 
scenes in documentaries on the internet I saw.  
 This argument can lead to another and that is how audiences negotiate and 
reconstruct the meaning of the cinema text. They do not automatically internalize the 
message. Rather, they reject some portion of the message while agreeing on the general 
idea. Of course, this is not to say that all audiences of this film can be categorized as the 
same. Some audiences reject the messages all together while some decode them in the 
same manner as they are encoded.  The following section is an attempt to highlight the 
audiences’ various interpretations of the film and interpretations of other interpreters.  
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 As noted earlier, participants frequently talked about the film’s possible 
geopolitical effects on the viewers and individuals in Turkey and abroad. According to 
the participants of this focus group, this film is an important instrument for Turkey’s 
soft power in the Arab world and some of the formerly colonized countries. The 
participants make the argument that VWP and other Turkish cinema products can 
function as a substantial cultural link between the communities that were colonized by 
the Western countries in the past and Turkey, a country claiming to promote anti-
imperialist agendas. The participants believe that what these cinema products attempt to 
accomplish in those countries, partially, correlate with the policies that Turkey has been 
pursuing especially under the Foreign Minister, Ahmet Davutoglu. The following 
discussions demonstrate that the audiences are aware of Davutoglu’s active foreign 
policy discourse and his ‘zero problems’ rhetoric with the neighbors and how much 
geopolitical rhetoric appears in the narrations of Turkish cinema products. Participants 
signal their awareness of Turkey’s regional aspirations and the AKP’s rhetoric about 
how international relations should be applied in the Middle East and the Balkan 
Peninsula.  
Fourth speaker: If we take into account the fact that this film is also 
watched in other countries and if these countries are those countries that 
are Islamic or formerly colonized [by West], intimate relationships might 
possibly develop between the peoples of those countries and Turkey. We 
have to include this fact that Turkey is a country that sells popular 
television shows and soap opera products in the Arab states. This 
exportation of cultural productions should be counted as a ‘soft power’ of 
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Turkey and it should be noted that Turkish state is the happy partner from 
doing this business. This [Turkish cultural products’ exportation to the 
Arab states] cultural exchange should enhance and diffuse Davutoglu’s 
arguments in the region. For example, the other day I saw the news 
explaining why thousands of pictures of Recep Tayyip Erdogan [Prime 
Minister] are hung at homes and businesses of Lebanese in Lebanon.  
Sixth speaker: This Tayyip Erdogan wave started after the Davos meeting.  
Fourth speaker: Yes, but it became very noticeable after this film. There is 
also this possibility. The film eliminates the embarrassment that came with 
the Mavi Marmara defeat for the peoples of the region. In other words, 
through this film, unattained or incomplete results are completed and 
attained in the eyes of the people in the region.  
Fifth speaker: It is again the policy of diverting the anger to something 
else.  
Sixth speaker: Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, too, functioned in the same way. 
Sacks were put on heads of Turkish soldiers, and then what happened? 
Nothing. But, then this film was introduced as a plan B. So because we are 
a very sensitive nation and people, these films helped us release our rage 
and put out the flames of anger safely.  
 The participants indicate that the film is a certain kind of statement of 
representation through which the Palestine issue no longer becomes simply Palestinian 
or Arab. The film fixes the issue as Turkish. Participants understood that films can be 
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an important conduit of message conveyance in international relations, in addition to 
formal channels. They believe that films can, in part, reflect and represent a state’s 
official language, geographical imaginations and geopolitical visions. In this respect, 
this film remains a key geopolitical text mediating Turkey’s geopolitical imaginations 
and culture. The following highlights this very functionality of the film.   
Fifth speaker: In the Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, the story was a Turkish 
story but in Valley of the Wolves-Palestine the story is a Middle Eastern 
story.  
Sixth speaker: It can also be said that via Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, 
Palestine became Turkey’s domestic issue in the eyes of Turkish people, 
an 82
nd
 province of Turkey so to speak. The foundations have already 
been laid for this to become reality. 
Fifth speaker: As a matter of fact, an event such as the Davos meeting of 
2009 and the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid of 2010 were another way of 
saying to the world that Turkey must not be ignored in the region.  
Fourth speaker: But Turkey was already an actor in the Middle East. 
Erdogan’s mediating role in between Israel and Syria before the Davos 
meeting regarding the situations of Golan Heights is an important 
indicator that Turkey is an active player in the Middle East.  
 Later in the conversation, the film’s Turkishness and its conservativeness 
dominate the discussion. To speak broadly, Turkish cinema and television serials 
narrate domestic socio-cultural stories. Mostly these stories tend to be conservative and 
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protective of cultural values, beliefs and norms. It is rare that Turkish cinema challenges 
state ideologies, formal rhetoric or fundamentals of Turkish culture except by some 
from the left-leaning cinema tradition. The Valley of the Wolves products are typical 
popular cultural examples that enforce traditional ways of life and the sanctity of the 
state in many ways. The group participants carefully read intentionally inserted political 
elements in the film and deconstruct genuine relationships between the state and the 
film making. In this sense, I have to acknowledge that this university discussion group 
is extremely well informed about the Valley of the Wolves cinema phenomena in 
Turkey. When I asked them if this film is nationalist cinema text, they responded that 
this film was not a nationalist but an Islamic one when compared to Valley of the 
Wolves-Iraq.  
Fifth speaker: In the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, there is no 
reference to Turkishness. But, in Valley of the Wolves-Iraq, there is.  
Moderator: How about immortal Turks, Polat and his men?  
Sixth speaker: These three heroes are immortal and the audience is already 
conditioned to see them as immortal. If these three will go to Israel, they 
have to go and do whatever they need to do and come back with no harm. 
Death has to pass them untouched… in Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, we 
were a nation of Islam but in Valley of the Wolves-Iraq we were Turkish 
again.  
Fourth speaker: In addition to that, we need to look at the scriptwriters of 
these two productions. Valley of the Wolves-Iraq’s scriptwriter was a 
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nationalist and statist. In other words, it was like he would do anything for 
the state type person. But the scriptwriters of the film Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine are conservative people, Islamist so to speak.  
 As discussed earlier, the group participants point out that the film VWP is more 
than just cinematizing geopolitical visions of Turkey or exploring Turkishness. It is also 
a kind of movie that transnationalizes Turkishness and becomes the voice for Turkish 
people in the Middle East. This film is also about ‘perception management’ by which 
audiences’ emotions, motives, objective reasoning as well as their meaning-making 
processes are influenced (aimed to influence) in favor of one or more ideological 
narrations or geopolitical cultures. The following conversations shed light on these two 
arguments.  
Fourth speaker: One of my Arab friends made this comment about this 
film during the first week of release: ‘if this film continues to pull millions 
into the theaters in the Arab countries, sincerely it can be said that people 
of these two geographies can come together and unite, and this can look 
small but be a big step at the end’.  
Moderator: Does this enforce the idea in which Turkey is presented as a 
regional player?  
Fourth speaker: Yes, this film facilitates such a perception. In general, 
films are about perception management. It does not necessarily have to 
happen physically. It is notional. For example, Rambo goes to Vietnam 
alone and wins the battle but in actuality the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam. 
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However, how many people know that the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam? 
This is a perception management. Cinema can do this, and it has power to 
do this. And this is what Turkey is taking advantage of.  
 The question of what sort of perception was at play here becomes an important 
topic of conversation. In the following conversation, the participants make clear 
references to Turkey’s historical ties with the Middle East and they highlighted that 
Turkey is sort of obliged to be involved in the region’s problems including the 
Palestine-Israel conflict, Iraq’s territorial unity, and so on. Turkey’s Ottoman past 
becomes the reference point as to why Turkey should take on such a mission.  
Sixth speaker: I think the film points out this notion that the sons of a 
nation who had raced horses in three continents can intervene in a problem 
that occurs in one of its former regions [refers to Ottoman controlled 
territories] whenever it is necessary.  
Third speaker: This has to be pointed out that Turkey could not ignore the 
Palestine issues as a successor country to the Ottoman Empire.  
Fifth speaker: But there is no emphasis to Ottoman Empire in Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine. 
Sixth speaker: There is no emphasis but there is that implied reference. It 
creates the perception.  
 Participants not only emphasize moralistic and historical necessity to intervene 
in the Israel-Palestine conflicts for Turkey but they also make the point that 
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involvement in Israel-Palestine issues is critical for the current AKP government and 
contemporary Turkish geopolitics. To them, what the film highlights adequately 
correlates with what the AKP government has been pursuing since 2002.  
Fourth speaker: Both films [Valley of the Wolves-Palestine and Iraq] 
parallel the AKP policies.  
Fifth speaker: How is Valley of the Wolves-Iraq parallel with Davutoglu 
policies?  
Fourth speaker: In this way: there is this country that does not want to be 
fall under any humiliation. Why was the bill blocked by the Turkish Grand 
National Assembly, because we were against the war in Iraq? And this 
parallels with Davutoglu’s policies.  
The bill mentioned above was sent to the parliament by the AKP government to 
allow the stationing of US troops on Turkish territory as part of preparations for the 
2003 war against Iraq. The AKP majority parliament rejected the bill which unleashed a 
bitter reaction in Washington but was welcomed elsewhere.  
Our conversation moved back to the topic of why VWP did not attract as many 
spectators as Valley of the Wolves-Iraq did. Participants laid out several reasons why 
they thought VWP was marginalized. The first reason was because several other popular 
movies were released at the same time such as Eyvah Eyvah 2. The second reason was 
that reviews of this film were not that exciting or stimulating compared to the reviews 
of Valley of the Wolves-Iraq. Another reason according these focus group participants 
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was that this film was already characterized in the media as being Islamist, anti-Semitic 
and violent. I want to note here that the following conversations can shed light on some 
of the survey results discussed in Chapter 7 indicating that not many people were 
interested in seeing the film.  A similar study conducted about Valley of the Wolves-
Iraq, found that 68.5 percent of survey respondents indicated that they saw the film out 
of 292 sampled population in Istanbul, Turkey in 2006 (Anaz and Purcell 2010). An 
online survey that I conducted for this study shows that only 33.4 percent of the 
participants indicated that they saw the VWP out of 344 respondents among Turkish 
speaking people in 2011 (15 respondents skipped this question). These two studies 
confirm the lack of popularity of the both films Valley of the Wolves-Palestine and Iraq 
if not explaining completely why this film lacked attention. Here is what the focus 
group participants said about Valley of the Wolves-Palestine’s unpopularity.  
Third speaker: There were other films that came to theaters about the same 
time with Valley of the Wolves-Palestine.  
Second speaker: When the film Valley of the Wolves-Iraq was released, 
everyone told me that I should go to this film. But when this film came 
out, I heard no one telling me the same thing.  
Fifth speaker: For example, my uncle never cares about cinema but even 
he went to cinema to see the film Valley of the Wolves-Iraq.  
Fourth speaker: My grandmother, too, went to that film [laughing]. I am 
serious.   
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Sixth speaker: After the Mavi Marmara raid, there were so many 
demonstrations throughout Turkey. And when this film made this attack as 
big part of the scenario, people thought that the film was politicized too 
much. Plus, when you go to the film, you would see people with turbans, 
gown, and long beards. This automatically alienated other sectors of 
Turkish society. I mean at least this was the common perception. The film 
did not appeal to everybody. It seemed to be the political propaganda of a 
certain group. Therefore, the filmgoers did not go to film just because they 
did not want to be profiled as one of those religious people. There is also 
invocation ceremony in the film which I think enforces the idea that the 
film is very conservative one.  
Fourth speaker: Even more, those other Islamic communities [this speaker 
refers to the Fetullah Gulen movement, and of course this is my 
interpretation of his reference] who did not support the Mavi Marmara 
movement did not support this film either.  
Fifth speaker: This is also important to know that current television series 
[called] Valley of the Wolves-Ambush has lost its popularity which also 
affected numbers of movie goers greatly for this film.  
 From the conversation above, it becomes noticeable that the film VWP was 
stigmatized immediately after it was released. With the influx of certain type of cultural 
and religious symbols and dress styles into the theaters, this film became an Islamic 
film which in the end caused a decline in the numbers of tickets purchased. This 
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assessment may seem to be contradictory with the general human geography of Turkey 
wherein more than 60 percent of people identify themselves as conservative or rightist 
as this study highlights. But the nuance is that people in Turkey are also moderate and 
want to keep the fine line between what is extreme and what is not. Religious symbols 
such as wearing a turban for a man or a burka for a woman are not a common practice 
of Islam in Turkey for which one can easily be marginalized in various places and 
occasions. But as explained in different sections of this study, characterizing the film as 
an Islamic one is not the only reason why the film VWP failed to attract ticket sales. 
There were other factors at play.  
With this focus group, I also wanted to delve into some of the survey questions 
that I posed to online audiences. In doing this, I wanted to find out (1) how accurate the 
information I received through the online survey was and (2) what possible explanations 
are there for such outcomes. As I mentioned earlier, this focus group participants were 
well informed and educated. Therefore their interpretations of the film and their 
interpretations of other people’s interpretations remain were also valuable. My question 
in this regard related to commonly known as ‘the Polat Alemdar phenomenon’ (see 
Table 7.20). In this Polat phenomenon, the main character becomes a sort of iconic 
figure, a model and vigilante hero. He resembles American heroes (Rambo, Batman, 
Superman, etc.) but this one is more of a Turkish one and real because the filmic Polat 
lives among people just like anyone else. Some of the phrases he uses in television 
series and cinema films become vehicles of meaningful exchanges and ways of 
communicating among young (mostly male) audiences such as ‘talking or walking like 
Polat’. There are other figures (Abdulhey and Memati) that are always together with 
259 
 
Polat and complete this Polat phenomenon that also requires mentioning. These 
secondary actors also have unique characteristics that attract different people for 
different reasons. For example, one of the speakers after the focus group interview said 
that he swapped his Facebook profile picture with Memati’s just because he wanted to 
send a message to his girlfriend. And when I asked what that message was he said that 
in one of the scenes as these two were watching Valley of the Wolves-Ambush, Memati 
stared at a woman angrily and menacingly. Since then, this piece of scene and filmic 
memory has functioned as a meaningful exchange of expression between the two. He 
said that the message got across smoothly by replacing the profile picture with 
Memati’s. Similar to this story, this focus group’s participants note that people’s 
decoding of the meanings vary from person to person. In other words, reproductions of 
meanings are personal and private. However, this does not mean that meaningful 
patterns cannot be formed. Indeed, my conversations with this and other groups’ 
participants indicate that there are patterns for decoding the film and its characters. The 
following conversations mostly refer to the television series when Valley of the Wolves 
had been rated as a top show among many others in Turkey.  
Third speaker: Everywhere was full of people who would dress and talk 
like Polat when the television series was very famous.  
Fourth speaker: Polat became a phenomenon. 
Moderator: Similar to James Bond perhaps?  
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Sixth speaker: Polat was a more realistic hero than American Rambos. For 
example, James Bond kills people and so does Polat but he also lives in 
the streets of Turkey like anybody else.   
Third speaker:  Additionally, Polat is not just a hero like the superman, 
rather he is someone who can be approached and imitated as a role model. 
In other words, no one can fly like the Superman but everyone can pull the 
trigger like Polat.  
Fifth speaker: We used to go to Turkish café houses to watch Valley of the 
Wolves television series every week.  
Third speaker: Streets used to go empty when the series was on TV.  
Sixth speaker: People used to share phrases, stories and action scenes from 
Valley of the Wolves episodes on their Facebook wall.  
Third speaker: There was a term like ‘let’s toss a valley’ [meaning: let’s 
download and watch a Valley of the Wolves episode together].  
 As demonstrated, the group participants continued using past tense when they 
talked about the Polat phenomenon because they think that things are much different 
these days. To them, the Polat phenomenon was very popular from 2003 to 2006. When 
I delved into what has changed since then, they highlighted that people changed and so 
did the mindset in the society. Around 2003, Polat was a vigilante hero, a very much 
appreciated role back at the time. But, they note that these days siding and working for 
the deep state does not sell well in Turkey.  
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Fifth speaker: People are more rational these days. They no longer 
appreciate social sentimentalism.  
 All the elements of societal change that this focus group’s participants 
highlighted tie deeply with the results that I obtained from the online surveys.  Those 
who said they watched the film VWP were not in great numbers and their education 
level tended to be lower than survey participants who said they did not watch the film. 
There is a possible pattern here and that would be that this film which is closely tied 
with the Polat Alemdar phenomenon did not get much attention from those who tended 
to have higher education and more nuanced ways of understanding the world.  
 On the basis of seeking some sort of confirmation between the focus group 
discussions and the survey results, I directed my questions to the nature of effects of the 
film on people. The responses the participants gave were supportive of the survey 
results (see Table 7.16). In other words, this film VWP did little to make a difference in 
changing people’s mind toward Israel. Rather the film took advantage of the political 
atmosphere and the social sentiment that arose over the years against Israel.  
Fourth speaker: There was no need for this film to be knowledgeable 
about what happened in Palestine. Actually the film situates itself on this 
collective perception about Palestine. First, there was this perception and 
then the film is produced enforcing that perception.  
Sixth speaker: It is the Valley of the Wolves-Palestine that wants to take 
advantage of this sentimental atmosphere that existed among the people. 
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Fourth speaker: As everyone knows, the film’s scenario was reedited after 
the Mavi Marmara flotilla raid.   
As seen in the participants’ comments and similar to the survey results, the film 
VWP takes advantage of sensational moments that accumulated over the years against 
Israel and in favor of Palestine in Turkish society. An influx of information via different 
forms of media indicates that Turkish people are well informed about Israel and 
Palestine. Even so, it is almost impossible to say that the film’s effects on shaping 
people’s opinions are zero. In the following section, I delve into another survey 
question which interrogates the general characteristics of the political-action film.  
Moderator: In general, how would you describe the film?  
Fourth speaker: It is a film that is full of violence. The scenario in the film 
is performed under the shadow of guns if there was an identifiable 
scenario in the film.  
Third speaker: I found it in very good quality. I mean the sound system, 
music, visual effects, and acting were adequate, and the scenes were also 
affective and agitative.  
Fourth speaker: For example, the scene that showed the Palestinian-
disabled boy is left inside by Israeli soldiers when they demolished the 
house was very sensitive.  
Third speaker: I don’t believe such an event can ever occur.  
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Fourth speaker: But just the other day when Palestinians were protesting 
on the Golan Heights, did not Israeli soldiers begin shooting at them even 
before they came close to the border? I mean the film scenes are possible.  
Fifth speaker: Yes, but Moshe’s gun testing on a civilian seemed to be 
little bit exaggerated.  
Sixth speaker: Okay! But this is a cinema art in the end. And it is a 
scenario that is written to explain Moshe’s cruelty. 
Fourth speaker: The scene is to put emphasis on Moshe’s character to say 
that how he is a psycho-maniac. In addition to that, I think the scene is 
there to say how he is out of balance and he is the guy behind this Mavi 
Marmara attack.  
Fifth speaker: From this, it can be inferred that the target is not Israel; it is 
Moshe.  
Fourth speaker: I don’t see any anti-Israel approach in this film. Whoever 
is equivalent of Moshe character in reality; that is the person to whom this 
film is based on. 
 Regarding the relations between the real and the reel, participants highlight 
different points of view and contradictory opinions. Again, cinema form and 
expectations play an important role in reading film realities and tying that to the realities 
of everyday life. As discussed earlier, reality can be nicely embedded within unrealistic 
narrations as it occurs in this film VWP. The opposite can also occur. Imagined or more 
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complex representations of place, people and events can be formalized realistically in 
cinema forms for audiences. Here participants make clear distinctions between the 
genre realities (guns, killings, heroism, etc.) that are inserted in this action film and the 
everyday realities of Palestinians represented through the action scenes (cruel treatment 
of Palestinians by Israeli soldiers). This means, the participants do not completely 
embrace what the film depicts. Instead, they actively engage in negotiating the meaning 
and understanding what is the story behind those filmic representations. However, I do 
not argue that Fiske’s model is operating here, emphasizing ‘active audience’ which is 
thought to be completely autonomous, free from institutional constrains or  personal 
limitations in their reading of media products (Biocca 1988, Es 2011). What I do argue 
is that this focus group’s participants are very active in making their own reading of the 
political messages that VWP attempts to convey. As Morley argues, there is no doubt 
that audiences are limited in their reading of media texts completely free from any kinds 
of internal or external constraints. Indeed he notes that audiences are limited in their 
own meaning-making capacity of media texts as media messages are embedded in some 
sort of “signifying mechanisms which promote certain meanings, even one privileged 
meaning, and suppress others” (Morley 1996, p. 282). It should be highlighted that 
these focus group participants understand the film and its messages in the realm of the 
general knowledge that exists beyond the cinema product VWP about Israel and 
Palestine and Turkey’s role in the region. However, cinema products such as this film 
resume being a vital body of knowledge through which people shape their opinions and 
understandings about the world and geopolitical practices and representations.  
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9.3 A student group in Ankara 
The commonality of this student group is that this group is comprised of students of 
different universities in Ankara. Their ages ranged from 23 to 27 years old. Face-to-face 
conversations took place in a coffee shop in Sakarya district. Conversations that we 
made were not structured and did not follow a specific order. At first, I started the 
conversation by asking how they found the film, VWP in general. Comments and 
opinions were freely expressed with little prodding by me. The goal was to get the 
essence of their thought without making them feel that there is an audio-recorder on the 
table and their talk is being recorded or interrupted. Participants in this group were also 
very informed audience about Turkey’s human geography and political history. In this 
group, one thing was strikingly obvious and that was that participants were very 
skeptical about the film’s highlighted messages and its purpose of production. 
Participants constantly questioned the quality of messages and searched for political-
economic reasons behind the production.  
Before I talk about audiences’ skepticism about the film and geopolitics within 
the film, I revisit the Valley of the Wolves phenomenon as a television text in Turkey. 
For over ten years of operation, Valley of the Wolves cinema products (including both 
films and several television series) established a didactical framework through which 
public was informed about various subjects related to Turkey’s geography, history and 
politics. The decade long television series interrogated current developments that no 
other popular production had ever attempted to incorporate. To name a few, these 
themes included underground working of the mafia, affairs of the deep state, ongoing 
court cases and international organizations’ aspirations involving Turkey. Thus, the 
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audiences always found pieces of reality re-presented in these Valley of the Wolves 
productions which in turn led to the belief that the story in VWP may be exaggerated but 
everyday conditions on the ground in Palestine are more real and arduous than 
described -and maybe even modulated- in the film.  
Moderator: What do you think of the scenes in the film?  
Second speaker: The scene that shows the boy dies under the debris does 
not even reflect reality. Reality is more factual than that scene [meaning: 
conditions are harsher in Palestine than it is portrayed in the film].  
First speaker: Absolutely.  
Second speaker: We always hear things like that. We know that Israel 
demolishes homes top of the residents, kills children, and even drops 
bombs on people at the beach and so on. I was personally very happy that 
the film touched upon these subjects.  
First speaker: Think about this. If Israel can kill nine people in 
international waters and in front of the eyes of the whole world, the very 
same state can even do more horrendous actions against Palestinians when 
there are no eyes watching them. To understand this, one should not need 
to be that clever.  
Second speaker: Valley of the Wolves-Palestine is showing an 
extraordinary scene like this to carry out a mission in which where the 
reality of the film is unleashed.  
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Third speaker: Yes and there are so many unrelated scenes in the film –I 
guess- just to show how cruel Israel is. But these unrelated scenes 
interrupt the story and audience. Then, the point of the film becomes 
showdown between Israelis and Turks. 
First speaker: Correct. The story turns into a message to say that we, 
Turks, come and disrupt everything. So you [Israel] better watch out.  
 However, participants appreciate the film’s attempt to redefine geopolitical 
definitions and practices. For them, the film bravely engages in redefining geopolitical 
terms and concepts such as national borders, locality, security, terrorism, violence, 
danger and so on.  As argued in the Chapters 5, 7 and 8, the film’s counter-argument 
about geopolitical representations and practices of Israel against Palestine is one of the 
crucial arguments of the film that is noted by the viewers. The film can be situated as an 
important anti-geopolitical text (or another geopolitics in its own right) that creates 
alternative ways of defining geographical and political representations in Palestine.  
Second speaker: One of the messages that the film is giving and that is that 
it defines terrorism from the other way around. According the film’s 
definition, the actions of Israel are the real act of terrorism. It says that 
Israel is the one who is committing the crimes. The film also guides our 
attention to the idea that Israel is going after the project of establishing 
‘the Kingdom Greater Israel’.  
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Fourth speaker: But in the remaining one and half hours, the film is 
showing how the three Turkish commandos devastate the Israel Special 
Forces. The film does this just to show that how Turks are great. 
Third speaker: But in a virtual world [laughing]. 
 In the following conversation, participants make the point that VWP in the end is 
a commercial attempt to make profits. For them, film makers take advantage of any 
political atmosphere to place their film at the top of the box office. Participants note that 
this film, like many others, functions in the realm of political economy of cultural 
production.  
Second speaker: Essentially, the film includes current events like the Mavi 
Marmara raid to increase the numbers of filmgoers and to find excuses to 
kill Israelis, which by the way some people may like to see even if it 
occurs in a virtual world. I mean the impression I got was that the Pana 
Film was looking for ways of making some money. The Mavi Marmara 
raid provided that opportunity. In the end, Pana film is a commercial entity 
and built to make money.  
 One of the points that other focus group participants also made is that the film 
functions as a safety valve for releasing people’s anger toward Israel because of the 
recent developments since the Davos meeting in 2009. Considering the public outrage 
and mass demonstrations against Israel in different Turkish cities after the Mavi 
Marmara attack, the film’s timely release partially helped to quench people’s anger and 
outrage through a safe mechanism. This is the point that following exchange makes.   
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First speaker: With the Mavi Marmara, people’s anger toward Israel 
increased tenfold. This film helped to discharge people’s anger by killing 
many Israelis in the virtual world. I don’t think there is much of Palestine 
in this film. That is where the film’s exaggeration starts. How many Turks 
went to Israel and killed a single Israeli? None. But Polat Alemdar kills 
many. This is very unreal. If more Turks and Palestinians died, then I 
would say this is more real. 
Second speaker: But Polat cannot die.  
Third speaker: Nobody would watch the film if he did.  
 The tradition in acting in Turkish cinema mostly has been an actor-character 
style. This means that an actor or actress establishes a certain character through one or 
two cinema products and then the built character continues to be the same character in 
the following cinema productions. The Polat character can be a good example to this 
actor-character style film making. There is a built character for Polat. He cannot unact 
his role, who he is, and what he does. He has to beat, kill, destroy and win at the end 
everytime and everywhere. The following conversation highlights the signature of 
Polatism in Valley of the Wolves cinema products.   
Second speaker: Polat has to kill and kill in large numbers. He solves 
problems with guns. Otherwise people would not watch Polat.  
First speaker: I have been watching Valley of the Wolves for about seven 
years. Now, this series has reached to a certain number of fans that are 
very fond of this Polat phenomenon. The creators of the Valley of the 
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Wolves will not easily give up on this audience pool. And there are people 
who like Memati’s prototype, very Turkish and manly, or Abdulhey’s 
hairs. Girls like them and boys like them for different reasons. Thus, they 
cannot die.  
Second speaker: Abdulhey, for example, is a Kurdish. He cannot die. He is 
there to say that we are working for the state together [Kurds and Turks 
are together for Turkey].  
First speaker: The image of Turkey in people’s mind and the image that 
this film draws match. Many people believe that Turkey is in the center of 
the world politics. The Valley of the Wolves series and films draw a very 
dramatic picture in which only someone like Polat could succeed. In order 
to succeed in the world politics, solutions are embedded within having 
someone like Polat. In other words, we will need a Rambo which makes 
the film fictional and makes me believe that producers care more about 
keeping their audiences than giving messages. Of course, there are some 
messages too.  
Moderator: Can we say that this film is disconnected from what is happing 
in Palestine?  
Second speaker: No. The only disconnected part is where three men kill 
hundreds of people. Again, in the end this film is produced to make profit 
and entertain people. It is not simply made for art or politics.  
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First speaker: But not everybody sees it the same way. People perceive 
the world as it the film interprets.  
 In the following discussions, the participants pay attention to subjectivity of 
defining what is acceptable and not acceptable in the political-action subgenre film 
making. The second speaker, for example, questions what he sees as unfair criticism of 
VWP for being a very Rambo-like film. He contests the notion that why everybody 
accepts it normal when many Afghans or Arabs are killed in American action films but 
everybody talks about chauvinism when Polat kills Israelis. He acknowledges that in 
order to explain the reality in Palestine and to appeal to millions, VWP needed to 
include actions in the narration to make it a story of violence and political crime.  
Second speaker: What this film does is instead of showing pieces of events 
and incidents from Palestine similar to news; it adds some dramatization 
and a story to make the whole thing watchable and entertaining while it 
squeezes some messages between the lines. Also, don’t we watch 
Americans killing Afghans, Arabs and others in the name of fighting 
against terrorism? To be honest with you, I like when Polat and his men 
kill Americans and Israelis.  
Fourth speaker: Let’s not forget that the producers are coming from 
conservative and nationalist background.  
In the following discussion, participants talk about the argument that highlights 
which affects what first: cinema products affect people or it occurs the other way 
around where cinema products take advantage of a pre-existing atmosphere to produce 
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films. In the end, participants come to a realization that this is an unending circle and 
difficult to identify. Indeed, the ‘which comes first’ question does not provide practical 
solutions to understanding the relationship between pre-existing notions and cinema 
products. But what is important to pay attention to is that the public discourse is formed, 
maintained and transformed during this interaction. Participants acknowledge their pre-
existing negative notions toward Israel accumulated through years of public news 
coverage by Turkish media, but they also claim that their source of information about 
Israel and Palestine issues is accurate and this film serves to maintain this geopolitical 
perception. In this respect, as discussed in earlier chapters (see Tables 7.16, 7.17 and 
7.18), this film functions as the voice for audiences who believe they have no voice but 
have more to say. This study reveals that many Turkish people believe that Palestinians 
live in unacceptable conditions and therefore their drama and miseries need to be heard. 
This film claims to be doing this in the eyes of Turkish audiences.  
Second speaker: I saw people were applauding in the theater.  
First speaker: This is because audiences’ world view overlaps with that of 
the film makers.  
Second speaker: We cannot say that the film is shaping audiences’ opinion 
in a negative way.  
Fourth speaker: There is this demand and the film supplying this demand 
in turn there becomes more reaction in public.  
Second speaker: Now, there are opinions and beliefs in the society. These 
opinions and views are not easily put into words. For example, people 
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have strong opinions about Israel but they cannot express their thoughts all 
the time and easily. What this film does is to popularize these views and 
make them legitimate to be pronounced. Now, people are not afraid of 
expressing their thoughts and views. Even if they spoke before; their voice 
was short and barren. What Valley of the Wolves-Palestine did is that it 
embraced those public opinions which I think majority shared and turned 
it into a cinema story. When people saw their thoughts were publicized, 
they grasped the film as their reference point or piece of evidence for their 
opinions.  
First speaker: We hear lots of news about Israel and this news makes us 
hostile against Israel but we cannot do anything about it. Almost for a 
century, we could not do anything. Palestinians are dying but Turkish 
people are only watching. Because of this, there is grudge in Turkish 
people’s mind. What this film is doing is that it is mitigating this anger 
and hostility among people. Thus we love when Polat kills Israelis and 
establishes justice in Palestine. In other words, Polat takes revenge for a 
hundred years of Turkish absence in Palestine. This might be very unreal 
to believe but people still like to see these things happen even if they are 
on the white screen.  
In this portion of the discussion, participants agree that the film audiences also 
enjoy when their geographic imaginations and historical aspirations are reflected onto 
the big screen, if not into the reality. Up to now, not many Turkish cinema products 
pushed people’s geographic imaginations beyond the official borders to include the 
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former Ottoman territories and its subjects. It is likely that this is the first time a film 
series explored Turkish possibilities in the Middle East and sets sail for geopolitical 
adventures along with Turkish people to the familiar territories. The film VWP offers 
Turkish people the chance to re-experience the glorious past and voyage to the familiar 
geographies. By doing this, the film also reminds the audiences about their historical 
responsibilities and geographic opportunities. It tells the audience that Turkey cannot 
stay away from its past or ignore the familiar geographies if Turkey wants to be the 
regional actor in the Middle East again.  
Fourth speaker: Also there is this imagination of being an actor in the 
region and transferring it into the white screen.  People enjoy this too.  
First speaker: Of course, Turks would like to have influence in the region 
and want to have such foreign polices and military power so that Turkey 
advances in international politics. Especially Turks would want to 
dominate the region because they have successfully done this once. Of 
course, every nation can imagine but not every nation can achieve. We can 
hope this [possibility that exists for Turks]. For example, Saudi Arabia 
cannot do this but Turkey can because we dominated this region for about 
600 years.  
Moderator: So we like this film because it fires our imaginations?  
First speaker: I like this film because it sends a clear message to Israeli 
officials about Turkish people’s feelings. Now they understand what Turks 
feel about Israel and its actions. If I were an Israeli official, I would take 
275 
 
this message seriously and consider evaluating my relations with other 
countries. I think film sends more messages to Israelis than Turkish 
people.  
Fourth speaker: Israel is very aggressive just because of this no-alternative 
situation.  
First speaker: If Israel did not pursue its big Israel project, no one would 
bother Israel.  
Second speaker: But if Israel does not weaken everybody around it by 
fighting, Israel cannot survive there.  
As the exchanges above reveal, participants have strong opinions about Israel’s 
position in the Middle East and are aware of its purported regional aspirations. In this 
respect, perceptions that Turkish people have about Israel as the trouble-maker state in 
the region parallel Turkish official rhetoric. Political discourse circulated by the 
officials also confirms the public contention toward Israel along with the VWP’s 
portrayal of Israel. For example, during his speech at the United Nations, Prime 
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan fortified this argument by decrying Israel as the 
‘spoiled boy’ of the region: “so far, Israel has always played the role of spoiled boy in 
the face of U.N. resolutions concerning Israel, thinking that it would carry on with this 
role” (Hurriyetdailynews 2011, Diplomacy section, ¶ 4). To further the discussion, 
attention should be paid to the ideological proximity between the current AKP 
government’s foreign policies and the audiences of VWP. Indeed, the results of an 
online survey conducted for this study support this statement. In the survey, 41 percent 
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of respondents believe that the film mirrors the current government’s Middle East 
policies while 62.8 percent indicate that the film VWP became the voice for Turkish 
people (see Tables 7.18 and 7.19).  
9.4 Private sector employees in Ankara  
This group consisted of private employees with a lower level of education (Middle 
school and high school) compared to that of the other focus group participants. Their 
age distribution is 24 and 45. Everyone in this group saw the film and indicated that 
they also follow Valley of the Wolves television series almost every week.  
A lack of formal training in geography or international area studies did not 
prevent the group participants from engaging in topics that are considered to be core 
topics for classical geopolitics. The very heart of the conversations touched on terms 
and concepts that are counted to be very geopolitical such as territoriality, resources, 
international politics, technological superiority, military power, population, supremacy 
and geostrategic domination. This group’s participants constantly compared and 
contrasted military and technological capabilities of countries and nations as they 
discussed regional politics and supremacy. Very often, they gave examples from their 
military experiences in Turkish army to make the point whether Turkey is capable of 
dominating the region. To them, international politics is all about diplomacy and 
military capability, and about who controls what geopolitical resources. Through this 
lens, Turkey seems to be a key country that has to stand on its feet freely. The 
participants argue that the eyes of the world powers are on Turkey, that these powers 
have secret agendas, and the country is surrounded by unstable countries that can 
jeopardize Turkey’s long run leadership in the region. This is why VWP and rest of the 
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Valley of the Wolves productions are crucial to understand the geopolitics that is related 
to Turkey. Even though the film VWP is more or less about Israel and Palestine, the 
conversations that form this focus group often wandered off to other topics. However, 
Turkey remained in the center of the discussions because it was thought that Turkey is 
the central country in the Middle East and more often described as the last castle 
standing in front of the latest crusade, in the eyes of the participants.  
 The following conversation with participants brings about intense but 
disconnected exchanges of thoughts about Israel, United States, and Turkey and their 
geopolitical agendas in the Middle East. In their analysis, Palestine does not seem to be 
an independent actor. It is a land where wolves wander around similar to the terrains of 
those Iraq and Afghanistan. This means that the discussants implicitly count the United 
States in Iraq, Israel in Palestine and the coalition powers in Afghanistan as imperial 
actors pursuing their own geopolitical advantage in the Muslim geography. Throughout 
the discussion, participants sustained their tone about the US’s and Israel’s geopolitical 
practices in the Middle East. By doing this, participants also feminize these oppressed 
geographies (the Middle East) as vulnerable to immediate danger from the masculine 
West. Accordingly, more attention focused on the notion in which the United States is 
the main actor as Israel becomes the fifty-first state of the U.S.  
Third speaker: Palestine is not Israel’s soil.  
Second speaker: It is the US’s.  
Third speaker: It would not be possible for Israel to occupy Palestine if 
America was not behind Israel. America has money and can buy anything 
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and anywhere. First, Palestine territories were bought then their residents 
were kicked out.  
Fourth speaker: They [America] menaced Turkey too.  
Third speaker: Yes. The Mavi Marmara and the sacking event [referring to 
the event when American forces put sacks on Turkish soldiers’ head in 
Iraq in 2003] were all part of this threat.  
First speaker: But you cannot do anything to America. 
Third speaker: No.  
Second speaker: Actually, this film tells us that we really want to do this 
to Israel but we cannot.  
Fourth speaker: Because America is behind Israel.  
First speaker: Yes, but in actuality if you assign everybody in Israel as a 
District Governor in Turkey, Turkey would still be in need of 
administrators. [This speaker is referring to the state of Israelis total 
population compared to that of Turkey, indicating that in the end number 
of soldiers count.]  
 The human resources and military capabilities of countries were constantly 
brought up in the conversation as the sign of geopolitical superiority. Related to that, 
Israel’s military capability in the region is always thought to be attached the military 
capabilities of the United States. But some participants find the US military weak in its 
core. Speaker two supports this assumption: 
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Second speaker: Do you think the US soldiers fight if they are not paid? 
No. But our soldiers fight without asking anything because we believe in 
rising from the ashes but they believe in eternal death.   
First speaker: When our soldiers die, we just say ‘God bless our 
homeland’.  
One participant invokes one of the famous quotes of the French commander Napoleon 
Bonaparte about Turks to support the idea that Turks are invincible.  
Second speaker: They cannot defeat Turks. Remember Napoleon’s words 
‘Turks are such courageous and virtuous people. That is why you can kill 
a Turk but you can never defeat them.’ That is why they are trying to 
divide us from inside, piece by piece.  
In his statement, ‘we’ refers to Turks but what ‘they’ represents is not so clear. 
What is clear is that discourse of ‘they’ vs. ‘us’ binary mindset is always at play when 
participants are asked to conceptualize geopolitics surrounding them. Anderson’s 
(1991) conceptualization of a nation and what unites the nation applies to every piece of 
this conversation. Participants think that in a glorified Turkish past, Turks defended 
their land sacrificing their lives for the unity of their nation and they will do the same 
when it becomes necessary.  
Fourth speaker: They [Americans and Israelis] have the technology but 
they don’t have the guts.  
Third speaker: Have you seen anybody killing himself in the West? 
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Fourth speaker: But Muslims happily give their lives to defend their 
homeland.  
First speaker: They do not even have to watch this film to see Turks’ 
heroism; they can investigate what happened in Dardanelle. There hundred 
times more of heroism will be found.  
One participant again mentions a famous story of the Dardanelle that has been 
told from person to person and from classroom to classroom in Turkey. The origin of 
reference is believed to belong to Ataturk (founding father of Turkey). During the War 
of Dardanelle (1915-1916), one soldier approaches Ataturk and says: “Sir! We are 
pulling back because we are out of ammunition”. He replies: “soldier, I did not order 
you to fight, I ordered you to die. Go back to your position”. This piece of memory 
regardless of its authenticity tells how courageous and virtuous Turks are. The 
following conversations highlight that neither state-of-art machinery nor high-tech 
weaponry suffices to defeat Turks on the ground. In other words, participants make the 
point that Turkey is not Palestine or Iraq.  
First speaker: And that soldier carries out Ataturk’s order without any 
hesitation.  
Second speaker: When the time comes and we have to do it [fighting], we 
do it even better [than those who fought in Dardanelle].  
First speaker: You have to know that war cannot be completed with 
technology only. War will have to be ended after face-to-face fighting 
takes place as it happened in Iraq.  
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 Participants in the following part of the discussion highlight the importance of 
the film’s potential effects on public. They believe that films’ effect on people is limited 
but they also believe that the message in this film is strong and well presented. For them 
this film is an important instrument expressing public’s discontent against Israeli 
actions toward Palestinians. Since Israel is so connected to the US and Turkey cannot 
do anything against the U.S, people read this film as a Rambo-like Turkish revenge on 
Israel. Participants made it very clear that the film successfully voices many people’s 
opinions and solidifies the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ binary thinking via 
Polat’s way. If Turkey cannot do anything, then, Polat will have to take the matter in his 
hands. Hence, Polat becomes a new friend of Rambo and James Bond.  
First speaker: Actually, we did nothing, except making a film about it [the 
Mavi Marmara raid] and that was sufficient enough for us.  
Second speaker: The film also explains Israel’s cruelty on Palestinians. It 
shows Palestinians’ desperation. 
Participants, without any empirical support, began discussing the politics of 
Israeli real estate transactions in Turkey and Palestine. For them, the real danger is 
hidden from the public. Israelis are claimed to be buying up land in Turkey which will 
eventually lead to the establishment of the Greater Kingdom of Israel. Participants 
believed that since Israelis succeeded in buying up Palestinian lands and exiling them 
away, what will stop them repeating this in Turkey.  From time to time, the 
conversations unleash collective fear of the participants about Israel and its secret plans 
in the region. However, Israelis are not the group that was a concern. Participants also 
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approached Arab subjects with strong skepticism, as they did for American or Israeli 
actions. For them, there is always some sort of connection between anything that 
happens in Turkey or in the Middle East and the state of Israel and the United States. As 
it becomes noticeable in participants’ conversations, they constantly refer to 
hypothetical conditions and Israel-phobia when they talk about Turkish geopolitics in 
the Middle East.   
First speaker: No, no! They [Israeli] are attacking because they fear. 
Third speaker: Fear will not go away from them because these soils don’t 
belong to them.  
First speaker: But, Palestinians sold their land to Israelis too.  
Fourth speaker: They buy up lands in Turkey to establish the Greater 
Israel.  
Second speaker: They make plans to last for centuries, but we [Turkey as a 
nation] plan daily.  
Moderator: What plans are you talking about? 
Second speaker: The Greater Middle East Project. Ten years ago, father 
Bush tried to enter Iraq but he could not do it. Back then, Saddam was 
stronger. What happened? The US played with oil prices and put 
economic embargo on Iraq to weaken the country. Then the son Bush 
came and completed the mission. These are the pieces of long term plans.  
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Third speaker: Let’s look at what is happening in Muslim countries. 
Muslims are killing each other. All these are part and parcel of the ‘divide 
and conquer’ strategies.  
Second speaker: Israel captured water reserves and America took control 
of oil reserves. These were all part of long-term plans as well. 
 Participants further expressed their skepticism by accusing some presidents of 
Turkey, members of the parliament and high ranked military personals for aiding those 
masterminds of the Greater Middle East project.  
First speaker: Who is behind all those murders; Turkish military and 
Israel?  
 The murders refer to the times when Turkey experienced many cases of political 
assassinations and ethnic killings which damaged the country’s international reputation 
and domestic safety.  Killings of Kurdish politicians in the 1990s are especially worth 
mentioning. But, in this case participants put more emphasis on murders of top Turkish 
engineers.  
Third speaker: Israel is inside us.  
First speaker: They are in our parliament.  
Third speaker: I think Suleyman Demirel [9
th
 president of Turkey] is 
clearly an Israeli. The other day, three ASELSAN [government-built firm 
to meet the needs of the communications electronics requirements of the 
Turkish Armed Forces] engineers died.  
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Fourth speaker: They were working on top-secret vital projects 
Third speaker: They said that one committed suicide and the other two fell 
off their balcony. [It is implied here that Israel and the United States are 
secretly killing scientists who work on top projects that are extremely vital 
for the Turkish nation.] 
Moderator: Yes, but how do you tie all these to Valley of the Wolves-
Palestine? 
First speaker: We like this film because Polat kills everybody that we 
don’t like. He kills Israelis and we like this [laughing]  
Third speaker: This film is telling us about all these Israel and American 
plans. It warns us.  
Fourth speaker: It deciphers the bad guys. If you watch Valley of the 
Wolves-Ambush, it shows you all these hanky panky politics in Turkey.  
Second speaker: The film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine also explains 
Israel’s cruelty on Palestinians. It shows Palestinians’ desperation. 
First speaker: The film also tells Palestinians not to be afraid because 
Turkey is behind them. But it tells this with only three people [laughing]. 
To be serious, after watching this film no one can say that Americans or 
Israelis are our friends anymore.  
Second speaker: After I watched this film, I felt like taking a gun and 
doing something.  
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First speaker: Even though the acting was amateurish, people did not 
focus on those errors. Everybody is taking in the message.  
Third speaker: The film is very realistic in terms of its message.  
 A recent research conducted by the Kadir Has University gives important clues 
about Turkish people’s threat perception from 2010 to 2011 in parallel with the 
conversation above. According to this new study, in 2011, 69.3 percent of Turkish 
people perceive Israel as the prime threat for Turkey as opposed to the United States 
being the prime threat with the rate of 67.8 percent in 2010. In 2011, the U.S follows 
Israel with the rate of 58.4 percent and Armenia comes after the US with the rate of 53 
percent (Aydin and Bulent 2012). This study shows that the U.S and Israel have a very 
negative perception in the eyes of Turkish people. However, the study does not tell us 
why people think the way they do and what factors led this to conclusion. 
 In the following discussions, participants paid attention to the geopolitical 
atmosphere wherein the real-world-events and reel-world-events are merged and 
processed meaningfully. In this area, viewers connect the flows of geopolitical 
information and cultural representations. Through these connections, they learn, 
understand and absorb new information with the help of pre-existing knowledge. 
Hence, VWP viewers cannot separate what they already knew about Israel and the 
United States from what they learned from the film. To put it differently, geopolitical 
information that the film presents cannot be comprehended without considering the 
pools of knowledge that exist beyond the film. The conversations that participants had 
here give important details about the notion that audiences’ opinions do not exist in a 
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vacuum but are formed and shaped within/through what Foucault calls ‘regime of 
truth’.  Foucault explains it:  
'Truth' is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the 
production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of 
statements…. 'Truth' is linked in a circular relation with systems of power 
which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and 
which extend it (as cited in Rider 1999, Writings section, ¶ 15).  
 Through the diffusion and consumption of popular statements and the simplified 
system of language utilized by cultural apparatuses (films, etc.), people learn and are 
informed about their world and, with that, become skilled at how to interpret ultra-
complex geopolitical information. Even though the viewers are aware of the film’s 
fictionality, they still believe that Israel is capable of executing such actions against 
Palestinians because in general the film messages do not contradict the ‘truth’ that 
existed before the film.  
First speaker: After watching films like this, if we were told that America 
or Israel did such and such things, we would automatically believe those 
statements without even questioning them and act accordingly. This is 
what this film made us feel.  
Fourth speaker: My views on Israel and America became even harsher.  
First speaker: People learn who our real enemy is and who is not after 
watching films like this.  
 Noticeably, the film VWP provides lenses and frameworks for the viewers to be 
able to make sense of what they see on the white screen and the real world within the 
contemporary social context. For instance, the film help audiences understand what (or 
287 
 
ought to be) Turkey’s geopolitical visions are and what to make of political events that 
take place around them.  
9.5 Private sector employees in Van 
This focus group was formed in the province of Van in eastern Turkey. Due to personal 
reasons, half of the group did not show up so the discussion continued with three 
people. The participants said that they were employed in a private accounting firm and 
have Kurdish ethnic background. Participants’ education in this focus group ranged 
between two years college and high school education. Conversations with this group 
were relatively short and focused on genre politics and messages in the film.  
 Regarding this private sector employee group, my initial goal was to bring 
socio-ethnic differences in the forefront of audience interpretations given the fact that 
these group members openly identified themselves as Kurdish. Whether they did not 
feel comfortable talking to me or for other reasons, they did not comment on the film’s 
nationalist narratives or its legitimization of Turkishness. Perhaps, such expectation was 
mine as someone who is being sensitive about the politics of socio-spatial differences. 
For this reason, this study shows extreme caution claiming to include the voice of 
Kurdish population regarding their interpretations of the film. However, I still find their 
comments important on the matter as individuals who are employed in private sector in 
the eastern flank of the country.   
One of the important underlying topics of this discussion continued to be 
audience expectations from sub-genre films such as VWP. Participants understood the 
fact that they had to curb their expectations of an action-political film. They indicated 
that VWP, similar to Rambo-esque films, prioritized action before anything else. As 
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with other groups, participants acknowledged that, action films employ political 
messages and this film includes messages that portray Israel as an oppressor state 
against Palestinian subjects. The participants also highlighted that the filmmakers 
included too many action scenes, which hijacked the intended message and turned the 
film into a tasteless comedy-action film.   
First speaker: Although the film did not get the message across properly, 
it shows the Palestinian people’s victimization by Israel and the cruelty of 
Zionists to Palestinians. But this is not clear in the film. It seems like Polat 
is chasing Moshe for revenge. Even this is not very clear. Everything starts 
so quickly and never stops.  Action after action, I was so tired of seeing 
scenes of explosions and shootings. Of course, those messages were there 
too.  
Moderator: Were those scenes realistic to you or similar to the images of 
Israel in your mind? 
First speaker: The film’s visual effects were not that great. For example, 
the scene that showed Israel bulldozers demolishing a Palestinian home on 
top of a boy could have been made better. It was breathtaking scene but 
the presentation of it was not very professional.  
Second speaker: I think Israel is worse than how this film describes it.  
Third speaker: I, too, think that Israel is more cruel than portrayed.  
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Second speaker: This film only reflects a small portion of the reality. If 
this film represented true happenings in Palestine, it would become 
completely a different film.  
Moderator: What is your source of information about Israel?  
First speaker: The internet and other news media 
Second speaker: We saw everything during the Mavi Marmara attack. 
People are trying to deliver aid to Palestinians but Israel attacked them in 
international waters.  
First speaker: Many television channels broadcast the Mavi Marmara raid 
live.  
Moderator: But you did not enjoy the visual effects of the film? 
First speaker: No, everything started so quickly and happened one after 
another. Everything was mixed and confused. They suffocated the 
message in action.  
Second speaker: For example, helicopter explosions were so amateur that 
one could easily see they were fake helicopters.  
Third speaker: I did not worry about the helicopter explosions on the 
ground, but the ones that happened on the air were so obvious.  
Moderator: Then why should one want to see a film such as this? 
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First speaker: To me, I first decide whether I want to go to a cinema or 
not. Then I pick a film, watch it and then evaluate it. Of course this film is 
different than others. Muslim people went to the cinema group by group 
[group of friends or group members of a certain religious or other 
communities].   
Second speaker: People went to this film because of its messages. They 
went to the film to know Israel better. This is not a film of pleasure.  
Third speaker: People also wanted to support this film against Israel.  
Moderator: What do you think about the film’s characters?  
First speaker: With the Jewish-American character [Simone], the film 
wants to send a message that not all American or Jewish people are bad. If 
you look at the passengers of the Mavi Marmara, you will see that people 
are from everywhere and every religion.  
Moderator: How about Polat and his men? 
First speaker: They are a team sent by Turkish government for a mission. 
They represent Turkey. Why they are not dying is the screenwriters’ 
business. They don’t die in the television series either. This might seem 
irrational but there is this Rambo too. He also never dies and saves the 
world.  
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Third speaker: There is Jackie Chan, for example. Sometimes you say: 
‘Can this really happen?’ but, they are the protagonists and the film is an 
action film. And Polat is our Jackie Chan.  
Third speaker: Polat is a Turkish terminator. Sometimes the scenario is so 
exaggerated that a film becomes a comedy more than an action film.  
Second speaker: But if there is Rambo, why should there not be Polat.  
First speaker: I think a message is needed to be sent out about situations in 
the Middle East and that is what this film attempts to do.  
Second speaker: The film wanted to focus Muslims’ attention on Israel’s 
cruel treatments of Palestinians. Naturally it exaggerates events and the 
story to convey its message. It is a film in the end anyway.   
 Participants in this group highlighted that the film’s depictions of people and the 
story were exaggerated and its messages overshadowed by unrealistic action scenes. 
However, participants found the film’s messages agreeable but they also believed that 
what the film portrayed does not completely reflect Palestinian reality on the ground. To 
their minds Israel’s real actions against Palestinians are more severe than what the film 
presented. They indicated that they were aware of this because they also follow other 
sources of news about the Israel-Palestine conflict from the internet or other forms of 
news media. As in all other focus group discussions, I can conclude that these 
participants also possessed pre-conceived notions about Israel and Palestine issues 
before viewing and interpreting this film.  
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9.6 Government employees in Istanbul  
The composition of this group differs from all other focus groups in terms of their 
employment status. This focus group included only male participants and their age 
ranged from 28 to 35. The participants of this group are highly educated and well 
informed about Turkish history and international politics. Being well informed about 
history and politics, these participants provided important clues about the film’s world 
of meaning in relation to the current geopolitical developments in Turkey and the 
region. For them, the film VWP is a cinematic alternative paradigm, to borrow the title 
of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s famous book, for the ideologies and 
paradigms that are set by the western film industry.  
 In the following discussion, it becomes noticeable that participants find strong 
relations between the latest cinematic developments in Turkey and Turkey’s current 
geopolitical aspirations which are pushed to the forefront of the AKP’s political agenda. 
For the participants this film is not only about the Palestinian cause, but it is also about 
Turkish geopolitics and the Turkish people’s century-long regional ambition.  
First speaker: To me the film primarily portrays the Palestinian cause, and 
is produced by Necati Sasmaz [Polat Alemdar] and his team as an 
alternative [to common discourses that portrays the Palestinian cause 
differently]. Of course, there have always been economic concerns in film 
making.  
Moderator: Alternative to whom or what?  
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First speaker: To Israel-sided Hollywood movies. Look around you. Do 
you see any films that are produced anywhere beside the U.S? No. 
Everywhere is occupied by Hollywood films.  
Third speaker: Because the Hollywood films are produced and distributed 
from the same center, you will always see these films presenting the same 
logic, mentality, Israel-sided scenarios and views.  
First speaker: Seeing Hollywood films everywhere, of course, irritates 
Turkish audiences. Now and for the first time, there is this film [produced 
in Turkey] that is at the same standards with the Hollywood films in terms 
the sound and special effect qualities. But, what you don’t see in this film 
is that there are no scenarios that we used to see or favor with America or 
Israel. Rather this film’s storylines show Palestine and oppressed people in 
alternative ways to Hollywood productions. In this film, we don’t see 
stories in which Muslim geographies are othered, humiliated and America 
always prevails and wins.  
Third speaker: To me, the importance of this film is not because it uses 
Hollywood-level technology and special effects; it comes from because 
this film gives important subliminal messages to the audiences.  
Fourth speaker: As an action film, it makes Israel to pay for its mistakes.  
First speaker: Even it is a cinema product; this film gives people some 
sort of relief. People become happy. We used to watch films in which 
Americans would always win, their flag would appear at the end, and a 
294 
 
Rambo-like hero would go into somebody else’s country and wreck the 
country’s pride in 90 minutes. This has always been the case from 
‘Superman’ to ‘Rambo’. Now, for the first time a film is produced that is 
an alternative to the American film tradition or, to put it differently, it 
disrupts this tradition [the American way of seeing the world via 
Hollywood].   
Moderator: But, isn’t Polat another Rambo? What is the difference? 
First speaker: That is right but they [Hollywood] taught us how to be a 
Rambo.  
Fifth Speaker: Why would this be a problem [referring to my question: 
Polat as Rambo]? 
First speaker: And of course this is our Rambo [laughing].  
 It is noticeable that along with other Turkish cultural products, Valley of the 
Wolves cinema series are important part and parcel of Turkey’s soft power in the 
Middle East and other former Ottoman territories, especially the small Balkan 
communities and countries like Azerbaijan. Why Polat Alemdar films are welcomed in 
such communities is an important question to address. One possible explanation is 
because of the film’s anti-American and anti-Israeli scenarios in which Polat defeats 
American and Israeli generals. This gives cinematic pleasure to the film audiences who 
have always seen Western victories over Muslim subjects.  
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 Besides giving cinematic pleasure to the audiences, the Valley of the Wolves 
cinema products come with geopolitical messages. Messages in these cultural products 
include regionalism in the economy, politics, Islamic unification, Turkey’s 
indispensible role in these culturally connected territories and anti-imperialism which 
paralells what Turkey has been advocating recently. What Arab or non-Turkish 
audiences make of these messages is yet to be explored but it surprised me when I saw a 
little boy wearing a T-shirt, Polat Alemdar’s picture is printed on, in the streets of 
Skopje in Macedonia. At first glance, one can come to a conclusion that Turkish 
cultural products are an important tool to influence millions in geographies outside of 
Turkey.  
Third speaker: After the Mavi Marmara period, three people became 
noticeable in the Middle East: Recep Tayyip Erdogan [Prime Minister], 
Ahmet Davutoglu [Foreign Minister], and Polat Alemdar [known as Murat 
because of Arabic pronunciation].  
First speaker: When R. Tayyip Erdogan was in Northern Iraq, it was 
reported that he could not move through the street because of the crowd 
around his automobile. It took him more than an hour to get fifteen-
minutes-long ride. Now, people in the Middle East see Turkey differently. 
They want Turkey to ensure justice, bring economic stability and security, 
not only in Turkey but also in the region.  
 It is still not so clear the alleged connection between the R. Tayyip Erdogan 
phenomenon and Valley of the Wolves’ popularity in the region, but what is clear is that 
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both Erdogan and Polat Alemdar of Valley of the Wolves are the elite actors producing, 
and the production of the geopolitical atmosphere in Turkey and the Middle East. In 
other words, the geopolitics of art and cultural products go hand in hand with a 
country’s geopolitical aspirations and international affairs. As one of my interviewees 
mentioned, this film could only be produced within a country that strives to reach 
beyond its material and mental borders.  To some commentators, this is a ‘new 
Ottomanism’ and that is what this film is advocating for. Hence, VWP serves an 
important function for translating Turkish national interests, geopolitics, and culture 
wherever it travels.  
Third speaker: This film seems to me that it can only be the film of an 
extrovert country. A country that wants to say: ‘I am also here’ [active 
player of the chess game in the Middle East].  
Second speaker: When we look at the entire Valley of the Wolves concept, 
we will see that Turkey is pictured as a country that reaches out to assist 
other nations in the former Ottoman territories.  
First speaker: How can Turkey break away from its historical and 
geographical past? What constitutes your historical and geographical past 
is what your strategic values are. This is a power and if you cannot utilize 
this power, you will be in trouble. If you utilize this power, then, you will 
seize the power of ability to interfere international conjuncture 
dynamically.  
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 Given their understandings of geographic and historical realities surrounding 
Turkey, participants make the point that Turkey cannot run away from its historical and 
geographic responsibilities. For example, consider the so called ‘Arab spring or 
revolution’ that started in Tunisia and spread to other states in the Middle East. 
Turkey’s leadership and political responsibility as a Muslim and democratic country is 
often brought into the discussion saying that Turkey can become a role model and the 
leading actor for these Arab and Muslim states. In fact, Turkey was asked to be on 
board by the international community because Turkey’s century-long experience in 
democratization and modernization is thought to be helpful in reconstructing these 
countries (e.g. Syria crisis). Turkey had to respond to this call because Turkey had 
century-long cultural and socio-political ties with peoples of these states. The current 
AKP government especially saw this call as an opportunity to reconnect with the Arab 
world and as a historical responsibility to correct years of long mutual ignorance. Here, 
it is noticeable to see this ambition and yearning in the  so called ‘the third balcony 
speech’ of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan delivered on the night of his 
party’s third victory, securing 50% of votes and his third consecutive term:  
From here, Ankara, headquarter of the Justice and Development Party, 
with all my friends, I salute all of you. With love I salute 81 provinces and 
74 million of citizens in 780 thousand kilometers of the Republic of 
Turkey. And, those who turned their faces to Turkey from Bagdad, Cairo, 
Sarajevo, Baku, Nicosia, and all other friend and brother soils, and wait 
for the coming news, I salute you from here with love. The results of the 
June 12, 2011 parliamentary election may bring happiness to our country, 
people, the entire geography and the world… A new leaf is now turned 
over for Turkey, a new and spotless page (June 2012, Ankara). 
 As far as I am aware, no other Prime Minister in Turkey gave such an inclusive 
speech or exclusively mentioned the names of capitals that are considered to be 
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extremely important centers for Turkey. Similar to the Prime Minister’s speech and in a 
response to a question of a parliamentarian of the opposition party Republican Peoples 
Party (CHP), the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu makes these remarks about 
Jerusalem:  
Dear Elekdag, Jerusalem is our problem. Why is Jerusalem our problem? 
As you thought, East Jerusalem is not Israel’s territory. According to the 
international law, East Jerusalem is part of Palestine state and it lies under 
the occupied territories of 1967. Al-Aqsa Mosque is in the East Jerusalem 
and it does not belong to Israel and it never will be. And Jerusalem will 
become the capital city of the Palestinian state. When we look it from 
Turkey’s perspective, let me explain why Jerusalem is our problem? First 
of all, even today, the religious institutions are administered by the 
established practices built during Ottoman time. There are no laws, no 
rules. Ottoman established practices are still the law there. Second, Turkey 
along with the US and France is the member of Palestinian council 
established in 1948 at the United Nations. This council is still there and 
active. We are member of this council and therefore Jerusalem interests us 
in this regard as well.  
…and I repeat again as I refer to Mister Prime Minister’s statement, 
the destiny of Jerusalem, the destiny of Bagdad, the destiny of Bishkek, 
the destiny of Samarkand, and the destiny of Sarajevo is our destiny. If 
there is order in those geographies, then the Anatolian geography becomes 
the leader geography. If there is no order in those places, we cannot sit in 
Anatolian geography peacefully (Davutoglu 2011, Ankara).  
 As seen in these speeches, the Prime Minister overtly provides the geographical 
coordinates of the new hub center where the heart of the regional politics will beat in 
coming years. The Foreign Minister explicitly states that Turkey’s destiny is tied to the 
destiny of former Ottoman territories. In his statement, it is clear that to position Turkey 
as the regional leader country, the region order must be established in these capitals. 
Without this, Turkey will not be the leader. This geopolitical psyche is well 
communicated to the public because unsurprisingly this is the point that focus group 
participants constantly re-visit and highlight. To put it differently, Turkish people’s 
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geopolitical imaginations agreeably overlap with the practical geopoliticians’ 
geographic imaginations. In this framework, it can be said that the film audiences 
interpret VWP as a rehearsal for a Turkey dominated geopolitical world and alternative 
paradigm in a cinematic form.   
9.7 A family group interview in Ankara 
This focus group had unique characteristics. First, the focus group discussion took place 
in one of the discussant’s home. Second, participants consisted of several families who 
were invited by the host family. Their number was fifteen in total, including small 
children. Third, unlike other focus groups, this group watched the film together and then 
participated in the discussions. This group included husbands, wives, and children. The 
environment showed some sort of conformity where humor and laughter dominated the 
entire interview.  The education level of this group was similar to the average education 
level of Turkish citizens in which high school graduates comprise the majority. All of 
the participants were self-employed individuals except for the housewives and children.  
 From transcribing about an hour long conversations and observing participants’ 
instantaneous comments during the film viewing, I can say that discussions with this 
group shows similar patterns with other focus group discussions. But one aspect was 
more visible than others, and the act of seriously laughing as they viewed VWP. 
Laughter matters. It is probably the most important manifestation of response to a 
medium of pleasure. For this reason, quite a number of scholars (Harbidge 2011, Dodds 
2007, Purcell, Brown and Gokmen 2009, Nerhardt 2007) are interested in analyzing 
moments of laughter and (non)laughter as both lead to fruitful discussions about 
negotiated spectatorship and popular geopolitics. As Rothbart argues, laughter arises 
300 
 
“‘from the view of two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or 
circumstances, considered as united in one complex object or assemblage, or as 
acquiring a sort of mutual relation from the peculiar manner in which the mind takes 
notice of them.’” (as cited in Rothbart 2007, p. 37). She also argues that perception of 
an incongruous or “an unexpected event may also lead to fear, curiosity, problem-
solving, or concept learning” (Rothbart 2007, p. 38) In this sense, a singular focal point 
of analysis from this focus group discussion emerges. It is the participants’ 
instantaneous response to the extraordinariness of the characters and the film scenes’ 
comedic fabrications, the act of laughing out loud. However, when participants begin 
reading the text critically and analyze the possibilities of the conditions of the film 
realities, they immediately come to the understanding and confirmation about the 
seriousness of the film messages.    
Moderator: what is happing in the film? 
First speaker: The film is telling us how our Rambos destroy Israel 
[laughing]. 
Fifth speaker: I don’t think they can even be considered as a Rambo 
[referring Polat and his men’s physical look] [laughing]. 
Second speaker: Why not? If Rambo can destroy Vietnam, why cannot our 
three Rambos destroy Israel [defensive mood and seriousness dominates 
the room]?  
Fourth speaker: Actually, there is no indication in the film that they 
destroy Israel. This film is about taking revenge from General Moshe. 
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Fifth speaker: They are in Israel because they want to retaliate against the 
Mavi Marmara attack.  
Third speaker: They are doing what Turkey cannot basically.  
 Participants talk about real-reel comparisons. For them, this film should be 
evaluated within its sub-genre and it should be noted that the impossible is always 
possible in action films. They understand and expect that there will always be moments 
of absurdity and actions that contradict the reality of human capability. To defend their 
position, they question Hollywood films and their normality. If Rambo-like American 
action films achieve impossibility, why cannot Turkish Rambo-like films do the same 
thing? To them, (ir)rationality should be universal and objective.  
Second speaker: In the Rambo films, Rambo used to destroy everything 
with a bomb attached to the tip of an arrow. Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
will be a more realist film compared to Rambo.  
Fifth speaker: [In Valley of the Wolves-Palestine] the dead are coming 
back to life and the wounded are healing in five minutes [laughing]. 
First speaker: I think this film is produced to relieve people’s anger 
because of the Mavi Marmara raid and also taking advantage of the 
moment to make some cash. Other than that this film is a full of fantasy.  
Moderator: Are you relieved [laughing]?  
Fourth speaker: Not really [laughing].  
302 
 
First speaker: We can say that with this film, we took revenge for the 
Mavi Marmara raid.  
Fourth speaker: I think this is the Turkish people’s cinematic answer.  
Moderator: Where are Palestinians in this film? 
Fourth speaker: There are no Palestinians here. They are decorations at 
the end of the film, throwing stones, running around, lamenting on their 
deaths, etc.  
First speaker: Of course, Palestinians are there from the beginning. 
Turkey is saying that ‘look if you [Israel] treat our brothers like this, we 
will have to intervene in the situation in Palestine’.  
Second speaker: I don’t think there is this Muslim brotherhood here. Then, 
why Turkey is so quiet for Afghanistan or anywhere else?  
Third speaker: In here, there is this notion of standing for the oppressed.  
Sixth speaker: The situation in Syria is not good. Let’s see what Turkey is 
going to do about it.  
Second speaker: I think Turkey wants to say that ‘I am here’ in the Middle 
East. And Turkey wants to demonstrate that it is an active player in the 
Middle Eastern affairs. Turkey wants to say that I am an actor along with 
the US and Israel.  
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Third speaker: Israel claims that the land stretches from the Tigris to 
Egypt is promised to them. They call it ‘Promised Land’.  
Second speaker: Who promised that? 
Fourth speaker: Prophet Moses.  
Second speaker: So, our prophet promises us Jerusalem. What are we 
going to do now?  
Third speaker: These are the messages that the film reveals in every 
paragraph. This is what I think; I think that Jews are the headaches of the 
world since the beginning.  
Second speaker: They look like the Cin Cin kids [laughing]. 
Moderator: I did not get that? Who are they? 
Second speaker: Israelis [laughing]. 
 They explain to me that Cin Cin is a commonly known neighborhood in Ankara 
where there is a high rate of violent crime, lawlessness, high pollution, and chaos. 
People do not go there unless necessary. When they go there, they never lower their 
guard. In this neighborhood, no one needs no reason to be harassed, beaten or ribbed. 
Being there is enough to be attacked. Rationality has no place in this neighborhood nor 
do the residents of this place recognize law and order. Hence, participants relate Israel’s 
irresponsible behaviors (perhaps as the Turkish Prime Minister puts it ‘spoiled kid’) to 
that of Cin Cin residents.  
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The conversation, as in other focus groups, comes back to the military capability 
of Turkey and its use of military and diplomatic power to influence other state actors. 
The emphasis is that Turkey is not the same country as it was in the past. Turkey has 
progressed militarily, technologically and in economic matters. Participants think that 
Turkey may not be the only dominant actor in the Middle East but definitely it is a 
country that will not be by-passed by other states during any negotiations related to the 
Middle East. Participants also agreed that Turkey would not have become an active 
country if the AKP were not in power for several consecutive terms. Conversations led 
to a conclusion that participants find close links between the AKP’s conservative 
ideologies and Turkey’s current foreign affairs policies as evidence the attention given 
to Turkey’s position in the Middle East. They see Turkey as the only country that has 
this capability to be a dominant actor and potentials to become a leader among Muslim 
states.  
Second speaker: For instance, Arabs cannot deliver the help that 
Palestinians need.  
Fourth speaker: Never mind intervention, Arab states cannot even give a 
simple condemnation statement about Palestine. 
First speaker: Let’s not forget Recep Tayyip Erdogan effect.  
First speaker: Also we have to remember that when Israel annexes 
Palestine, all the natural resources will become Israel’s. This will mean 
that Israel will be the most powerful country in the region, which will 
ultimately clash with the interests of Turkey in the region.  
305 
 
Second speaker: It is not just R. Tayyip Erdogan effect. Turkish people are 
also behind Turkey’s Middle East policies.  
Second speaker: I think the AKP government would not support this film, 
if such a support for the ruling party was not there. Pana Film supports the 
AKP government and AKP supports the film company.  
Participants make connections between the filmmakers’ decision to make such a 
film and the current AKP government’s implicit support for such an idea. To them, this 
film would not be possible if the AKP was not in power. Next the following 
conversations highlight film’s possible effects on the viewers. Again, interpretations 
vary and different people view scenes differently but their interpretations coalesce to 
form similar patterns to be evaluated.  
Moderator: What scenes did you like the most or think were most 
effective?  
Second speaker: When Memati
30
 said ‘hi’ [laughing]. Polat’s conversation 
with an Israeli soldier at the border [Soldier: why did you come to Israel? 
Polat: I did not come to Israel, I came to Palestine].  
Fourth speaker: Israeli soldiers’ shooting randomly toward Palestinians 
looked real and effective.  
Moderator: Real means?  
                                                          
30
 Memati is a character that does not talk or smile. He communicates through his punches, shootings and 
killings. He has a very unique look on his face that fans say that he is definitely scary-looking even in the 
daylight. To many, he is a classic Turk, meaning that he is masculine and fights fearlessly.  
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Fourth speaker: I mean Israel does this all the time. They randomly open 
fire and kill people.  
Fifth speaker: Demolishing a Palestinian’s home top of the crippled boy.  
First speaker: I think the most realistic scene of the film was when Israeli 
soldiers closed the gate and did not allow anyone to enter inside including 
Jewish-American woman. These are the sorts of news reports that we 
always associate Israel with every day. They ignore the law and the whole 
world. By this, Israel means to say that ‘I am the law’.  I let in whoever I 
want.  
Moderator: What I understand from our conversation is that you have 
some preconceived knowledge about Israel prior to watching this film.   
Fourth speaker: Of course. 
First speaker: We know what Israel does to Palestinians. There are 
eyewitness videos on the internet. We don’t need to see Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine to understand Israel’s unjust treatment of the 
Palestinians.  
Second speaker: This film is just reminding us about the situation in 
Palestine again.   
First speaker: Additionally, not everyone can watch those eyewitness 
videos online because they are mostly very gross and violent. In contrast, 
this film explains the Palestinian drama with a watchable story. People 
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would not watch videos that are similar to those of the reality shows, but 
they watch narrated stories that are not so bloody or violent.   
The first speaker’s point is so valuable in a sense that effectiveness of news 
becomes higher when it is put in a socio-cultural context and decorated with 
background pictures and alluring sound system. Although, audiences can be skeptical 
about the film’s story and the way the story is portrayed, the main message will always 
be there for audiences to internalize wittingly or unwittingly. Related to this point, if 
one decides to go to a film such as VWP, he/she already shows some sort of 
acknowledgement of a selective exposure for ideological messages that are scattered in 
the film. As highlighted earlier, people watch films such as this to maintain and/or 
manifest their opinions about issues in a cinematic world.  People support such films 
when the messages overlap with their worldviews. 
9.8 A female group in Istanbul  
This focus group, in part, differs from other discussion groups. This group comprised of 
participants that were college educated and female. Since two other female participants 
did not show up, the group discussion continued with three people. This group brought 
new dimensions to the film discussions by highlighting the different aspects of the film. 
This new perspective might be result of the gendered culture that has been embedded in 
Turkish society for many years. Their interpretations of several scenes and dialogues 
differed from those of male participants’ interpretation. They paid greater attention to 
emotional conversations and sensuous actions that were not brought up in other focus 
group discussions. Words like ‘crying, worrying, sad, funny, children, women, violence, 
etc. overwhelmingly dominated the conversation. However, the difference in their 
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interpretations did not contradict the insights from other groups. Rather female 
participants touched on different aspects of audience reception complementing the other 
interpretations. Without essentialazing gendered differences in decoding cultural text, 
this group’s comments enriched the study.  
Emotional moments dominated much the conversation here. The following 
exchange was in response to my question of ‘how did you find the film’? Participants 
immediately begun talking about a scene wherein the disabled boy gives his necklace to 
Polat and tells him that as long as he wears that necklace he will be protected (the boy 
believes that his necklace protects the carrier as it protected him). As it confirms the 
boy’s prophecy, Polat escapes from a near-death situation but the boy cannot. And 
because of the flashbacks, these two events appear to be happening at the same time.  
First speaker: Aaa! That scene was terrible. That is when I cried.  
Second speaker: Polat escaped from a certain death when exactly the boy 
died.  
First speaker: What happened to that woman [Simone]? I thought there 
was going to be a romance developing [between Polat and Simone] 
[laughing].  
Third speaker: I thought the same. Maybe a kiss at the end [laughing].  
First speaker: Did they arrive to Turkey safe? [The film does not include 
this part.]  
Second speaker: They returned after they killed Moshe.  
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First speaker: I felt really sorry for death of Palestinian Abdullah too.  
Second speaker: Even if he survived, life would not be too good for him.  
Moderator: Why? 
Second speaker: Because his mother died, the boy died; probably no one 
left from his family.  
First speaker: Really, I felt sorry for the Palestinians. I cannot believe that 
Israel can demolish homes just like that without paying any attention to if 
there is anybody inside [Actually, film makes the point that Moshe wanted 
to kill the boy like that.] 
Third speaker: I did not understand this ‘Promised Land’ concept. Is it 
lawful?  
First speaker: The Promised Land idea is in their book. It is a religious 
order.  
A disruption occurs and participants move on talking about Polat and his men’s 
adventure as they rescue prisoners from the Israeli jail.  
First speaker: What was that shooting in the prison? It was so funny.  
Third speaker: With four people, they destroyed the whole army of guards 
[laughing].  
First speaker: But similar scenes are in American films too.  
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Second speaker: Yes, there are. Why there should be a problem when 
there are shown in Turkish films?  
First speaker: For example, I watch an American series, 24. The 
protagonists never die there either, and they save the world too.  
Moderator: What message would you think there are in this film?  
First speaker: This is a one-sided story. It tells what Palestinians go 
through every day, how Israel occupies Palestinian lands and how the 
human rights in Palestine are ignored by Israelis. However, I believe in the 
story that this film tells. Even though American and Israel media try to 
cover up what really happens in Palestine, leaks on the internet disclose 
the reality there. In this film, how Israeli soldiers beat Palestinian kids, 
how the soldiers demolish or burn Palestinian homes, and how they 
imprison Palestinian men, women and children indiscriminately are 
explained nicely.    
Third speaker: To test a bullet, Moshe kills a driver. This scene was 
terrible. This was another way of saying that Palestinians are inferior, even 
lower than animals. It [Moshe’s action] means to say that this land is ours 
and even whole world for that matter. I think this is the mentality by 
which a Jewish person is raised.  
 Conversation continues on the identity politics and perceptions of others by 
defining who Israelis are and people’s relations to their holy book and geography. 
Participants make the point that how religion, politics and place all intertwined in the 
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conceptualization of the ‘holy land’. The premise of the politics, hence, is to protect the 
land because it is promised by God for the people of Israel.    
First speaker: They merged their religion into the political system. I don’t 
think the real Judaism is like that but they are educated this way. For 
example, the entire Palestinian land belongs to Israelis. They can do 
anything they want to. Even if there are errors in the film, Valley of the 
Wolves-Palestine successfully shed lights into the core of this issue. Israel 
is very successful with advocating the idea that Palestine belongs to 
Israelis all around the world. This film challenges this propaganda.  
Second speaker: Israelis relate everything to their holy book, their 
geography, or history. I think the film objectively shows this problematic 
relationship. 
Third speaker: They [Israelis] don’t treat non-Jewish as a human being.  
Second speaker: To my understanding, this Jewishness is beyond borders, 
books and the law. This film sophisticatedly explains privileges of being 
Jewish.  
Moderator: Is this film about Judaism, then? 
Second speaker: To me, this film is produced in relation to the Mavi 
Marmara attack.  
First speaker: I evaluate the film in terms of being a part of the Greater 
Middle East project. This film points out the project in which America’s 
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and Israel’s framing about Turkey and the Middle East become obvious. 
This is what this film is trying to shed light on. When I watched this film, 
the 9/11 event, Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the Palestine conflict came 
to my mind.  
Participants in the conversation above, like other group discussions, understand 
that filmic representations are parallel to the ongoing geopolitics in Palestine. It can be 
argued that the filmmakers closely monitor the world events to deploy them into the 
cinema products. This ultimately makes the viewers believe that the Pana Film’s action-
political films are factual and reflective of true events. The participants then make 
interesting connections between the cinema settings in the film and cultural reflections 
of those settings in real life especially concerning the place of women in the reel and 
real locations.  
Moderator: Have you noticed gender roles in the film? 
First speaker: Of course [laughing]. 
Second speaker: Men are macho and women worry about security 
[laughing].  
First speaker: For example, that woman’s [Simone] panicked behaviors 
and her untimely and improper demands perfectly match with our female 
characteristics. Her hesitant actions such as her walking out into the dark 
and coming back into the house, her crying out to get out of the car but 
being scared to do it, all, resemble us. I mean her indecisiveness and 
perfect ability to create trouble for others looks like us [laughing].  
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Third speaker: Also in Abdullah’s home, women and men were sitting 
separately. One of the women was standing to serve, and men were sitting 
and eating separately from women. All these pictures remind me of the 
eastern culture.  
Second speaker: We see this in Turkey too.  
First speaker: Yes, but this sort of culture is mostly associated with the 
eastern part of Turkey. Women always work and men always eat type of 
culture [laughing]. For instance, Polat’s ordering that woman to ‘sit down’ 
was so interesting [laughing]. I think we like macho men [laughing].   
Second speaker: But Abdullah was a very nice father.  
First speaker: These scenes are not so unfamiliar to us.  
Third speaker: In our culture too, women are the ones who serve at home 
and nurture the family. 
Moderator: Do you think that the Palestine issue became a Turkish issue 
now? 
Second speaker: With the AKP government, yes! We can say that. Turkey 
supported the Palestinian cause in the past too, but this time it was the 
AKP that clearly transformed the Palestinian issue into Turkey’s internal 
politics.  
First speaker: I think the difference between this government and the 
others is very easily distinguished because the former strongly referenced 
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religion more than the latter. Of course, because of the new developments 
in the Arab states, it would be surprising if we did not see Turkey’s 
footprints in the Middle East. The AKP would want to satisfy its 
constituency by focusing on the Middle East. We know that majority of 
those who voted for the AKP also support Palestinian cause actively, and 
they want Turkey to be a part of this cause. We all saw that R. Tayyip 
Erdogan’s Davos scolding brought great support for the AKP in the last 
election. Of course, the AKP, too, sees this opportunity.  
Moderator: How would you describe the film? 
First speaker: There was no emphasis on Turkishness in the film.  
Second speaker: First of all, this was an action film; of course, there were 
some politics.  
Third speaker: It was not solely an action film. There were excellent 
messages too.  
First speaker: I don’t think this film was completely anti-Israel. It seems 
to be a film that tells about Palestinian lives.  
Third speaker: It is a film that carries the Palestinian issue into the cinema.  
Second speaker: There are these action and reality dimensions, but 
definitely there are funny parts to make it a ‘hahaha film’! 
First speaker: To me, the film’s location settings look very realistic. For 
example, the Palestinian side looks so ruined and streets appear terrible. 
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This picture does not contradict the picture that I see on the news and the 
internet. I mean the film scenes matched with what I imagine Palestine in 
my mind eighty percent, if not hundred percent. In other words, nasty 
homes, dirty streets and the 24/7 presence of Israeli security check points 
are correct depictions.  
Third speaker: But the Israeli side was very orderly: clean streets and 
beautiful homes. Even one house has a pool.  
First speaker: Also there was sandy roads and dry climate like the real 
geography of Palestine.  
Noticeably in the conversation above, the meaning of reality for participants is 
gauged by how similar the filmic depictions of place, people, culture and events are to 
those of the depictions on television, internet or in other forms of media. When the 
representations of places and events showed material and characteristic congruent with 
the participants’ mental map of those places and events, then the film’s scenes and 
stories are thought to be more authentic.  
9.9 Summary  
This chapter explores negotiated spectatorship by examining seven different groups 
within Turkish society to discuss the meanings drawn from VWP. Their interpretations 
of the film create an interesting map of spectatorship indicating that their engagement 
with the text was critical and complex. At the first glance, it can be said that audience 
reading of the film varied depending on their socio-cultural background and their level 
of exposure time to the Valley of the Wolves cinema products (both the television and 
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film series). For example, female focus group participants paid more attention to the 
emotional and sensitive aspects of the film settings compared to the mostly male focus 
group participants. Again, individuals who had followed the Valley of the Wolves 
cinema products for a longer time engaged in in-depth analysis and intertextual 
readings. Despite the participants’ educational and location differences, some 
commonalities exist that support the idea of shared understandings within their 
readings. These readings suggest that the film’s geopolitical messages overtly reflect of 
those of the current AKP government and the opinions of the public in general. People 
also display some pre-conceived views toward Israel that favor the Palestinian cause. 
Additionally, the discussions with different participants reveal that the rhetoric of the 
film can be closely identified with the rhetoric of the practical geopolitics, in terms of 
the relative power of the states and their interactions.  
It should be noted that the participants’ reading of the film is a critical and 
negotiated one, despite their varied educational and cultural backgrounds. Participants 
reject some of the encoded messages while welcoming others. It is also clear that in 
their meaning-making processes, audiences’ engagement with the film was active and 
negotiated, indicating that the participants actively challenge the film’s authenticity and 
representation of people, place and events.   
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
First and most, I must acknowledge that the study findings that I highlight here in this 
chapter should be read within the constraints of doing audience research. This means 
that, any sweeping generalizations made in this dissertation must be taken cautiously. In 
this study, I never claim to be capturing the essence of encoding and decoding processes 
in their totality. The conclusions of this study are subject to misinterpretations and the 
complexity of sustaining fluid audience interpretations thus lessons from this study 
should be taken limited in scope.  
 This chapter summarizes the findings of this study by joining the major 
conclusions of each chapter and analyzing the results in a broader context of the 
literature review on geography of film, critical geopolitics, and audience geography. 
Additionally, in this chapter the theoretical contributions and limitations of the study 
will be discussed in relation to the body of geopolitics and audience geography 
literature. There will also be a brief introduction to ‘what is next’.  
10.1 Geography of film: Revisited  
Everyday, as the world becomes more and more visual and transparent, films becomes 
an important part of our socio-cultural life. Thus they are not only the elements of 
communication and entertainment but also the codes and reference points that 
contribute to our ability to understanding our world and what surrounds it. Films 
provide clues of how human experiences become meaningful. Therefore, they are 
powerful and convincing enough to re-present the reality of life (theater as life), and 
powerful and convincing enough to create reality re-produced from geographic 
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representations, imaginations and mythologies (life as image) (Duncan and Duncan 
1992). As in other forms of arts, films can cleverly reproduce or liquidate the traditional 
values of the socio-cultural heritage and geographic representations. As films tell 
something about who we are (are not) and what the world is supposed to be, they 
simultaneously serve to strengthen, rationalize, or challenge the importance of our 
traditional values and social structures. In other words, as a medium of communication, 
films tend to deconstruct traditional values and the culture of imagining while 
simultaneously the naturalizing political dimensions of real life in the eyes of observers 
(Monaco 2009). 
The theoretical framework of this study comes from critical geopolitical 
thinking, which has dominated the subfield of political geography since the early 1990s 
with work from scholars such as (Toal 1994, Agnew 2002, Sharp 1996, Dodds 2006, 
Dittmer 2010). These and other geographers’ inquiry in popular culture and its 
representations of place, space and people derive mainly from post-structural 
perspectives. Geographers believe that popular cultural products such as films, cartoons, 
magazines, and books are an important part of geographical investigation. These 
cultural artifacts influence the way we think of ourselves, our relations with others, 
nature, and the way the world operates. In other words, popular culture informs us of 
who we are, how we got to be that way, and then provide clues to the answers. As Said 
notes, geography is not always about soldiers and cannons but also about ideas, about 
forms, about images and imaginations (Said 1978). In the same context, ideas, images 
and imaginations have geographical consequences.  Thus, through our everyday 
consumption of mass and popular productions, we engage with geographical 
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representations and spatial identity constructions, which, in essence, is very 
geopolitical. In this sense, the Turkish film VWP becomes an important geopolitical text 
that influences people, places, and events in multiple ways. Through the consumption of 
such geopolitical texts, Turkish audiences engage with different ways of place 
construction, identity formation, and geopolitical representations.  
Through this research effort I sought to answer the question of what Turkish 
people make of the film VWP. Specifically, I wanted to explore how the film influenced 
their thinking about themselves and others, their geographic imaginations, and 
understanding of Turkey’s geopolitical positions within the Middle East in the post 9/11 
world. To do this, three sites of the film: production, message (text), and reception 
(consumption) were investigated. A mixed-method approach was utilized including two 
interviews, seven focus group discussions, internet comments from fans, and an online 
survey with 359 respondents. Collected data, in general, showed that Turkish audiences’ 
reading of the film is diverse but some commonalities were found.  
10.2 Geopolitical imaginations and geographical representations 
Inspired from post-structural studies, critical geopolitics highlights the importance of 
language, culture and socio-political structures. All of these aspects are a constructed 
form of knowledge that helps us understand who we are (who we are not), our place in 
the world, and our relations with the surrounding world. This critical body of work 
emphasizes the way we think about our world and our relations with other places, 
peoples, and events   and how they are produced and shaped through everyday 
discourses and our practices. Film, in this sense, becomes the focal point for forming 
and reforming these everyday discourses, which, in turn, becomes a tool to help us 
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legitimize these socially constructed ways of looking and understanding the world. 
Needless to say, these everyday discourses and practices are primarily ideological, 
political and geographical, but by no mean they are neutral or natural. Therefore, 
cinema as a language and culture force us view places in the world through certain 
lenses that shapes our geopolitical imaginations and geographical representations. These 
discursive engagements, in exchange, have geopolitical implications and particularities. 
For instance, the film VWP tells more about Turkey and Turkish geopolitics than it does 
about Palestine and Palestinians or even Israel.  A critical reading of the film reveals 
that in a cinematic meaning, the film is largely referencing Turkey and its animosity 
toward Israel. Regarding this point of view, in Chapter 5 I argued that the film VWP 
should be situated in three forms of analysis: as a geopolitical text, as a counter-
geopolitical text, and cinema text wherein genre politics and a vigilante hero become 
dominant characters. The film favors a particular kind of geopolitical imagination of the 
Turkish people, and the government, which helps the audiences understand Turkey’s 
geopolitical location in the current developments in the Middle East. Therefore, it is the 
influence of the images and identities in the film that help Turkish people orient 
themselves in a chaotic and uncertain world and assist to level the playing field for state 
apparatuses to inscribe their national narratives and regional policies. Thus the film and 
consumption of it is as much about understanding the Palestinian struggle as it is about 
re-presenting and re-orienting Turkey and its geopolitical position in the Middle East. 
Similarly, the genre of the film and the character Polat Alemdar becomes an 
indispensable factor that helps to reproduce Turkey’s image at home and its geopolitics 
within the region. The politics and the character represented by Polat and his men, 
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immediately prioritizes Turkey’s ethno-religious national identity (Turk-Islam) and 
either wittingly or unwittingly assist with legitimizing the current government AKP’s 
conservative foreign policies and national narratives in the minds of everyday people. 
The film tells the audiences that these characters are the real heroes and their 
extraordinariness derives from being Turks and Muslims. Despite its nationalistic tone, 
the VWP also represents an important geopolitical text that overtly contests the 
legitimacy of Israel’s territoriality and the concepts of home and homeland.   For 
instance, throughout the film Polat reaffirms where the borders of Israeli’s home and 
homeland begin and end through his conversations. Polat also frequently verifies the 
notion that Palestine does not belong to Israel; it is Israel that occupies the Palestinian 
home and homeland. By doing this, VWP engages in territorial correction and attempts 
to re-draw the map of Palestine and its boundaries. The film is very critical, opposing 
dominantly produced and consumed geopolitical discourses about Palestine and 
Palestinians by different matrices of power (Israel and the West) other than Palestinians 
themselves. In Chapter 6, the interview with the scriptwriter gives clues regarding who 
might be part of this power matrix.  
To further this study, the voice of the production site of the film was included to 
better understand the dynamics of the meaning-making process at different levels. To 
do this, two interviews were conducted. In both interviews, mainly, three important 
arguments were highlighted. First, both interviewees defensively argued that Palestine 
is the proverbial ‘bleeding wound’ in the middle of Muslim geography. They argued, 
little has been done to heal this wound. According to these interviewees, it is in 
everyone’s interest, and obligation for that matter, to shed light on this global problem; 
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therefore, visualizing this human crisis is the right thing to do. Second, these 
interviewees agreed that understanding the vitality of popular culture as a ‘soft power’ 
is essential. Moreover, the importance of mobilizing this power for the benefits of 
Turkey and Turkish geopolitics in the Middle East as well as in different regions is a 
crucial task. Similarly, the third argument highlighted that cinema in terms of its choice 
of topic, technological aspects, politics of representations, and geographical limit should 
be understood within the given country’s political, economic, and cultural conditions 
and positioning in the geopolitical world map. In this regard, Turkish cinema, 
particularly the conservative cinema, shows elements of ideological similarities with the 
recent developments in Turkey. They think that as socio-economic conditions in the 
Middle East and Turkey have changed in the last decade, Turkey became more 
extraverted, as well as, a more economically and politically self-confident country in 
relation to its culture of art and cinema. Thus, within these changing socio-political 
dynamics, Turkish cinema opened new horizons in the film-making and became a new 
wave of change not only within Turkish society, but also culturally familiar 
geographies.  From this vantage point, VWP should be interpreted without isolating it 
from these changing social, cultural, economic, and political dynamics in Turkey in the 
last decade.  
As indicated in Chapter 6, these two interviews provide geopolitical codes of 
meaning making and important clues to identifying media’s role in Turkish society. 
These interviewees acknowledge that socio-political changes in Turkey greatly 
influenced what media, cinema in particular, can do and should do for societies in the 
current geopolitical conjuncture. With this, they generally desire to deploy a normative 
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task for cinema and popular culture. In other words, cinema for these people stands to 
be an important tool to enlighten people about their historical and geographical realities, 
to alter opinions and perceptions of millions, and to mobilize millions toward more 
ethno-religious political worldviews. For this reason, cinema is not and should not be 
understood as solely a form of art or a piece of entertainment. Rather, cinema should be 
more didactic, enlightening, and normative. Cinema cannot ignore nations’ socio-
political problems or turn its back to oppressed geographies of people. Indeed, cinema 
should not only visualize these socio-political problems, but also take sides to make 
visceral changes on the ground. If cinema cannot reverse these geographical inequalities 
and oppressions completely, it at least can inform millions about these problems. In the 
eyes of these interviewees, cinema is the rehearsal of realities and the materialization of 
geopolitical imaginations.  
Chapter 5 is constructed to be a critical reading of the film text. In Chapter 7, I 
furthered my investigation of the film by conducting an online survey with 359 
participants via Facebook to better understand the relationships between the text and the 
readers. In this chapter, descriptive results of the survey are laid out to get a sense of 
what common threads could be drawn out of the audiences’ responses regarding their 
meaning-making process. This chapter also highlights the validity of quantitative 
methods in using audience interpretations in order to better understand general 
characteristics of readership and their interpretations of a text within a constrained 
environment. The results of this study reveals that deviation between quantitative 
(survey) and qualitative (focus group and online comment discussions) is relatively 
slight in terms of audiences’ reading the filmic text. For example, the survey results 
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showed that the Turkish people’s negative opinions about Israel are generally the same 
among those who watched the film VWP and those who did not. Similarly, comments 
from the focus group discussions and online fan comments indicated that, in general, 
Turkish people have a negative view of Israel regardless of their social background. 
Indeed, this negative image toward Israel among Turkish people has much to do with an 
already-damaged Turkey-Israel relationship stemming from the 2008 Gaza (Israel’s 
offensive bombing of Gaza) and the events following. In support of this assessment, 
respondents to the survey, participants of the focus groups and the online film fans 
indicated that the VWP did not change their views toward Israel or Palestine. 
Participants in this study repeatedly and overwhelmingly expressed that their negative 
opinions toward Israel stayed the same. However, this does not mean that Turkish 
people’s readings of the film are identical. Indeed, their reaction to the film and 
interpretations of Turkey-Israel, Israel-Palestine, and Turkey-Palestine relations differed 
in many ways. Again, perception of Israel among Turkish people did not greatly differ 
between those who saw the film and those who did not see it. This outcome supports the 
idea that Turkish people had pre-conceived notions toward Israel, its policies toward 
Palestine and its geopolitical position within the Middle East. However, I have to note 
that respondents did not need to see the film VWP to appreciate what the Valley of the 
Wolves is all about. This is one of the reasons that I needed to pay a serious attention to 
the television series establishing Valley of the Wolves and Polat Alemdar phenomena 
among Turkish public.  
As mentioned earlier, a key data source for this research was gathered through 
fan comments, coordinated through an online discussion forum, sinemalar.com. 
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Audience readings within this online discussion forum can be categorized in two ways: 
those who embraced the film as a monument of bravery against the power of Zionism 
and as those who rejected the film in terms of its butchering the artistic side of the film-
making at the expense of conveying political messages. It should be noted that the latter 
group did not discard the film massages completely but rejected the film-makers’ 
mindset for not respecting cinema as a form of art. After closely surveying of comments 
on this online discussion forum, it should be also noted that the film fans possessed 
valid knowledge of the Valley of the Wolves phenomenon which has dominated the 
Turkish cinema culture for years. Their film readings and analysis of the film’s 
conjectural roles in Turkish society were significant. Another important point that can 
be drawn from commenters’ discussion is that some fans were uncomfortable the way 
the filmmakers portrayed Palestinians in the film. They were agitated by the fact that 
the film treats Palestinians as the Other while prioritizing Turkish bravery and heroism. 
In other words, the film implicitly (if not explicitly) engages in orientalizing Palestine, 
identifying the Palestinian case as the new white man’s burden. In this respect, I can say 
that commenters did not easily adopt the film’s goal (to visualize the Palestinian 
struggle) as a noble action, as the producers intended. In this sense, fan comments in 
this forum were exclusively enriching for this study not only because their comments 
were well articulated, but also because these comments were a part of audience 
interpretations that were made without any fabricated environment or any interference 
from the researcher.  
Focus group discussions conducted for this study also offer important insights 
for mapping out Turkish people’s interpretations of the film and provide clues for why 
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the film should be situated within the geopolitical moments mainly shaped by the 
current Turkish government, AKP. Here, attention is paid to the intertexuality of the 
film and its readership. Semi-structured and intense conversations with various group of 
people showed that a cinematic text could be read in many different ways depending on 
the readers’ social, cultural, educational, political backgrounds as well as socio-political 
conditions within which the film is produced. The socio-political conditions of the 
readership influenced their meaning-making process, which is also seen to be 
contingent to geographical and historical conditions that initially made the text possible. 
As a result, the audiences are influenced by socio-cultural dynamics of given time and 
space, but their readings are by no mean are inseparable or free from the social 
structures that give shape to Turkish society. For example, discussions made with 
student focus groups in Istanbul and Ankara showed that their engagement with the film 
and their understanding of what this film means in contemporary Turkish geopolitics, to 
some extent, varied from other researched groups’ understanding. The student groups 
highlighted that the film should be interpreted within the changing socio-political 
context brought about by the current AKP government. They found a close correlation 
between the AKP policies and the messages of the film. Moreover, student groups 
focused their attentions to the Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s regional agendas 
and the possible influences of Turkish cultural products exported abroad mainly the 
Middle East. It should be noted that visible cooperation between the government and 
conservative cinema has been emphasized by other focus group discussants as well. 
Generally, people understood that this film could have not been made if the Turkish 
government was not under the control of Islamic-leaning AKP. The consensus was that 
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the political ideology of conservative cinema was supported by the Islamic-leaning 
capital in Anatolia (discussed in earlier chapters) and the AKP government whose 
political agendas overlapped and fed one another (cinema, government, and the 
Anatolian capital). Parallel to this statement, the survey response to the question “do 
you believe that the film mirrored the current government’s Middle East policies?” 
showed that 50 percent of the respondents agreed that the government’s Middle East 
policies are reflected in the film. This conclusion generalizes the viewers’ familiarity 
with the intertextual frames: “a knowledge of film language at its present point of 
development and a understanding of appropriate narrative conventions” (Aitken and 
Zonn 1994, p. 5).   
Students also highlighted that through this film, the Palestinian issue no longer 
became strictly an Arab issue. To them, this film demonstrated that Palestine is not just 
an official topic but part of the public discourse and geopolitical imagination. 
Additionally, the student participants understood that film VWP is a continuation of the 
conservative cinema that is often associated with being protective of cultural values, 
beliefs and social norms. For them, this film undertook the role to educate people about 
regional geopolitics and historical realities from a Turkish perspective, while enforcing 
traditional ways of life as well as legitimizing sanctity of the Turkish state.  
The focus group research organized from private employees in Ankara and the 
government employees in Istanbul primarily discussed the particularities of Turkey’s 
place in the Middle East. Private-sector-employees continually emphasized that Turkey 
holds a special position in the region in terms of its military, economic, cultural and 
geographic dynamics. For them, Turkey has always been apart of the chess game of 
328 
 
some ‘other’ external international powers. For this reason, a film such as VWP 
becomes critical for enlightening people about geopolitical dangers that surround the 
state and the region. Not surprisingly, this group, unlike other groups, continually 
referenced Turkey’s military capabilities and the ability to mobilize its armed forces 
when needed. For this group, success means the ability of defeating possible attacks 
from (outside) states that have interests in the region. Therefore, a weak US or Israel 
means an advantaged Turkey, while a plausibly weak Turkey means advantaged 
‘others’. Furthermore, the private employees and to some extent the government 
employees, talked about various conspiracy theories that surround Turkey. For example, 
Israeli citizens’ buying vast lands in the southeastern region of Turkey indicates that 
Israel is seriously committed to establishing the ‘Greater Israel’ soon. If this project 
does not take shape by force, Israel will complete it during peace times. The United 
States, as an important supporter of Israel, is behind this project and an active player of 
this secret plan. Thus, the collection of Valley of the Wolves cinema products actively 
seeks to uncover these secret projects and the codes of the geopolitical chess games 
played in the Middle East. To these groups, the film VWP should be read in terms of its 
messages and warnings given, rather than focusing on its artistic qualities. The film then 
becomes a great source of understanding Turkey’s geopolitical visions. Beside its 
informative role, the film again becomes an opposing discourse against the Hollywood 
culture industry for the government employees. The film’s scenario becomes an 
alternative to Israel-US favored scenarios with its Hollywood-level artistic qualities and 
filmic effects. The film for this group is a cinematic challenge to dominate 
representations of the Muslim geographies envisioned by the Western cinema.  
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A discussion with private sector employees in the province of Van revealed 
similar results with other discussion groups. But the noticeable argument of this group 
about the film was that the film turned out to be a tasteless, action-comedy film. To 
them, filmmakers sacrificed the filmic quality for the sake of getting the message 
across. This group indicated that they understood the intended message, but did not 
appreciate the exchange of quality with the message. These two fundamental elements 
of the film could have been achieved at the same time, but they said Polat and his men 
lacked this artistic quality. For them, the message is suffocated in exaggerated action 
scenes. Violent ways of representing the Palestinian cause was unnecessary and 
harmful. This group highlighted that no representation is better than a bad 
representation, and this film did an inadequate job. They concluded that they did not 
need to see this film to understand what really goes on in Palestine. Indeed, they noted 
that what the film portrayed was limited. They commented that Israel’s oppression in 
Palatine likely exceeds the film-makers’ imaginations.  
Family group discussions, on the other hand, approached the film as seriously 
funny cinematic parody. The extraordinariness of the film’s characters and comedic 
nature of conversations in the film became the first noticeable characteristic of the film 
by this group. As I was watching the film with this group, laughter became louder and 
louder, especially, when Polat and his men mutated themselves into the characters of 
the film Matrix (1999). Their laugh was not a mysterious one, at all. They laughed 
because Polat Alemdar character is portrayed in the film superior than Superman, 
tougher than Rambo and smarter than James Bond. He and his men became men of 
comedy as they seriously participate in serious actions in Israel. Focus group viewers 
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laughed as these men run from danger to danger similar to those of animation 
characters.  However, the conversations became serious when I asked them about the 
quality of the film and its messages. They interpreted the film within its genre and 
found that the film is reasonable and justifiable as far as the action-film genre is 
concerned. The Rambo (1985) genre, for example, was brought up to be compared with 
VWP. After a critical assessment of Rambo, viewers found the film logical and Polat’s 
extraordinariness and immortality fitting with the genre. Viewers also highlighted that 
the essence of the film, which is to portray what is going on in Palestine should be 
recognized. They argued that the film was essentially made to send political messages 
and that these messages were recognizable. Of course, this is not to say that the entire 
group of participants agreed on this aspect of the film altogether. Within each group, 
participants continued to challenge each other’s assessments of the film as well as 
agreed on other matters.  
Unlike the comments made by other focus group participants, the all-female 
group mainly circled around emotional aspects of the film’s sensuous scenes and 
conversations.   Words such as crying, worrying, sad, funny, children, violence, and 
love overwhelmingly dominated their conversation. This is not to essentialize social 
gender role in the meaning-making process; rather it is to pay close attention to the role 
of culture and emotional practices that are rendered in the filmic readership. Participants 
of this group were highly aware of women’s cultural roles deployed in the film, but 
their reactions to these kinds of typifications were casual and absent from a serious 
criticism. For example, one of the participants made this comment referring to Polat’s 
commanding voice to the women character in the film: “I think we like macho man”. 
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Other participants responded to her by laughing. This anecdote can make us think that 
the filmmakers’ choice to include such conversations in the film may not be completely 
irrational or irrelevant to what reactions female viewers recognize when a woman 
character is present in filmic life. I argue that this is frankly calculated inscription of 
gender relations aimed to maintain dominantly viewed socio-cultural relations between 
genders by the filmmakers.  This is not a statement of I know better, but it is my 
observation that this film is another collection of many other Turkish films that portray 
women’s subordination to culture and men (of that culture), and present these 
problematic relations as natural and everyday practicality of Turkish life.  
10.3 Contextualizing audience: Cartographies of textual reading 
This study broadly utilized Hall’s encoding and decoding model, which is understood to 
be a theoretical criticism for the notion that mass communication is a structured activity, 
and as a consequence of it institutions which produce the messages do have power to set 
agendas and to define issues. As an attempt to take the reception studies forward, Hall’s 
model highlighted that a) “the same event can be encoded in more than one way”, b) 
“the message always contains more than one potential reading”, which is not to say that 
the reader is left with unlimited reading of the message, but is to say that readings 
remain polysemic, and c) “understanding the message is always a problematic practice” 
(as cited in Morley 1999, ¶ 8), which means that different readings of the same text is 
always available and inevitable. According to his model, when audiences engage in 
reading the message they communicate the message in three different ways: audiences 
take the message in the same way as it is encoded, they negotiate the meaning, or they 
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read the message within some alternative framework of reference in oppositional 
manner.  
Similar to Hall’s framework model to formulate audience interpretations, this 
study highlights that ‘negotiated’, ‘oppositional’ and ‘dominant’ ways of readership is 
also present in the meaning-making of the Turkish film VWP. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, some Turkish audiences understand that the film is a cinematic challenge to 
Israel’s Middle Eastern policies while others see the film as an ethno-religious narrative 
that operates within the limits of political economy and agenda setting. Also a large 
number of people indicate that they understand the essence of the message in the film, 
which is to visualize the Palestinian drama, but they oppose the ways in which the 
message is represented.   
As discussed in several chapters in this study, Turkish audiences do not 
submissively internalize the message but they actively question the text and attempt to 
read it within current geopolitical conjuncture. Unlike claims of textual determination of 
earlier reception studies, this study notes that the viewers of VWP actively create their 
own meaning instead of waiting to be overcome by the elite-produced meaning, say, to 
dysfunction audiences’ ability to read the text differently. Repeatedly, participants of 
this study indicated that they made their own interpretations of the film. However, this 
is not to mean that interpretations or decodings never reflect, or are not reflected by, 
“the code and discourses… [and] the socially governed distribution of cultural codes” 
(Morley and Brunsdon 1999, p. 134). As Livingstone notes, since people communicate 
through similar symbols, metaphors, and signs, even though they live in distance 
geographies, their textual interpretations and meaning-making process can show 
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similarities and overlap (Livingstone 2005a). For instance, conservative people in 
Turkey make sense of the film VWP differently than those who are not conservative. 
Cultural consumption cannot be an isolated activity nor can it be beyond socially 
produced cultural boundaries. As Dittmer argues, our experiences and interpretations of 
a text are always connected to our social networks and identity (Dittmer 2010).  
As Dittmer states, studying audience and contextualizing the meaning-making 
process is complex and daunting. He points out that research conducted on audiences’ 
engagement with cultural texts indicate two principle problems: theoretical and 
practical.  He argues that interpretations are diverse and hard to pin down. As an 
example, he asks the question of how one can uncover this complexity and then 
generalize about it to draw conclusions (Dittmer 2010). Undoubtedly, his point of 
questioning the difficulties of contextualizing audience is valid and this study is not an 
exception. However, Dittmer’s point should not be understood in the sense that 
interpretations of a text are infinite, or boundless. In this study I also make the claim 
that there are no unlimited interpretations of a text or audiences are completely 
imprisoned within already-produced message cells and are passive consumers of 
imposed messages. Furthermore, I argue that cultural consumptions of popular 
productions are our everyday practices and important vehicles of communicating 
messages, which are produced, circulated, and given meanings by sets of different 
socio-cultural experiences, including both structures and agents. Therefore, there are 
some levels of autonomy embedded within the act of consumption of popular culture 
that are private and personal. However, there are some levels of identical practices of 
consuming which are observable and can be investigated but with a very circumspect 
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manner when drawing conclusions. In other words, there is a finite amount of 
interpretations of the geopolitical messages because of audiences’ geo-cultural 
dispositions and preconceived notions.  Nevertheless, this study contains many lapses 
and limitations in terms of practicality of executing methodologies of interpretation, 
contextualizing Turkish audience, and mapping out people’s geopolitical imaginations 
via investigating a single film.  
10.4 Research limitations and contributions 
This research acknowledges several limitations that are worth mentioning here. The first 
limitation of the study is that of investigating Turkish people’s geopolitical 
imaginations via a single film. Although other cinema productions of Pana Film are 
included in the analysis to better understand audiences’ engagement with the film VWP, 
the question of how much can be uncovered from studying audiences’ interpretation and 
their meaning-making process through a single film remains challenging and difficult. 
A second limitation comes from the methodology of investigating audience geography. 
Determining what methodology is more suited to investigate one’s interpretations of a 
film in a given time and space also remains problematic and thought-provoking. Even 
though I used mixed-method (qualitative and quantitative) to address this difficulty, I 
still believe that in order to reach a broader categorizations, it requires a careful re-
evaluation and re-thinking ways in which the methodology is approached, especially 
when it comes to assessing individuals’ opinions. Mapping out audiences’ 
interpretations and their geopolitical imaginations is daunting because they are partially 
personal, private, and temporal. For example, this study is conducted within a year after 
the Mavi Marmara incident occurred. During this time, Turkish people’s negative 
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reaction to Israel was at its peak, and the Turkish media’s handling of the post-Mavi 
Marmara was very much sided. Given this political and emotional atmosphere, 
outcomes of a study such as this could change if the same study would have been 
conducted in a different time. Hence, drawing conclusions and making grand 
generalizations about viewers’ film interpretations resemble walking through a 
minefield for students of audience studies. Another limitation of this study included 
determining the sample size and sectoral quantity of the participants. Although the 
question of ‘how many is better’ is another subject matter of debate, reaching out to a 
select number of people from various cultural, social and political backgrounds can 
affect possible outcome of the research. In other words, representativeness of the group 
sampling was a crucial task for this audience study. For this reason, this study included 
various group members from different backgrounds and geographies; however, for 
some focus groups, sampling was not adequate. In this respect, even one can argue that 
this study mainly is an attempt to map ‘male’ geopolitical imaginations given the 
weight of gender participation in the study. For this reason, further studies on audience 
need to balance gender inputs as well as other socio-cultural fragmentations in Turkish 
society.  
Even with its limitations, this study offers several contributions to the literature 
in critical geopolitics, Turkish geopolitics and geography of film and audience studies 
in general. The first contribution of this study is that this research constitutes a more 
consumption-oriented (compared to a textual analysis of) film interpretation. 
Additionally, this research provides a recent geographical inquiry that investigates the 
interrelations between a film and geopolitical representations and imaginations. As 
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Aitken and Zonn note “the impact of a film on an audience can mold social, cultural, 
and environmental experiences. Clearly, a research direction focused on the production 
and consumption of space and place in cinema deserves serious geographic attention” 
(Aitken and Zonn 1994, p. 5). Hence, this research becomes a modest contribution to 
the inquiry of geographical representations of film, wherein people, places, and events 
are positioned with political, cultural, and social representations, ideologies, images, 
and imaginations.  In turn, these representations, images and imaginations have 
geographical consequences and political implications. 
The second contribution of this study is that this research puts more emphasis on 
utilizing empirical perspectives to understanding the geopolitical dynamics of audience 
interpretations and their geographical meaning-making process in Turkish context.  
Audience studies in geography are an increasing trend especially following the 
paradigmatic change called the ‘cultural turn’ of late twentieth century (Scott 2004, 
Peckham 2004, Dittmer and Dodds 2008). Geographers began paying significant 
attention to incorporating everyday peoples’ everyday experiences and interpretations 
of the popularly consumed cultural products. However, geographers’ incorporation of 
audience into spatial studies is a recent development and quite limited. Primary 
concerns with film studies have been to discursively analyze and textually interpret 
selected films. Thus, this study offers an extensive and comprehensive investigation of 
audience reception utilizing and combining important elements of both qualitative and 
quantitative research techniques such as conducting a survey, organizing focus group 
discussions, interviews and online surveying of viewer comments to better understand 
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the dynamics of meaning-making process. In this sense, this study remains to be an 
important scholarly contribution to the general body of geography of audience studies.  
Another contribution of this study is that this research enriches a limited collection 
of scholarly work that has been devoted to focusing on geopolitical texts that are 
produced in the Middle East (Yanik 2009, Srinivasan 2006, Ghazi et al. 2006). 
Popularly produced western products (films, magazines, journals, cartoons, etc.) have 
received significant attention from geographers while alternatively and internationally 
produced peripheral productions are (inadvertently) excluded from scholarly 
examination and disciplinary attention. Even though a number of studies are devoted to 
internationally produced films, their point of analysis remained interpretative and 
lacked extensive fieldworks to bring the audience into the focus of the meaning-making 
process (Dittmer and Dodds 2008). Therefore, VWP as one of the internationally 
produced and consumed popular cultural products, should be considered an important 
example of visual texts for examination within this context while contributing to the 
literature in popular geopolitics and Turkish geopolitics.   
10.5 Future research  
This study examined a political-action film which is produced and circulated within 
particular time and space. Investigation of this film was limited to space with three 
Turkish cities with the exception of the survey portion of the study. Thus, future studies 
can extend both the duration of investigation and expand the geography of its 
consumption. For instance, the geography of consumption of the film VWP in Arab 
countries is yet to be explored. Given the volume of exportations of Turkish cinema 
products to Arab states, such an investigation surely would enrich audience studies that 
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highlight the interrelations between cinema and its transnational consumptions, 
geopolitical imaginations and representations. Of course, this may require academic 
collaboration.  
This study would also benefit from broadening audience sample groups, 
formulizing questionnaires and reorganizing ways of conducting face-to-face 
discussions. Due to lack of resources and time constrains, this study included only 
limited number of focus group participants as a representative of the entire population 
from three cities in Turkey. In the future, both Philo’s and Berry’s surveying (structured 
questions) and face-to-face focus group (semi-structured) sampling techniques can be 
applied to better understand audiences’ film interpretations. Structured questions help 
us understand the main dynamics of sample population in terms of their socio-cultural, 
political and economic backgrounds while semi-structured questions explore possible 
links between film, content of the film, and the nature of audience interpretations and 
beliefs. To do this, at least 13 focus groups should be organized, and each group should 
have minimum of 5 people organized as followed:  
1. Low-income males and females (similar occupation and city & 5-8 people) 
2. Low-income females (occupation/city & 5-8) 
3. Low-income males (occupation/city & 5-8) 
4. Students females (high school & 5-8) 
5. Students males (high school & 5-8) 
6. Students males and females (high school & 5-8) 
7. Students males (college/city & 5-8)  
8. Students females (college/city & 5-8)  
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9. Students males and females (college/city & 5-8)  
10. Middle-class females (occupation/city & 5-8) 
11. Middle-class males (occupation/city &5-8) 
12. Middle-class males and females (occupation/city &5-8) 
13. Elderly/retired males and females (occupation/city &5-8) 
 
 Criteria for selecting these participants would be more of a naturally occurring 
manner, meaning that these people would meet and speak with each other in the normal 
course of their lives. Again the rationale would be to identify the nature and source of 
audiences’ film interpretations and to better understand their consumption of space and 
place within film over a given time and space.   
Additionally, including interdisciplinary approaches and multidisciplinary 
scholars from different subject area of study would greatly enrich this study, and in turn, 
may promise much valid conclusions. Such cooperation can include cultural studies, 
broadcasting professionals, international area and film studies, etc. This means that 
different point of views will have to take part in the discussions and conversations 
which will ultimately lead to different ways of conceptualizing of audiences’ meaning-
making process and their role in materializing the competing geographical imaginaries 
in our geopolitical processes.  
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Popular Perceptions of the movie Valley of the Wolves – Palestine toward Turkey-
Israel relations and Turkey’s role in the Middle East: General public survey 
 
1- Gender 
 M               F               
2- Marital status 
  Single       Married    Divorced      Other……. 
3- Your age group 
 
a) 18 – 25 
 
b) 26 - 35 
 
c) 36 - 45               
 
d) 46 – 55 
 
e) 56 – 65 
 
f) 66 or older    
 
4- Which city do you live in? (please write only name of the country if you live 
abroad) 
a) ……….. 
 
5- Which one of the below describes you the best? 
 
a) Turkish  
b) Kurdish 
c) Turkic Republics 
d) Armenian 
e) Arab  
f) Bosnian 
g) Other (please specify)   
h) I don’t want to answer  
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6- Education level (If currently enrolled, mark the program that you are still in.) 
 
a) Primer School 
b) High School 
c) Two-year college 
d) Undergraduate 
e) Master 
f) Ph.D. 
 
7- Employment status?  
 
a) Government employee  
b) Private sector employee 
c) Employed in Education (academician, teacher, assistant, etc.)   
d) Self-employed 
e) Small shopkeeper (retailer, etc.) 
f) Housewife 
g) Farmer 
h) Student 
i) Labor 
j) Labor without a contract  
k) Unemployed 
l) Retired (government or private sector)  
m) Other 
 
8- Your world-view                        First Preference                Second Preference 
 
a) Secular                                    
b) Kemalist 
c) Nationalist 
d) Islamist 
e) Liberal 
f) Conservative 
g) Democrat 
h) Leftist 
i) Rightist  
j) I don’t want to answer 
k) Other -----------                                            
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9- How many hours do you watch television in a day?  
 
a) I don’t watch television 
b) Less than 2 hours 
c) 2-4 hours 
d) 4-6 hours  
e) More than 6 hours 
 
10- How many hours a day do you use internet excluding work-related usage times 
 
a) Less than 2 hours 
b) 2-4 hours 
c) 4-6 hours 
d) 6 and more 
 
11- How often do you watch films (in theaters, on TV, Internet, etc)?  
 
a) I don’t watch films 
b) 1-2 in a month 
c) 1-2 in a week 
d) 3-4 in a week 
e) 5 or more in a week 
 
12- How often do you read news about the Middle East (from newspapers, internet, 
etc.)? 
 
a) Everyday 
b) Several in a week 
c) Several in a month 
d) I don’t read 
 
13- In your opinion, which of the following best describes the problems between 
Israel and Palestine?  Strongly agree (5), agree (4), neutral (3), disagree (2), 
strongly disagree (1).   
 
a) Problem is the state of Israel                            5  4  3   2   1 
b) Problem is the Palestinian authorities              5  4  3   2   1  
c) Problem is Judaism                                          5  4  3   2    1 
d) Problem is Islam                                              5  4  3    2   1    
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e) Problem is America and Western Europe          5  4  3  2  1  
f) Problem is the Arab states                                  5  4  3  2  1  
g) Other   …………..                                              5  4  3  2  1  
 
14- Which state or international organization can be a fair mediator to solve the 
Israel-Palestine problem? 
 
a) The United Nations 
b) The European Union 
c) The United States 
d) Turkey 
e) The Arab states 
f) Russia 
g) China  
h) Israel-Palestine problem cannot be solved  
i) Israel and Palestine authorities only 
 
15- Do you think Turkey should become involved in the Israel-Palestine conflict? 
And if so, how should Turkey become involved? 
 
a) Turkey should support only Palestine side 
b) Turkey should support only Israel side 
c) Turkey should follow only the United Nations 
d) Turkey should follow only the European Union 
e) Turkey should stay neutral  
 
16- If you think that Turkey should involve in Israel-Palestine conflict, why do you 
think Turkey should become involved in the Israel-Palestinian conflict? The 
most important reason (5), important reason (4), moderately important (3), 
unimportant (2), least unimportant (1).  
 
a) Because Turkey and Palestine are Muslim states                      5  4  3  2  1            
b) Because Palestinian case is a human rights issue                      5  4  3  2  1 
c) Because Palestine is a former Ottoman territory                       5  4  3  2  1 
d) Because if Turkey wants to be a powerful actor in the region  5  4  3  2  1 
e) Because Palestine is a holy land for Muslims                           5  4  3  2  1 
f) Turkey should not involve in Israel-Palestine conflict              5  4  3  2  1 
g) Other………………                                                                  5  4  3  2  1 
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17- A fair solution to the Israel-Palestine conflict cannot be established in the 
absence of Turkey? Do you agree?  
 
a) Definitely agree 
b) Somewhat agree 
c) I am not sure 
d) Disagree 
e) Definitely disagree 
 
18- In your opinion, how do you describe the Mavi Marmara Gaza flotilla activists’ 
sailing to break the Gaza blockade? 
 
a) It was a human rights motivated movement 
b) It was a religious (Islam) motivated movement 
c) It was a nationalism motivated movement  
d) It was a violence motivated movement 
e) It was an anti-Semitism motivated movement 
 
19- In general, which of the following term best defines Israel – Turkey relations? 
 
a) Allies 
b) Friends 
c) Shared interests  
d) Enemies 
e) Other (please specify) ……………………. 
 
20- Please rate the following events in terms of affecting your opinion about Israel-
Turkey relations. Where 5 is very negatively effective and 1 is not very 
effective.  
                                                                                                   
a) Israel’s diplomatic assault to Turkish Ambassador                      5 4 3 2 1 
b) Israel’s killing nine Turkish citizens during Mavi Marmara raid 5 4 3 2 1 
c) Israel’s demolishing of Palestinian homes                                   5 4 3 2 1 
d) Israel’s embargo against the people of Gaza                                5 4 3 2 1  
e) Israel’s military threat to its neighbors                               5 4 3 2 1 
f) Other (please specify)……………..                                            5 4 3 2 1 
 
21- In terms of cultural closeness, where do you think Turkey belongs to? 
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a) Europe 
b) Middle East 
c) Caucasia and Central Asia 
d) Eurasia (Europe & Asia) 
e) Other 
 
This section asks about your opinions regarding the film Valley of the Wolves – 
Palestine.  
22- Have you watched the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine? 
 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) Never heard of it 
 
23- After watching the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine, has your perception 
toward Israel changed?  
 
a) After watching the film, my opinions toward Israel has changed 
negatively 
b) After watching the film, my opinions toward Israel has changed 
positively  
c) After watching the film, my negative opinions toward Israel has  stayed 
the same 
d) After watching the film, my positive opinions toward Israel has stayed 
the same 
e) I have no idea 
 
24- In your opinion, do you believe that the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine 
reflected reality? 
 
 a)  Definitely agree 
 b)  Somewhat agree 
  c)   Neutral  
 d)  Disagree 
 e)  Definitely Disagree          
 
 
25- Please rate the following scenes in terms of affecting your opinions about Israel 
where 5 is very effective and 1 is not very effective.  
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a) Mavi Marmara flotilla raid                                             5 4 3 2 1 
b) Handicapped child’s death                                 5 4 3 2 1     
c) Israeli soldiers’ shooting of handcuffed Palestinians        5 4 3 2 1     
d) Israeli soldiers’ raid in Palestinian homes                         5 4 3 2 1     
e) Moshe’s sniping an innocent civilian to test a weapon     5 4 3 2 1     
f) Other (please specify) ………….                                      5 4 3 2 1     
 
26- In your opinion, do you think that the film Valley of the Wolves- Palestine 
became the voice for Turkish peoples? 
 
a) Definitely Agree 
b) Somewhat agree  
c) Neutral 
d) Disagree 
e) Definitely Disagree 
 
27- Do you believe that the film mirrors the current government’s Middle East 
policies? 
 
a) Definitely Agree 
b) Somewhat agree  
c) Neutral 
d) Disagree 
e) Definitely Disagree 
 
28- Who is your favorite character in the film Valley of the Wolves-Palestine? 
a) Polat Alemdar 
b) Mose Ben Eliyezer 
c) Memati Bas 
d) Simone Levy  
e) Abdulhey Coban 
f) Abdullah (Palestinian)  
g) Other (please specify)  
 
29- Overall, how do you describe the film?      First Reference         Second 
Reference  
a) Realistic         0       0 
b) Provocative 
c) Fictional 
d) Anti-Semitic 
e) Nationalist 
f) Islamist 
g) Neutral  
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